Year:

  1.  3
    Guest Editor's Introduction to Book Symposium on The Heart of Human Rights, by Allen Buchanan.Lister Matthew - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 2017.
    For many years now Allen Buchanan has been one of the most important theorists working on the philosophy of human rights, producing a large number of papers and two books significantly devoted to the topic. In the work under consideration in this symposium, Buchanan breaks new ground by examining what he claims to be the “heart” of international human rights practice – the international legal human rights (“ILHR”) system, subjecting it to moral and philosophical analysis and criticism. Buchanan's book was (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  10
    What is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate.Alexander Brown - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (4):419-468.
    The issue of hate speech has received significant attention from legal scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast majority of this attention has been focused on presenting and critically evaluating arguments for and against hate speech bans as opposed to the prior task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate speech’ itself. This two-part article aims to put right that imbalance. It goes beyond legal texts and judgements and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an attempt to understand the general (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  1
    Comparative Desert Vs. Fairness.Gordon-Solmon Kerah - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (4):367-387.
    In the recent book The Geometry of Desert, Shelly Kagan explores, with a rare degree of precision, how best to cash out two fundamental and widely shared intuitions. The first intuition says that virtuous people deserve to be doing well, and that less virtuous people deserve to be doing less well – and thus, that it’s good if virtuous people are doing well and if less virtuous people are doing less well. The second intuition says that the distribution of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  3
    Drug Proscriptions as Proxy Crimes.Douglas Husak - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (4):345-366.
    Our drug policy has been widely deemed a failure because the criminalization of drug use has not succeeded in reducing prevalence rates. I contend that the most promising basis to defend the justifiability of drug offenses is to construe them as proxy crimes: offenses designed to prevent the commission of other, more serious crimes. I make a case that many law enforcement officials use drug proscriptions for this purpose in the real world. When construed as proxy crimes, drug prohibitions are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  6
    The Indivisibility of Human Rights.Ariel Zylberman - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (4):389-418.
    This article defends a novel, normative conception of the indivisibility of human rights. Human rights are indivisible because normative commitment to one mutually entails normative commitment to another. The normative conception enables us to defend three important theoretical and practical corollaries. First, as a conceptual thesis normative indivisibility lets us see how human rights constitute a unified system not liable to the typical counter-examples to indivisibility as mutual indispensability. Second, as a dialectical thesis, normative indivisibility can support linkage arguments in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  9
    Promises Schmomises.Heidi M. Hurd - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (3):279-343.
    In this piece, I argue that promises need not be kept just because they were made. This is not to say, however, that unwise, unhappy, and unfortunate promises do not generate obligations. When broken promises will result either in wrongful gains to promisors or wrongful losses to promisees, obligations of corrective justice will demand that such promises be kept if their breach cannot be fully repaired. Thus, when a broken promise will constitute a deliberate loss transfer for personal gain, the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  4
    The Service Conception: Just One Simple Question.Nikolas Kirby - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (3):255-278.
    It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least three conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condition’, the ‘independence condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’. The overarching rationale of these conditions is that they ensure that authority is only justified when it provides the best means for the subject to conform to the reasons for action that she actually has. However, it is difficult to clarify whether Raz implicitly presupposes a fourth necessary condition. This condition might be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  2
    Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty.Patrick Tomlin - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (3):225-254.
    Constrained instrumentalist theories of punishment – those that seek to justify punishment by its good effects, but limit its scope – are an attractive alternative to pure retributivism or utilitarianism. One way in which we may be able to limit the scope of instrumental punishment is by justifying punishment through the concept of duty. This strategy is most clearly pursued in Victor Tadros’ influential ‘Duty View’ of punishment. In this paper, I show that the Duty View as it stands cannot (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  7
    Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights.Brooke Ackerly - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (2):135-153.
    In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  5
    Reply to Talbott, Ackerly, Kelly, and Risse.Allen Buchanan - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (2):191-213.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  5
    Law and Institutional Legitimacy in the Practice of Human Rights.I. Kelly Erin - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (2):155-168.
    The Heart of Human Rights develops an account of human rights as legal entities that serve important moral purposes in a legitimate international human rights practice. This paper examines Allen Buchanan’s general concept of institutional legitimacy and aims to expand that concept by emphasizing its connection with several ideas developed in the book about the nature and function of a system of international human rights. When it incorporates those ideas, Buchanan’s ‘Metacoordination View’ can be seen to set a standard of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  5
    Guest Editor’s Introduction to Symposium on Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights.Lister Matthew - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (2):115-120.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  8
    Approaching Human Rights Law Philosophically: Reflections on Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights.Risse Mathias - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (2):169-190.
    I begin by summarizing some of the main features of Buchanan’s account. I argue next that his account gets no support from defeating his envisaged opponent, the Mirroring View of human rights. Then I discuss some general ideas about the concept and different conceptions of human rights before introducing my own conception and explaining why I think it has certain advantages over Buchanan’s. In particular, my account is better suited for the intellectual engagement with China that philosophers should contribute to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  5
    A Social Practice Prioritarian Response to Allen Buchanan’s The Heart of Human Rights.J. Talbott William - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (2):121-133.
    Allen Buchanan’s ‘The Heart of Human Rights’ addresses the moral justification of the international legal human rights system. Buchanan identifies two functions of the ILHRS: a well-being function and a status egalitarian function. Because Buchanan assumes that the well-being function is sufficientarian, he augments it with a status egalitarian function. However, if the well-being function is utilitarian or prioritarian, there is no need for a separate status egalitarian function, because the status egalitarian function can be subsumed by the utilitarian or (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  14
    Democratic Authority and Respect for the Law.Harrison Frye & George Klosko - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (1):1-23.
    In recent years, scholars have argued that democratic provenance of law establishes moral requirements to obey it. We argue against this view, claiming that, rather than establishing moral requirements to obey the law, democratic provenance grounds only requirements to respect it. Establishing what we view as this more plausible account makes clear not only exactly what democracy itself contributes to requirements to obey the law but also important difficulties proponents of democratic authority must overcome in order successfully to make their (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  12
    Why More Choice is Sometimes Worse Than Less.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (1):25-44.
    In this paper, I shall argue that personal autonomy requires the availability of an adequate range of valuable options from which to choose, but that the availability of a larger rather than a smaller set of valuable options can be inimical to, rather than supportive, of autonomy.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  13
    Punishment as Moral Fortification.Jeffrey W. Howard - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (1):45-75.
    The proposal that the criminal justice system should focus on rehabilitation – rather than retribution, deterrence, or expressive denunciation – is among the least popular ideas in legal philosophy. Foremost among rehabilitation’s alleged weaknesses is that it views criminals as blameless patients to be treated, rather than culpable moral agents to be held accountable. This article offers a new interpretation of the rehabilitative approach that is immune to this objection and that furnishes the moral foundation that this approach has lacked. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  14
    When the Risk of Harm Harms.Adriana Placani - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (1):77-100.
    This essay answers two questions that continue to drive debate in moral and legal philosophy; namely, ‘Is a risk of harm a wrong?’ and ‘Is a risk of harm a harm?’. The essay’s central claim is that to risk harm can be both to wrong and to harm. This stands in contrast to the respective positions of Heidi Hurd and Stephen Perry, whose views represent prominent extremes in this debate about risks. The essay shows that there is at least one (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues