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  1.  22
    Against Logical Inferentialism.Nick Zangwill - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 255 (255):275-287.
    I argue against inferentialism about logic. First, I argue against an analogy between logic and chess, before considering a more basic objection to stipulating inference rules as a way of establishing the meaning of logical constants. The objectionthe Mushroom Omelette Objectionis that stipulative acts are partly constituted by logical notions, and therefore cannot be used to explain logical thought. I then argue that the same problem also attaches to following existing conventional rules, since either those rules have logical contents, or (...)
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  2.  89
    Van Fraassen’s Best of a Bad Lot Objection, IBE and Rationality.Michael J. Shaffer - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 255:267-273.
    Van Fraassen’s (1989) infamous best of a bad lot objection is widely taken to be the most serious problem that afflicts theories of inference to the best explanation (IBE), for it alleges to show that we should not accept the conclusion of any case of such reasoning as it actually proceeds. Moreover, this is supposed to be the case irrespective of the details of the particular criteria used to select best explanations. The best of a bad lot objection is predicated (...)
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  3. Mathematical Counterfactuals with Number-Theoretic Antecedents and Extra-Mathematical Explanation.Lars Arthur Tump - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 254:191-213.
    A proposal by Baron, Colyvan, and Ripley to extend the counterfactual theory of explanation to include counterfactual reasoning about mathematical explanations of physical facts is discussed. Their suggestion is that the explanatory role of mathematics can best be captured counterfactually. This paper focuses on their example with a number-theoretic antecedent. Incorporating discussions on the structure and de re knowledge of numbers, it is argued that the approach leads to a change in the structure of numbers. As a result, the counterfactual (...)
     
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  4.  3
    Frege, Peano and the Construction of a Logical Calculus.Joan Bertran San Millán - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 253:3-22.
    In contemporary historical studies Peano is usually linked to the logical tradition pioneered by Frege. In this paper I question this association. Specifically, I claim that Frege and Peano developed significantly different conceptions of a logical calculus. First, I clam that while Frege put the systematisation of the notion of inference at the forefront of his construction of an axiomatic logical system, Peano modelled his early logical systems as mathematical calculi and did not really attempt to justify reasoning. Second, I (...)
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  5.  65
    The Vienna Circle’s Responses to Lebensphilosophie.Andreas Vrahimis - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 253:43-66.
    The history of early analytic philosophy, and especially the work of the logical empiricists, has often been seen as involving antagonisms with rival schools. Though recent scholarship has interrogated the Vienna Circle’s relations with e.g. phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism, important works by some of its leading members are involved in responding to the rising tide of Lebensphilosophie. This paper will explore Carnap’s configuration of the relation between Lebensphilosophie and the overcoming of metaphysics, Schlick’s responses to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and Neurath’s reaction (...)
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  6.  25
    Traditional Epistemology and Epistemology Naturalized.Matt Carlson - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 1 (456):449-466.
    In this paper, I develop a new interpretation of Quine’s epistemology in the hopes of clarifying the relationship between naturalized epistemology and traditional epistemology. Quine’s naturalized epistemology is commonly criticized on the grounds that it amounts to giving up on traditional epistemological projects in favor of projects in natural science. But, I argue, this criticism rests on a mistaken interpretation of Quine’s epistemology. This is because Quine’s naturalized epistemology retains an important meliorative component; part of its aim is to improve (...)
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