10 found

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  1.  13
    A Neo-Armstrongian Defense of States of Affairs: A Reply to Vallicella.Katarina Perovic - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (2):143-161.
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  2.  57
    A Refutation of the Lewis-Stalnaker Analysis of Counterfactuals.Marcus Arvan - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (1):109-129.
    The standard philosophical analysis of counterfactual conditionals—the Lewis-Stalnaker analysis—analyzes the truth-conditions of counterfactuals in terms of nearby possible worlds. This paper demonstrates that this analysis is false. §1 shows that it is a serious epistemic and metaphysical possibility that our “world” is a massive computer simulation, and that if the Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals is correct, then it should extend seamlessly to the case that our world is a computer simulation, in the form of a possible-simulation semantics. §2 then shows, (...)
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  3. Why Realists Need Tropes.Markku Keinänen, Jani Hakkarainen & Antti Keskinen - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (1):69-85.
    We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by tropes and characterization or inherence between tropes and objects are more (...)
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  4.  42
    A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (1):1-18.
    In this paper I shall “draw” a sketch of a version of Meinongian Presentism. After having briefly presented some data that presentists need to explain and three problems that typically affect presentism (the triviality objection, the problem of the reference of true propositions’ constituents that seem to involve merely past and merely future objects, the truthmaking problem), I shall clarify the bases of my theory. First, I shall reject the actualist presentist assumption, according to which there are no things that (...)
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  5. Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity.Jeremy Fantl - 2016 - Metaphysica 17.
    Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remaining (...)
     
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  6.  3
    Worlds, Triangles and Bolts: Reply to Nulty.Julien Beillard - 2016 - Metaphysica.
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  7.  4
    Powers, Double Prevention and Mental Causation.Kim Davies - 2016 - Metaphysica.
  8.  3
    Super-Truth & Direct Reference.John Gabriel - 2016 - Metaphysica.
  9.  4
    The Largest Proper Parts of a Mereological Whole: A Refutation of Classical Extensional Mereology.Patrick Monaghan - 2016 - Metaphysica.
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  10.  4
    Where Are Universals?Howard Peacock - 2016 - Metaphysica.
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