68 found

Year:

  1.  58
    Recent Work in African Philosophy: Its Relevance Beyond the Continent.Thaddeus Metz - 2020 - Mind 130.
    In this article I critically discuss some recent English language books in African philosophy. Specifically, I expound and evaluate key claims from books published by sub-Saharan thinkers since 2017 that address epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory and that do so in ways of interest to an audience of at least Anglo-American-Australasian analytic philosophers. My aim is not to establish a definitive conclusion about these claims, but rather to facilitate cross-cultural engagement by highlighting their relevance particularly to many western philosophers and (...)
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  2.  79
    Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable.Arif Ahmed & Jack Spencer - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1157-1192.
    This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as we show, if options have objective values and evidential decision theory is true, then it is not always rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely (...)
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  3. Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.
    There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has. Call this substantive rationality. In another sense, to be rational is to be coherent, or to have the right structural relations hold between one’s mental states, independently of whether those attitudes are justified. Call this structural rationality. According to the standard view, structural rationality is associated with a distinctive (...)
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  4.  91
    Evaluative Discourse and Affective States of Mind.Nils Franzén - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1095-1126.
    It is widely held within contemporary metaethics that there is a lack of linguistic support for evaluative expressivism. On the contrary, it seems that the predictions that expressivists make about evaluative discourse are not borne out. An instance of this is the so-called problem of missing Moorean infelicity. Expressivists maintain that evaluative statements express non-cognitive states of mind in a similar manner to how ordinary descriptive language expresses beliefs. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of being in (...)
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  5.  14
    Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-Examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy, by Oskari Kuusela. [REVIEW]Martin Gustafsson - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1303-1311.
    Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy, by KuuselaOskari. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xi + 297.
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  6.  81
    The Structure of Bias.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1193-1236.
    What is a bias? Standard philosophical views of both implicit and explicit bias focus this question on the representations one harbours, for example, stereotypes or implicit attitudes, rather than the ways in which those representations are manipulated. I call this approach representationalism. In this paper, I argue that representationalism taken as a general theory of psychological social bias is a mistake, because it conceptualizes bias in ways that do not fully capture the phenomenon. Crucially, this view fails to capture a (...)
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  7.  15
    The Significance of the New Logic, by W. V. Quine.Gary Kemp - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1320-1327.
    The Significance of the New Logic, by QuineW. V. Edited and translated by Walter Carnielli, Frederique Janssen-Lauret, and William Pickering. Introduced by the editors with a scholarly essay by Frederique Janssen-Lauret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xxv + 217.
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  8.  27
    What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?James Kinkaid - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1009-1031.
    The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between (...)
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  9.  6
    Human Being, Bodily Being: Phenomenology From Classical India, by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad.Catherine Prueitt - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1291-1303.
    In the matter of the body, even comparative language—the very use of English today—is soaked through and through with the Cartesian version of the intuition of dualism: the idea that we are fundamentally a mind and a body that must be either related ingeniously, or else reduced to one another. Instead, by deliberately looking at genres that pertain to other aspects of being human, I seek to go deeper into texts that simply start elsewhere than with intuitions of dualism, even (...)
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  10.  43
    Equal Opportunities in Newcomb’s Problem and Elsewhere.Arif Ahmed - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):867-886.
    The paper discusses Ian Wells’s recent argument that there is a decision problem in which followers of Evidential Decision Theory end up poorer than followers of Causal Decision Theory despite having the same opportunities for money. It defends Evidential Decision Theory against Wells’s argument, on the following grounds. Wells's has not presented a decision problem in which his main claim is true. Four possible decision problems can be generated from his central example, in each of which followers of Evidential Decision (...)
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  11. Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories, by Ásta. [REVIEW]Elizabeth Barnes & Matthew Andler - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):939-947.
    Categories We Live by: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories, by Ásta. Oxford: OUP, 2018. Pp. 160.
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  12.  50
    The Rationally Supererogatory.Claire Benn & Adam Bales - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):917-938.
    The notion of supererogation—going above and beyond the call of duty—is typically discussed in a moral context. However, in this paper we argue for the existence of rationally supererogatory actions: that is, actions that go above and beyond the call of rational duty. In order to establish the existence of such actions, we first need to overcome the so-called paradox of supererogation: we need to provide some explanation for why, if some act is rationally optimal, it is not the case (...)
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  13. What the Future ‘Might’ Brings.David Boylan - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):809-829.
    This paper concerns a puzzle about the interaction of epistemic modals and future tense. In cases of predictable forgetfulness, speakers cannot describe their future states of mind with epistemic modals under future tense, but promising theories of epistemic modals do not predict this. In §1, I outline the puzzle. In §2, I argue that it undermines a very general approach to epistemic modals that draws a tight connection between epistemic modality and evidence. In §3, I defend the assumption that tense (...)
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  14. Grading Modal Judgement.Nate Charlow - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):769-807.
    This paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgment. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgments of probability targeting epistemically modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming: (1) Moss (2015), in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgments of probability targeting a “proxy” proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief (...)
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  15. Thinking and Being, by Irad Kimhi.Adrian Haddock - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):974-983.
    _ Thinking and Being _, by KimhiIrad. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. xx + 166.
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  16.  37
    The Quality of Life: Aristotle Revised, by Richard Kraut.Daniel M. Haybron - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):947-956.
    The Quality of Life: Aristotle Revised, by KrautRichard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 249.
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  17. Knowledge From Vice: Deeply Social Epistemology.Neil Levy & Mark Alfano - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):887-915.
    In the past two decades, epistemologists have significantly expanded the focus of their field. To the traditional question that has dominated the debate — under what conditions does belief amount to knowledge? — they have added questions about testimony, epistemic virtues and vices, epistemic trust, and more. This broadening of the range of epistemic concern has coincided with an expansion in conceptions of epistemic agency beyond the individualism characteristic of most earlier epistemology. We believe that these developments have not gone (...)
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  18.  28
    Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by Susanne Mantel.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):983-990.
    Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by MantelSusanne. New York and London: Routledge, 2018. Pp. xiii + 190.
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  19. On the Possibility of Hallucinations.Farid Masrour - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):737-768.
    Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A (...)
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  20. Language Loss and Illocutionary Silencing.Ethan Nowak - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):831-865.
    The twenty-first century will witness an unprecedented decline in the diversity of the world’s languages. While most philosophers will likely agree that this decline is lamentable, the question of what exactly is lost with a language has not been systematically explored in the philosophical literature. In this paper, I address this lacuna by arguing that language loss constitutes a problematic form of illocutionary silencing. When a language disappears, past and present speakers lose the ability to realize a range of speech (...)
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  21. Against Person Essentialism.Eric T. Olson* & Karsten Witt - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):715-735.
    It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.
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  22.  86
    A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology, by Robert Brandom.Terry Pinkard - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):990-999.
    A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology, by BrandomRobert. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019. pp. xiv + 836.
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  23. From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy.Matthieu Queloz - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):683-714.
    Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have?? To answer this question, I compare the method of pragmatic genealogy advocated by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker—a method whose singular combination of fictionalising and historicising has met with suspicion—with the simpler method of paradigm-based explanation. Fricker herself has recently moved towards paradigm-based explanation, arguing that it is (...)
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  24.  51
    Probabilistic Knowledge, by Sarah Moss. [REVIEW]Bernhard Salow - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):999-1008.
    Probabilistic Knowledge, by MossSarah. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 288.
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  25. Vices of the Mind, by Quassim Cassam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019 [Book Review]. [REVIEW]Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):959-964.
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  26.  10
    Vices of the Mind, by Quassim Cassam.Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):959-964.
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  27.  40
    The Fifth Corner of Four: An Essay on Buddhist Metaphysics and the Catuṣkoṭi, by Graham Priest.Jan Westerhoff - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):965-974.
    _ The Fifth Corner of Four: An Essay on Buddhist Metaphysics and the Catuṣkoṭi _, by PriestGraham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 208.
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  28.  85
    Counterfactual Scheming.Sam Baron - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):535-562.
    Mathematics appears to play a genuine explanatory role in science. But how do mathematical explanations work? Recently, a counterfactual approach to mathematical explanation has been suggested. I argue that such a view fails to differentiate the explanatory uses of mathematics within science from the non-explanatory uses. I go on to offer a solution to this problem by combining elements of the counterfactual theory of explanation with elements of a unification theory of explanation. The result is a theory according to which (...)
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  29. Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.
    Martin Smith has recently proposed, in this journal, a novel and intriguing approach to puzzles and paradoxes in evidence law arising from the evidential standard of the Preponderance of the Evidence. According to Smith, the relation of normic support provides us with an elegant solution to those puzzles. In this paper I develop a counterexample to Smith’s approach and argue that normic support can neither account for our reluctance to base affirmative verdicts on bare statistical evidence nor resolve the pertinent (...)
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  30. Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):579-584.
    Self-locating beliefs cause a problem for conditionalization. Miriam Schoenfield offers a solution: that on learning E, agents should update on the fact that they learned E. However, Schoenfield is not explicit about whether the fact that they learned E is self-locating. I will argue that if the fact that they learned E is self-locating then the original problem has not been addressed, and if the fact that they learned E is not self-locating then the theory generates implausible verdicts which Schoenfield (...)
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  31.  44
    Zahavi’s Husserl and the Legacy of Phenomenology: A Critical Notice of Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, by Dan Zahavi.David R. Cerbone - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):603-620.
    As the title – Husserl’s Legacy – and subtitle – Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy – make clear, Dan Zahavi’s new book is centrally concerned with developing and defending a particular account of Husserl’s legacy. Rather than tracing lines of influence or measuring the impact of various of Husserl’s ideas, Zahavi is interested in Husserl’s legacy in a different and more demanding sense that pertains to what he refers to as ‘the overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology’. He is (...)
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  32.  37
    To Shape a New World, Tommie Shelby and Brandon Terry.Myisha Cherry - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):656-664.
    To Shape a New World, ShelbyTommie and TerryBrandon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 449.
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  33. A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1.Alix Cohen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):429-460.
    The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...)
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  34. The Reduction of Necessity to Essence.Andreas Ditter - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):351-380.
    In `Essence and Modality', Kit Fine proposes that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever. Call this view Fine's Thesis. This paper is a study of Fine's Thesis in the context of Fine's logic of essence (LE). Fine himself has offered his most elaborate defense of the thesis in the context of LE. His defense rests on the widely shared assumption that metaphysical necessity obeys the (...)
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  35.  56
    Learning From Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.
    In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is (...)
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  36.  38
    Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.
    The traditional epistemological approach towards judgments like BACHELORS ARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE is that they are justified or known on the basis of understanding alone. In this paper, I develop an understanding-based account which takes understanding to be a sufficient source of epistemic justification for the relevant judgments. Understanding-based accounts face the problem of the rational revisability of almost all human judgments. Williamson has recently developed a reinforced version of this problem: the challenge from expert revisability. This (...)
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  37.  32
    Monads, Composition, and Force: Ariadnean Threads Through Leibniz’s Labyrinth, by Richard Arthur. [REVIEW]Julia Jorati - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):664-673.
    Monads, Composition, and Force: Ariadnean Threads through Leibniz’s Labyrinth, by ArthurRichard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. ix + 329.
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  38.  24
    Compassionate Moral Realism, by Colin Marshall.Heidi L. Maibom - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):631-631.
    Compassionate Moral Realism, by MarshallColin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 265 + xi.
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  39.  18
    Rethinking Existentialism, by Jonathan Webber.Katherine J. Morris - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):638-646.
    Rethinking Existentialism, by WebberJonathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 229.
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  40. Unable to Do the Impossible.Anthony Nguyen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):585-602.
    Jack Spencer has recently argued for the striking thesis that, possibly, an agent is able to do the impossible—that is, perform an action that is metaphysically impossible for that person to perform. Spencer bases his argument on (Simple G), a case in which it is impossible for an agent G to perform some action but, according to Spencer, G is still intuitively able to perform that action. I reply that we would have to give up at least four action-theoretical principles (...)
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  41.  19
    What a Philosopher Is: Becoming Nietzsche, by Laurence Lampert.Antoine Panaïoti - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):621-631.
    What a Philosopher Is: Becoming Nietzsche, by LampertLaurence. London: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. x + 349.
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  42. Synonymy Between Token-Reflexive Expressions.Alexandru Radulescu - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):381–399.
    Synonymy, at its most basic, is sameness of meaning. A token-reflexive expression is an expression whose meaning assigns a referent to its tokens by relating each particular token of that particular expression to its referent. In doing so, the formulation of its meaning mentions the particular expression whose meaning it is. This seems to entail that no two token-reflexive expressions are synonymous, which would constitute a strong objection against token-reflexive semantics. In this paper, I propose and defend a notion of (...)
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  43.  45
    Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account, by Øystein Linnebo.J. P. Studd - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):646-656.
    Thin Objects: Anionist Account, by LinneboØystein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xviii + 238.
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  44.  10
    Descartes, Malebranche, and the Crisis of Perception, by Walter Ott.Anik Waldow - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):673-681.
    Descartes, Malebranche, and the Crisis of Perception, by OttWalter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 272.
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  45. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, by Herman Cappelen. [REVIEW]Derek Ball - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):245-256.
    Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, by CappelenHerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 212.
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  46.  31
    True Enough, by Catherine Z. Elgin.John Bengson - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):256-268.
    True Enough, by ElginCatherine Z. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. Pp. 352.
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  47. Naturalness as a Constraint on Priors.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):179-203.
    Many epistemological problems can be solved by the objective Bayesian view that there are rationality constraints on priors, that is, inductive probabilities. But attempts to work out these constraints have run into such serious problems that many have rejected objective Bayesianism altogether. I argue that the epistemologist should borrow the metaphysician’s concept of naturalness and assign higher priors to more natural hypotheses.
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  48. A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.
    Our evidence can be about different subject matters. In fact, necessarily equivalent pieces of evidence can be about different subject matters. Does the hyperintensionality of ‘aboutness’ engender any hyperintensionality at the level of rational credence? In this paper, I present a case which seems to suggest that the answer is ‘yes’. In particular, I argue that our intuitive notions of independent evidence and inadmissible evidence are sensitive to aboutness in a hyperintensional way. We are thus left with a paradox. While (...)
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  49. How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head.Chad Carmichael - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):205-224.
    The ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon has given rise to a surprising array of apparently implausible views. For example, in order to solve the puzzle, several philosophers have been led to deny the existence of their own feet, others have denied that objects can gain and lose parts, and large numbers of philosophers have embraced the thesis that distinct objects can occupy the same space, having all their material parts in common. In this paper, I argue for an alternative (...)
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  50.  27
    Knowledge and Truth in Plato: Stepping Past the Shadow of Socrates, by Catherine Rowett.Sophie Grace Chappell - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):291-299.
    Knowledge and Truth in Plato: Stepping Past the Shadow of Socrates, by RowettCatherine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 305.
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  51.  29
    The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought, by Michael D. K. Ing.Julianne N. Chung - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):299-307.
    The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought, by IngMichael D. K.. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. x + 293.
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  52.  30
    Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets Duhem.Eleonora Cresto & Diego Tajer - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):71-111.
    In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as ‘voters’ in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters, provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow’s theorem applies to the amalgamation of (...)
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  53.  96
    We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.David Faraci - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):225-234.
    Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective (...)
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  54.  84
    The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg. [REVIEW]Craig French - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):339-349.
    The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by SchellenbergSusanna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 272.
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  55.  26
    How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, by Shannon Spaulding. [REVIEW]Mikkel Gerken - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):268-275.
    How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, by SpauldingShannon. NY: Routledge, 2018. Pp. ix + 102.
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  56. Updating Data Semantics.Anthony S. Gillies - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):1-41.
    This paper has three main goals. First, to motivate a puzzle about how ignorance-expressing terms like maybe and if interact: they iterate, and when they do they exhibit scopelessness. Second, to argue that there is an ambiguity in our theoretical toolbox, and that exposing that opens the door to a solution to the puzzle. And third, to explore the reach of that solution. Along the way, the paper highlights a number of pleasing properties of two elegant semantic theories, explores some (...)
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  57. Composition and the Logic of Location: An Argument for Regionalism.Cody Gilmore & Matt Leonard - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):159-178.
    Ned Markosian has recently defended a new theory of composition, which he calls regionalism : some material objects xx compose something if and only if there is a material object located at the fusion of the locations of xx. Markosian argues that regionalism follows from what he calls the subregion theory of parthood. Korman and Carmichael agree. We provide countermodels to show that regionalism does not follow from, even together with fourteen potentially implicit background principles. We then show that regionalism (...)
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  58.  43
    Reconceiving Spinoza, by Samuel Newlands.Karolina Hübner & Róbert Mátyási - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):307-314.
    Reconceiving Spinoza, by Samuel Newlands. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 283.
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  59.  68
    Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, by Mark Kaplan.Guy Longworth - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):323-331.
    _ Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method _, by KaplanMark. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 192.
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  60.  28
    Critique of Forms of Life, by Rahel Jaeggi, Trans. Ciaran Cronin.Andreja Novakovic - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):283-290.
    Critique of Forms of Life, by JaeggiRahel, trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. xx + 395.
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  61.  36
    Form, Matter, Substance, by Kathrin Koslicki.Michail Peramatzis - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):235-245.
    _ Form, Matter, Substance _, by KoslickiKathrin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xiii + 273.
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  62. A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.
    Hybrid metaethical theories have significant promise; they would have important upshots if they were true. But they also face severe problems. The problems are severe enough to make many philosophers doubt that they could be true. My ambition is to show that the problems are just instances of a highly general problem: a problem about what are sometimes called ‘intensional anaphora'. I'll also show that any adequate explanation of intensional anaphora immediately solves all the problems for the hybrid theorist. We (...)
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  63. Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem.Abelard Podgorski - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):43-70.
    In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to (...)
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  64.  49
    Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, by Jonathan Dancy.A. W. Price - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):314-323.
    _ Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning _, by DancyJonathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xiii + 185.
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  65. As If: Idealization and Ideals, by Kwame Anthony Appiah.Adam Toon - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):275-283.
    As If: Idealization and Ideals, by AppiahKwame Anthony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. xvi + 218.
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  66.  77
    Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, by Jean-Paul Sartre, Translated by Sarah Richmond. [REVIEW]Jonathan Webber - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):332-339.
    Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, by SartreJean-Paul, translated by Sarah Richmond. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. Pp. xlvii + 848.
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    Review of Douglas Ehring, Tropes. [REVIEW]Jessica M. Wilson - 2020 - Mind:1-12.
    Tropes is a systematic investigation into the metaphysics of properties, aiming to motivate and defend trope theory, and more specifically Natural Class Trope Nominalism (NCTN). Ehring’s book treats an impressive span of relevant positions, considerations, debates and objections with charity and clarity; it’s also a real page-turner, at least if one has (as I do) a taste for analytic twists and turns.
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  68. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, by Christine M. Korsgaard.Andrew Chignell - 2020 - Mind.
    A review of "Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals," by Christine M. Korsgaard. New York: Oxford, 2018. Pp. 271.
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