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  1.  3
    Fodor on Imagistic Mental Representations.Daniel C. Burnston - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):71-94.
    : Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic representation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a particular (...)
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  2. Explanatory Organization and Psychiatric Resilience: Challenges to a Mechanistic Approach to Mental Disorders.Raffaella Campaner - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):128-144.
    : This contribution aims to address epistemological issues at the crossroads of philosophy of science and psychiatry by reflecting on the notions of organization and resilience. Referring to the debate on the notion of “organization” and its explanatory relevance in philosophical neo-mechanistic theories, I consider how such positions hold up when tentatively applied to the mental health context. More specifically, I show how reflections on psychiatric resilience, cognitive reserve, and accommodation strategies challenge attempts to embrace a mechanistic perspective on mental (...)
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  3. Defense Mechanisms: From the Individual to the Collective Level.Rossella Guerini & Massimo Marraffa - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):95-112.
    : In this article we shall deal with the construction and defense of subjective identity as a topic at the intersection of psychology and anthropology. In this perspective, defense mechanisms are seen as falling along a spectrum that stretches from the individual to the collective level. The individual mind is the sphere of the intrapsychic defenses and the interpersonal maneuvers to which each of us appeals, in the relationship with other people and with one’s own environment, to defend one’s own (...)
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  4.  1
    Coping with Informational Atomism - One of Jerry Fodor’s Legacies.Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):19-41.
    : Fodor was passionately unwilling to compromise. Of his several commitments, I focus here on informational atomism. Fodor staunchly rejected semantic holism for two conspiring reasons. He took it to threaten his commitment to the nomic character of psychological explanation. He also took it to pave the way towards relativism, which he found deeply offensive. In this paper, I reconstruct the strands of Fodor’s commitment to the computational version of the representational theory of mind that led him to informational atomism. (...)
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  5. When the Selfing Process Goes Wrong: Social-Biofeedback, Causal Mechanisms, and Pathological Narcissism.Cristina Meini - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):113-127.
    : In direct opposition to the dominant nativist perspective tracing back to Descartes, William James suggested that the sense of self is constructed through a never-ending process of reflexivity. In more recent years, empirical data from various psychological domains have further strengthened this constructivist perspective. Notably, Gergely and Watson’s social biofeedback model has been proposed as a central mechanism in the development of emotional introspection, which itself constitutes a crucial step in the process leading to a mature sense of self. (...)
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  6. Recensione di S. Caputo, C. Barbero, Significato. Dalla filosofia analitica alle scienze cognitive.Elisa Paganini - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):145-147.
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  7. Recensione di M. Ienca, Intelligenza2. Per un'unione di intelligenza naturale e artificiale.Paolo Petricca - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):147-149.
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  8.  1
    Minds with Meanings.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):1-18.
    : Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn have proposed a purely referential-causal semantics, a semantics without meanings. Adopting Pylyshyn’s previous treatment of the fact that we can perceive and track something before we have any idea of what that is, these authors claim that such causal relations to external entities allow us to word-label them and thereby build an entire lexicon with specific referents. I disagree and explain why I do so. The kind of semantics that I prefer is radically opposite: (...)
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  9. Object Individuation by Iconic Content: How is Numerosity Represented in Iconic Representation?Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1):42-70.
    : Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for object individuation, but it represents instead conglomerations of properties and (...)
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