13 found

Year:

  1. Inductive Knowledge.Andrew Bacon - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):354-388.
    This paper formulates some paradoxes of inductive knowledge. Two responses in particular are explored: According to the first sort of theory, one is able to know in advance that certain observations will not be made unless a law exists. According to the other, this sort of knowledge is not available until after the observations have been made. Certain natural assumptions, such as the idea that the observations are just as informative as each other, the idea that they are independent, and (...)
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  2. What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.
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  3. Spatiotemporal Functionalism V. The Conceivability of Zombies.David J. Chalmers - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):488-497.
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  4.  41
    The Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence.Volker Halbach - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):431-450.
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  5.  63
    Praiseworthy Motivations.Zoë A. Johnson King - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):408-430.
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    Praiseworthy Motivations.Zoë A. Johnson King - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):408-430.
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  7. Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1.William MacAskill & Toby Ord - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):327-353.
    This paper argues in favor of a particular account of decision‐making under normative uncertainty: that, when it is possible to do so, one should maximize expected choice‐worthiness. Though this position has been often suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favor. After dealing with some preliminaries and giving the basic motivation for taking normative uncertainty into account in our decision‐making, we (...)
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  8. Perceptual Variation and Structuralism.John Morrison - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):290-326.
  9.  62
    Chalmers V Chalmers.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):469-487.
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  10. Killing Kripkenstein's Monster.Jared Warren - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):257-289.
    Here I defend dispositionalism about meaning and rule-following from Kripkenstein's infamous anti-dispositionalist arguments. The problems of finitude, error, and normativity are all addressed. The general lesson I draw is that Kripkenstein's arguments trade on an overly simplistic version of dispositionalism.
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  11.  75
    Anthropic Concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):451-468.
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  12.  80
    The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.
    The Luck Objection is an influential family of challenges to libertarianism. In recent years, discussions of the Luck Objection have reached an impasse of sorts. On one hand, existing responses to the objection have failed to satisfy libertarianism’s many critics. On the other hand, a growing number of libertarians seem unimpressed by existing formulations of the objection. To break the impasse, I present a two-stage version of the objection. The first stage has the limited objective of showing that supposed exercises (...)
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  13.  72
    Mental Structures.Kevin J. Lande - 2020 - Noûs.
    An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle (...)
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