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  1.  76
    The Cognitive Integration of Scientific Instruments: Information, Situated Cognition, and Scientific Practice.Richard Heersmink - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):1-21.
    Researchers in the biological and biomedical sciences, particularly those working in laboratories, use a variety of artifacts to help them perform their cognitive tasks. This paper analyses the relationship between researchers and cognitive artifacts in terms of integration. It first distinguishes different categories of cognitive artifacts used in biological practice on the basis of their informational properties. This results in a novel classification of scientific instruments, conducive to an analysis of the cognitive interactions between researchers and artifacts. It then uses (...)
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  2.  37
    Framing a Phenomenological Interview: What, Why and How.Simon Høffding & Kristian Martiny - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):539-564.
    Research in phenomenology has benefitted from using exceptional cases from pathology and expertise. But exactly how are we to generate and apply knowledge from such cases to the phenomenological domain? As researchers of cerebral palsy and musical absorption, we together answer the how question by pointing to the resource of the qualitative interview. Using the qualitative interview is a direct response to Varela’s call for better pragmatics in the methodology of phenomenology and cognitive science and Gallagher’s suggestion for phenomenology to (...)
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  3.  8
    The Enactive Approach and Disorders of the Self - the Case of Schizophrenia.Miriam Kyselo - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):591-616.
    The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack an account of how 1st (...)
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  4.  22
    Eidetic Results in Transcendental Phenomenology: Against Naturalization.Richard Tieszen - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):489-515.
    In this paper I contrast Husserlian transcendental eidetic phenomenology with some other views of what phenomenology is supposed to be and argue that, as eidetic, it does not admit of being ‘naturalized’ in accordance with standard accounts of naturalization. The paper indicates what some of the eidetic results in phenomenology are and it links these to the employment of reason in philosophical investigation, as distinct from introspection, emotion or empirical observation. Eidetic phenomenology, unlike cognitive science, should issue in a ‘logic’ (...)
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  5.  17
    Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias , Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW]Rami Ali - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):455-460.
    Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of perceptual (...)
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  6.  21
    Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior.Alejandro Arango - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):403-422.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  7.  37
    Theories of Apparent Motion.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):337-358.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially presented and spatially separated stimuli give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose the shortcomings of the explanations provided for apparent (...)
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  8.  6
    Connecting Emotions and Words: The Referential Process.Wilma Bucci, Bernard Maskit & Sean Murphy - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):359-383.
    This paper outlines the process of verbal communication of emotion as this occurs through the phases of the referential process, including arousal of an emotion schema; detailed and specific descriptions of images and episodes that are exemplars of emotion schemas; and reflection and reorganization, which may include emotion labels and other types of categorical terms. The concepts of emotion schemas and the referential process are defined in the theoretical framework of multiple code theory which includes subsymbolic sensory, visceral and motoric (...)
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  9.  3
    Achim Stephan, Sven Walter , Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft.Radoslaw Martin Cichy - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):461-466.
  10.  15
    Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve , Collective Emotions: Perspectives From Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology. [REVIEW]Tom Cochrane - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):467-473.
    Review of OUP volume on collective emotions which provides a taxonomy of the different theories, raising potential objections for each.
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  11.  18
    On Projecting and Willing: A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Intentions.Erol Copelj - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):385-401.
    This work is best described as an endeavour to contribute to the phenomenology of intentions, the experiences of intending to do something. It finds its point of departure in the discussion of two ‘analytic philosophers’, John Searle and John McDowell, where two contrasting accounts of intentions are offered. The first task is to derive a hybrid account, according to which there are different kinds of intentions, each having the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. The (...)
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  12.  40
    Distrusting the Present.Jakob Hohwy, Bryan Paton & Colin Palmer - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):315-335.
    We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted. The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed (...)
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  13.  9
    Kristin Andrews: The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition.Michele Merritt - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):475-481.
  14.  10
    Review of the Innocent Eye: Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process, by Nico Orlandi. [REVIEW]Ken Pepper - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):483-488.
  15.  21
    Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism.Mattia Riccardi - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):443-454.
    Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and (...)
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  16.  19
    The Phenomenology of Hypo- and Hyperreality in Psychopathology.Zeno Van Duppen - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):423-441.
    Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...)
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  17.  22
    Autopoietic Enactivism, Phenomenology and the Deep Continuity Between Life and Mind.Paulo De Jesus - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):265-289.
    In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism. These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not (...)
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  18.  4
    Situating the Self: Understanding the Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation.Roy Dings & Leon Bruin - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):151-165.
    The article proposes a theoretical model to account for changes in self due to Deep Brain Stimulation. First, we argue that most existing models postulate a very narrow conception of self, and thus fail to capture the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes. Second, building on previous work by Shaun Gallagher, we propose a modified ‘pattern-theory of self’, which provides a richer picture of the possible consequences of DBS treatment.
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  19.  17
    Situating the Self: Understanding the Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation.Roy Dings & Leon de Bruin - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):151-165.
    The article proposes a theoretical model to account for changes in self due to Deep Brain Stimulation. First, we argue that most existing models postulate a very narrow conception of self, and thus fail to capture the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes. Second, building on previous work by Shaun Gallagher, we propose a modified ‘pattern-theory of self’, which provides a richer picture of the possible consequences of DBS treatment.
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  20.  10
    Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic?Joseph A. Hedger - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):207-226.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained (...)
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  21.  4
    Jonathan Berger and Gabe Turow , Music, Science, and the Rhythmic Brain: Cultural and Clinical Implications.J. A. Judge - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):305-313.
  22.  3
    Kristin Zeiler and Lisa Folmarson Käll, Editors. Feminist Phenomenology and Medicine.Marianne E. Klinke - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):297-303.
    In Feminist Phenomenology and Medicine, the editors have assembled a collection of papers on important topics that should be addressed in the modern phenomenology of medicine - topics which do not exclusively focus on illness, disability, bodily deterioration or pathologies, as seen for instance in prior work of the philosophers S Kay Toombs, Frederik Svenaeus, and Havi Carel. The contributors met at a congress on feminist phenomenology and medicine in Sweden in 2011, and come from a variety of relevant disciplines (...)
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  23.  15
    Zdravko Radman , The Hand: An Organ of the Mind, What the Manual Tells the Mental.Victor Loughlin - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):291-296.
    Hands undoubtedly matter. Few, I suspect, would disagree. Yet The Hand, an Organ of the Mind uses this commonplace to dispel what is termed the “intellectualist illusion” , the illusion that the things we do with our hands are always and everywhere guided by an in-the-head centralised planner. Radman’s spirited collection of essays makes the point that we are not the sort of “centralised knowers” that the history of cognitive science might have us believe. Rather the manual is primary: it (...)
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  24.  12
    The Cognitive Foundations of Visual Consciousness: Why Should We Favour a Processing Approach?Francesco Marchi & Albert Newen - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):247-264.
    How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness.. Our aim, in this paper, is (...)
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  25.  15
    Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought.Michelle Montague - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):167-181.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...)
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  26.  22
    The Phenomenology of Empathy: A Steinian Emotional Account.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):227-245.
    This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her (...)
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  27.  11
    The Capgras Delusion: An Integrated Approach.Neralie Wise - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):183-205.
    Delusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an (...)
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  28.  90
    Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):7-15.
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real (...)
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  29.  47
    Body and Self: An Entangled Narrative.Priscilla Brandon - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):67-83.
    In the past three decades a number of narrative self-concepts have appeared in the philosophical literature. A central question posed in recent literature concerns the embodiment of the narrative self. Though one of the best-known narrative self-concepts is a non-embodied one, namely Dennett’s self as ‘a center of narrative gravity’, others argue that the narrative self should include a role for embodiment. Several arguments have been made in support of the latter claim, but these can be summarized in two main (...)
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  30.  7
    Introduction.Leon de Bruin & Maureen Sie - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):3-5.
    The idea that human beings experience their lives as some sort of story and tend to understand themselves as authors of a narrative has become increasingly popular in philosophy. Some philosophers suggest that narratives are indispensable when it comes to answering the traditional question associated with personal (numerical) identity: what makes it the case that the person considered at time t0 is the same person as the person considered at time t1? They claim that taking a narrative approach to this (...)
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  31.  34
    The Toiling Lily: Narrative Life, Responsibility, and the Ontological Ground of Self-Deception.Steven DeLay - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):103-116.
    In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture (...)
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  32.  21
    Artifactual Selves: A Response to Lynne Rudder Baker.Daniel C. Dennett - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):17-20.
    Baker’s critique of my view of the self as a fiction captures some of its points well but misses the possibility of a theorist’s fiction, like the Equator or a center of gravity, which is not an illusion, but rather an abstraction, like dollars, poems, and software—made of no material but dependent on material vehicles. It is an artifact of our everyday effort to make sense of our own complex activities by postulating a single central source of meaning, intention, and (...)
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  33.  13
    Narratives, Culture, and Folk Psychology.Anika Fiebich - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):135-149.
    In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false belief tasks. Methodologically, I (...)
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  34.  8
    Editorial Note.Shaun Gallagher - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):1-1.
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  35.  36
    Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal.Daniel D. Hutto - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):21-41.
    Decoupling a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis from Strong Narrativism this paper attempts to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that the basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment—the central tenet—of all Strong (...)
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  36.  98
    Towards a Constitutive Account of Implicit Narrativity.Fleur Jongepier - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):51-66.
    The standard reply to the critique that narrative theories of the self are either chauvinistic or trivial is to “go implicit”. Implicit narratives, it is argued, are necessary for diachronically structured self-experience, but do not require that such narratives should be wholly articulable life stories. In this paper I argue that the standard approach, which puts forward a phenomenological conception of implicit narratives, is ultimately unable to get out of the clutches of the dilemma. In its place, I offer an (...)
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  37.  10
    What Guides Pretence? Towards the Interactive and the Narrative Approaches.Zuzanna Rucińska - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):117-133.
    This paper will explore one aspect of the relationship between pretence and narratives. I look at proposals about how scripts play guiding roles in our pretend play practices. I then examine the views that mental representations are needed to guide pretend play, reviewing two importantly different pictures of mental guiders: the Propositional Account and the Model Account. Both accounts are individualistic and internalistic; the former makes use of language-like representations, the latter makes use of models, maps and images. The paper (...)
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  38.  18
    “Strong” Narrativity—a Response to Hutto.Anthony Rudd - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):43-49.
    This paper responds to Dan Hutto’s paper, ‘Narrative Self-Shaping: a Modest Proposal’. Hutto there attacks the “strong” narrativism defended in my recent book, ‘Self, Value and Narrative’ and in recent work by Marya Schechtman. I rebut Hutto’s argument that non-narrative forms of evaluative self-shaping can plausibly be conceived, and defend the notion of implicit narrative against his criticisms. I conclude by briefly indicating some difficulties that arise for the “modest” form of narrativism that Hutto defends.
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  39.  6
    Volitional Excuses, Self-Narration, and Blame.Marion Smiley - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):85-101.
    This article has three parts. The first argues that excuses such as "I didn't know" and "I couldn't help myself" are not, as we are frequently led to believe, vehicles for discovering whether or not an individual's will was free. Instead, they are self-narratives that we produce for the purpose of avoiding blame. The second part explores the particular notion of non-responsibility that governs these self-narratives. The third articulates the role that our judgments of fairness play in decisions to accept (...)
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  40.  11
    A Dilemma for Heideggerian Cognitive Science.David Suarez - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    ‘Naturalizing phenomenology’ by limiting it to the ontology of the sciences is problematic on both metaphysical and phenomenological grounds. While most assessments of the prospects for a ‘naturalized phenomenology’ have focused on approaches based in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, problems also arise for non-reductive approaches based in Heideggerian existential phenomenology. ‘Heideggerian cognitive science’ faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if it is directly concerned with the nature of subjectivity, and this subjectivity is assumed to be ontologically irreducible to its physical (...)
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