In this paper, I introduce the symposium on Dru Johnson’s Biblical Philosophy: A Hebraic Approach to the Old and New Testaments. I discuss the aims of the book and offer an example of how Johnson’s insights can be applied to a perennial philosophical problem, namely, the nature of truth. I then offer some suggestions for applying its contents to our philosophizing today. Finally, I briefly introduce each contribution to the symposium that follows.

This response to the symposium participants includes deep appreciation for their engagement with Biblical Philosophy: A Hebraic Approach to the Old and New Testaments. Esther Meek, Dolores Morris, and R. T. Mullins offer helpful insights, correctives, and questions about Biblical Philosophy. They also extended the project to shed light in other philosophical and theological domains. Ultimately, Dru Johnson asks how much of a revolution in philosophical style is required if one were to appropriate the fullness of his suggestions in the (...) book. (shrink)

The philosophy origins story often begins in the sixth century, in Greece, and in the mind. Biblical Philosophy: A Hebraic Approach to the Old and New Testaments reassesses that story to justify new side-by-side comparisons between Hellenic and Hebraic philosophical styles. The Hebrew Bible represents a sophisticated philosophical method worthy of putting in league with the Aegean traditions that developed centuries later. In this analysis, the Hebrew philosophical style starts in Asia, in the Iron Age, and in the social body (...) of Israel. As Christian philosophers, the touchpoint for the Christian philosophical tradition may require adjustment in light of the philosophical reasoning of the Hebrew Bible extending into the New Testament. (shrink)

The view of hell proposed by C. A. McIntosh, elsewhere called “the spectrum view,” is both promising and important, but I argue that it needs to be qualified; otherwise, it is a perilous thesis. Even in its qualified form, however, the spectrum view faces a problem: it’s not clear that it actually qualifies as a version of traditionalism, as McIntosh claims. I argue that the spectrum view is best construed as a new version of natural consequence annihilationism—one that avoids the (...) major problem of its closest competitors, but also faces problems of its own. I close with a suggestion for how the spectrum view might be strengthened. (shrink)

I respond to R. Zachary Manis’s wide-ranging critique of the spectrum view of the imago Dei, and further explore the possibility that the damned are preserved for eternity not in a state of conscious suffering, but as monuments to the significance of the earthly travail.

I argue that we can cease to be human by losing the imago Dei. Such a view has profound implications for how we understand hell, offering a fresh perspective on the debate between traditionalists, annihilationists, and universalists.

In Biblical Philosophy: A Hebraic Approach to the Old and New Testaments, Dru Johnson’s strategy just is the powerful and productive alignment between the philosophical style of Hebrew Scripture and all that premier scientific discoverer Michael Polanyi has said about the scientific enterprise. Polanyi provides the very lenses to notice significant, superior, philosophical dimensions in Scripture. In this essay, I suggest that we add a seventh philosophical style: interpersonalist. This addition highlights a couple of Johnson’s other key claims: Yahweh’s characteristic (...) personal encounter with his people, and his desire for friendship—thus for their skilled discernment. It adds coherence and distinctive depth to the already existing six categories. And the interpersonalist conviction accredits later developments of personalist philosophy within an otherwise Hellenic Western philosophical tradition, including the stunning work of Polanyi himself. (shrink)

Dru Johnson’s account of Hebraic philosophy seems well-suited for the task of reconciling the Christian account of God with the reality of suffering. I outline two ways in which this is the case: one retrospective, one proactive. Looking back, if biblical philosophy is mysterionist, creationist, transdemographic, and ritualist, then we might understand the failure of a certain kind of theodicy in light of its failure to meet one or more of these criteria. Looking forward, we ought to keep these features (...) in mind. I conclude by suggesting that Johnson’s account of truth is, in fact, best understood as a correspondence account. (shrink)

What if Dru Johnson is correct that the Bible is philosophy? I consider the implications of this for systematic theology and the doctrine of God. I argue that classical theism, Reformed Thomism, and other such positions are rival philosophical schools of thought that contradict the Bible’s philosophical reflections on God.

In “Divine Forgiveness and Legal Pardon,” William Lane Craig compares divine forgiveness to legal pardon, claiming that this is a “more accurate” way of thinking about God’s forgiveness because of God’s status as Ruler and Judge. Craig’s analogy is an admirable attempt to provide a biblical account of divine forgiveness, but the analogy is at best incomplete because God is not simply Ruler and Judge but also loving Creator and Father. A father does not pardon his children; he loves and (...) forgives them. In this paper, I evaluate Craig’s analogy and relate it to the atonement. (shrink)

This essay, will focus on Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland’s discussion on emergent properties, thin particular hylomorphism, and the relevance of their book, The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism, to advance the question that both philosophers and scientists ask regarding “strong artificial intelligence,” that is, whether computers will ever be conscious as technological devices as the programs that run on them get more and more complex.

This article addresses the following metaethical questions: how many intrinsic values are there? Robert Adams holds the view that there is only one intrinsic value, a view called “intrinsic value monism,” but does not present any arguments in favor of this view. This paper makes the case that there are good reasons for upholding value monism. I argue that our ability to weigh different values against each other supports value monism and that monotheistic worship also supports monism.

On hylomorphism and a concrete view of Christ’s human nature, a human person might be defined ontologically by a real definition. Per the definitions of hylomorphism and concretism, both views depend on a thick particular “human person.” I call the dependence between the person and its definition the principle of ontological priority (POP) and I analyze how POP affects the views given two theological puzzles, namely, the disembodied intermediate state, and, following Chalcedon, a single person in Christ. I find that (...) the entailment of the thick particular is unfavorable for both hylomorphism and concretism. Consequently, their real definitions need to be redefined. (shrink)

It has become commonplace to speak of proteins as sophisticated nanomachines, cells as miniature factories, and genomes as containing information in the form of code. Given that in our experience all other instances of machines, factories, and codes involve intelligent agency in their production, such descriptions, taken literally, suggest that the structures and operations of living things are best explained in terms of intelligent design. Not everyone agrees, however, that these descriptions should be taken literally. In this article, I evaluate (...) arguments for taking these descriptions metaphorically rather than literally and find them wanting. It will not do, therefore, to reject hypotheses of intelligent design on the grounds that we can only speak metaphorically of proteins as machines, cells as factories, and genomes as containing code. (shrink)

Code-switching is the adjustment of one’s speech, behaviors, or appearance across various contexts. Sometimes we code-switch to adapt to the communication norms of different groups, and sometimes we code-switch from social necessity. In many cases, code-switching is not morally blameworthy. It demonstrates an agent’s discernment or practical wisdom in navigating various situations. However, not all cases of code-switching are compatible with a good moral character. Many cases of code-switching involve a kind of impression management or doublespeak that can compromise integrity. (...) This article examines the conditions under which code-switching is duplicitous. More specifically, it explores code-switching regarding theological identity and plausible psychological and spiritual repercussions of code-switching for the agent. (shrink)

I argue that hindsight can counter the evidential problem of evil (EPOE). Specifically, if hindsight shows that an incident of evil that was previously accepted as pointless is actually justified, and the incident is a representative example of seemingly pointless evil, then that generates skepticism about the genuine pointlessness of other cases of seemingly pointless evil. Boethius’s life is used to illustrate this argument. Objections are then addressed, and it is shown that the reasoning behind those objections actually supports skeptical (...) theism, thus undermining the EPOE regardless. Finally, a stronger hindsight argument is presented to comprehensively defeat the EPOE. (shrink)

Proponents of “early high Christology” maintain that the New Testament teaches that God created the world through Jesus (John 1:3; 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16–17; Heb. 1:2, 10). Contemporary philosophical theologians sympathetic to Nicene orthodoxy appeal to this trend in order to justify their understanding of the person and nature of Jesus as divine. This article argues from the logic of the word “through” that the belief that God created the world through Jesus is incompatible with the Nicene doctrine of (...) the consubstantiality of Father and Son, and considers what options remain for pro-Nicene theologians. (shrink)

The modal version of the ontological argument (MOA) for God’s existence is controversial, primarily, at its first premise, the premise that reads “possibly, there exists a maximally great being.” So, what’s needed is an argument for the possibility of a maximally great being, a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, has these properties essentially, and is such that it exists necessarily. Ironically, I think that such an argument can be found in the literature on the problem of evil, literature (...) generally devoted to arguments against God’s existence. In particular, I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s “free will defense” (FWD) gives us such an argument. Moreover, since most philosophers agree that the FWD is successful, I argue that most philosophers should agree that FWD gives us a successful argument for the first premise of MOA. Thus, I argue that if most philosophers agree FWD is successful, then most philosophers should agree that God exists. There are several pressing objections to this line of reasoning that I consider in the paper. I argue that these objections fail. (shrink)

In “Early High Christology and Contemporary Pro-Nicene Theology,” Steven Nemes raises a dilemma. Either one may affirm what the New Testament teaches about the Word “through” whom all things were created, or one may affirm that the Father and Son are consubstantial (as the Nicene Creed teaches), but not both. I show that Nemes’s argument begs the question and that Nemes fails to represent how pro-Nicene theologians interpreted such prepositions (for example, “through”) in the New Testament. Contrary to what Nemes (...) contends, there is no inconsistency in believing what John 1:3 teaches and that the divine persons are consubstantial. (shrink)