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  1.  76
    A Probabilistic Analysis of Cross-Examination Using Bayesian Networks.Marcello Di Bello - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):41-65.
    The legal scholar Henry Wigmore asserted that cross-examination is ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ Was Wigmore right? Instead of addressing this question upfront, this paper offers a conceptual ground clearing. It is difficult to say whether Wigmore was right or wrong without becoming clear about what we mean by cross-examination; how it operates at trial; what it is intended to accomplish. Despite the growing importance of legal epistemology, there is virtually no philosophical work that (...)
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  2.  87
    The Pragmatist School in Analytic Jurisprudence.Raff Donelson - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):66-84.
    Almost twenty years ago, a genuinely new school of thought emerged in the field of jurisprudential methodology. It is a pragmatist school. Roughly, the pragmatists contend that, when inquiring about the nature of law, we should evaluate potential answers based on practical criteria. For many legal philosophers, this contention seems both unclear and unhinged. That appearance is lamentable. The pragmatist approach to jurisprudential methodology has received insufficient attention for at least two reasons. First, the pragmatists do not conceive of themselves (...)
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  3. Does Legal Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? On Fetishism, Two‐Tier System Design, and Conscientious Fact‐Finding.David Enoch, Talia Fisher & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 85-103, October 2021.
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  4. Rethinking the Wrong of Rape1.Karyn L. Freedman - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):104-127.
    In their well-known paper, John Gardner and Stephen Shute (2000) propose a pure case of rape, in which a woman is raped while unconscious and the rape, for a variety of stipulated reasons, never comes to light. This makes the pure case a harmless case of rape, or so they argue. In this paper I show that their argument hinges on an outdated conception of trauma, one which conflates evaluative responses that arise in the aftermath of rape with the non-deliberative (...)
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  5. Eleven Angry Men.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):227-239.
    While many of us would not want to abandon the requirement that a defendant can only be found guilty of a serious criminal offence by a unanimous jury, we should not expect epistemology to give us the resources we need for justifying this requirement. The doubts that might prevent jurors from reaching unanimity do not show that, say, the BARD standard has not been met. Even if it were true, as some have suggested, that rationality requires that a jury composed (...)
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  6.  8
    Realizing the Value of Public Input: Mini-Public Consultation on Agency Rulemaking1.Eduardo J. Martinez - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):240-257.
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  7.  36
    Political Action, Epistemic Detachment, and the Problem of White-Mindedness.Darien Pollock - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):299-314.
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  8. Justice in Epistemic Gaps: The ‘Proof Paradox’ Revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.
    This paper defends the heretical view that, at least in some cases, we ought to assign legal liability based on purely statistical evidence. The argument draws on prominent civil law litigation concerning pharmaceutical negligence and asbestos-poisoning. The overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls that result from supposing that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute.
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  9. Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence.Jacob Smith & Georgi Gardiner - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):334-354.
    Many jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict the use of evidence about a defendant’s character to prove legal culpability. Situationists, who argue that conduct is largely determined by situational features rather than by character, can easily defend this prohibition. According to situationism, character evidence is misleading or paltry. -/- Proscriptions on character evidence seem harder to justify, however, on virtue ethical accounts. It appears that excluding character evidence either denies the centrality of character for explaining conduct—the situationist position—or omits probative evidence. (...)
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