Year:

  1.  66
    Perceptual Consciousness Plays No Epistemic Role.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):7-23.
    It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to (...)
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  2.  41
    Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived.Bill Brewer - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):24-38.
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  3.  21
    Perception, Discrimination, and Knowledge.Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):39-53.
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  4.  22
    Rigidity, Symmetry and Defeasibility: On Weisberg's Puzzle for Perceptual Justification.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):54-70.
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  5.  52
    Evidential Support and Best Explanations.Earl Conee - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):71-85.
    The essay seeks the best combination of internal and external factors in the evidential support that we can have for a proposition. After identifying the combination, the essay criticizes views according to which our evidence supports propositions in virtue of the propositions explaining the evidence to us.
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  6.  11
    Recognitional Competence and Knowing What Things Look Like.Megan Feeney - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):86-101.
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  7.  31
    Naive Realism, Representationalism, and the Rationalizing Role of Visual Perception.Craig French - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):102-119.
  8.  28
    Perceptual Evidence: Against the View of the Vulgar.Richard Fumerton - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):120-131.
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  9.  15
    Do Looks Constitute Our Perceptual Evidence?Harmen Ghijsen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):132-147.
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  10.  20
    Dretske & McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge, Conclusive Reasons, and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.
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  11.  13
    Adam Marushak on the Hypothetical Given.Anil Gupta - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):167-174.
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  12.  20
    Appearance and Reality.Christopher S. Hill - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):175-191.
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  13.  32
    Internalism, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Defeat.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):192-204.
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  14. Do You See What I Know? On Reasons, Perceptual Evidence, and Epistemic Status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.
    Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don’t necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a (...)
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  15.  96
    Two Dogmas of Empirical Justification.Jack C. Lyons - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):221-237.
    Nearly everyone agrees that perception gives us justification and knowledge, and a great number of epistemologists endorse a particular two-part view about how this happens. The view is that perceptual beliefs get their justification from perceptual experiences, and that they do so by being based on them. Despite the ubiquity of these two views, I think that neither has very much going for it; on the contrary, there’s good reason not to believe either one of them.
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  16.  55
    Multisensory Evidence.Casey O'Callaghan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):238-256.
    It is tempting to think that one’s perceptual evidence comprises just what issues from perceiving with each of the respective sensory modalities. However, empirical, rational, and phenomenological considerations show that one’s perceptual evidence can outstrip what one possesses due to perceiving with each separate sense. Some novel perceptual evidence stems from the coordinated use of multiple senses. This paper argues that some perceptual evidence in this respect is distinctively multisensory.
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  17. The Puzzle of the Laws of Appearance.Adam Pautz - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):257-272.
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about visual appearance. There are certain necessary constraints on how things can visually appear. The puzzle is about how to explain them. I have no satisfying solution. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is a puzzle. I will develop the puzzle as it arises for representationalism about experience because it is currently the most popular theory of experience and I think it is along the right lines. However, everyone faces a (...)
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  18. Concepts and Predication From Perception to Cognition.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):273-292.
  19.  89
    Reading the Bad News About Our Minds.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):293-310.
    Psychologists and neuroscientists have delivered a lot of bad news about the inner workings of our minds, raising challenging questions about the extent to which we are rational in important domains of our judgments. I will focus on a central case of an unsettling effect on our perception, and primarily aim to establish that there actually is no impact from it on the rationality of our perceptual beliefs. To reach my goal, I will start with a rough review of different (...)
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  20.  26
    A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge‐First.Mona Simion - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):311-323.
    Tyler Burge notably offers a truth‐first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge's truth‐first a priori derivation on functionalist and value‐theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge‐first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe (...)
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  21.  56
    Non‐Epistemic Perception as Technology.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):324-345.
    Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non-epistemic perceptual relation of which feature-seeing and object-seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance relations are counterexamples, detailing their case for lurking inferential epistemology. (...)
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