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  1.  39
    Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):7-24.
    To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one’s information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for (...)
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  2.  18
    Practical Perception and Intelligent Action.John Bengson - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):25-58.
    Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent. This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question—which I call the question of “practical perception”—and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's (...)
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  3. Against Emotional Dogmatism.Brogaard Berit & Chudnoff Elijah - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):59-77.
    It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other (...)
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  4.  6
    Incompatibilist Commitment and Moral Self‐Knowledge: The Epistemology of Libertarianism.E. J. Coffman - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):78-98.
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  5.  18
    The Essential Connection Between Epistemology and the Theory of Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):99-129.
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  6.  19
    An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.
    White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...)
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  7. How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
    When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...)
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  8.  18
    Testimonial Knowledge: A Unified Account.Peter J. Graham - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):172-186.
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  9.  55
    Safety, Explanation, Iteration.Daniel Greco - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):187-208.
    This paper argues for several related theses. First, the epistemological position that knowledge requires safe belief can be motivated by views in the philosophy of science, according to which good explanations show that their explananda are robust. This motivation goes via the idea—recently defended on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that knowledge attributions play a crucial role in explaining successful action. Second, motivating the safety requirement in this way creates a choice point—depending on how we understand robustness, we'll end up with (...)
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  10.  12
    How Understanding People Differs From Understanding the Natural World.Stephen R. Grimm - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):209-225.
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  11.  5
    Knowing Our Own Hearts: Self‐Reporting and the Science of Love.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):226-242.
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  12.  48
    Unconscious Evidence.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.
    Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person-level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled (...)
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  13.  19
    Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases.Fiona Macpherson & Clare Batty - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):263-296.
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  14.  68
    Good Looking.Jennifer Matey - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):297-313.
    Studies show that people we judge to have good character we also evaluate to be more attractive. I argue that in these cases, evaluative perceptual experiences represent morally admirable people as having positive (often intrinsic) value. Learning about a person's positive moral attributes often leads us to feel positive esteem for them. These feelings of positive esteem can come to partly constitute perceptual experiences. Such perceptual experiences evaluate the subject in an aesthetic way and seem to attribute aesthetic qualities like (...)
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  15. Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.
    According to Paul Boghossian and others, inference is subject to the taking condition: it necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion, and drawing the conclusion because of that fact. Boghossian argues that this condition vindicates the idea that inference is an expression of agency, and that it has several other important implications too. However, we argue in this paper that the taking condition should be rejected. The condition gives rise to several serious prima facie problems and (...)
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  16.  7
    Evidentialism, Transparency, and Commitments.Christian Piller - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):332-350.
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  17.  2
    Simulation and Understanding Other Minds.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):351-373.
    There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mind-reading, behavior-reading, and simulation each have and need to have in our knowing and understanding other minds, and how each method is implemented in the brain, but less discussion of the epistemological question what it is about the products of these methods that makes them count as knowledge or understanding. This question has become especially salient recently as some have the intuition that mirror neurons can bring understanding of another's action (...)
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  18.  15
    Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.
    When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify (...)
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  19. Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some degree (...)
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  20. Mind Misreading.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1).
    Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others’ beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as it turns out, we regularly make mindreading mistakes. Understanding when and how mind misreading occurs is crucial for a complete account of mindreading. In this paper, I examine the conditions under which mind misreading occurs. I argue that these patterns (...)
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  21.  7
    Empiricist Pragmatism.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):441-461.
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  22.  12
    No State A Priori Known to Be Factive is Mental.Elia Zardini - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):462-492.
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