1.  47
    Lessons and New Directions for Extended Cognition From Social and Personality Psychology.Joshua August Skorburg - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the historical development of the person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the extended cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some instructive similarities between the two and consider possible objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism lends support for an analogously interactionist conception of extended cognition. (...)
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  2.  16
    What Makes Delusions Pathological?Valentina Petrolini - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads (...)
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    Why Emotion Recognition Is Not Simulational.Yousefi Heris Ali - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the (...)
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