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Forthcoming articles
  1.  10
    Joe Cunningham (forthcoming). Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
    This review provides an overview of Eva Schmidt's impressively thorough and detailed book on the Conceptualist/Nonconceptualist debate in the philosophy of perception, and briefly sketches two objections to Schmidt. First, I suggest that a certain dilemma for the Conceptualist Schmidt raises in the context of her discussion of the fineness of grain argument is surmountable. Second, I question whether Schmidt's response to the epistemological motivation for Conceptualism is sound.
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  2.  15
    Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Gualtiero Piccinini: Physical Computation. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
    Physical Computation is the summation of Piccinini’s work on computation and mechanistic explanation over the past decade. It draws together material from papers published during that time, but also provides additional clarifications and restructuring that make this the definitive presentation of his mechanistic account of physical computation. This review will first give a brief summary of the account that Piccinini defends, followed by a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book, before finally discussing one aspect of the account in more critical detail.
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  3.  6
    Rob Goldstone & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). The Multiple, Interacting Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) Perspective on Group Cognition. Philosophical Psychology.
    In approaching the question of whether groups of people can have cognitive capacities that are fundamentally different than the cognitive capacities of the individuals within the group, we lay out a Multiple, Interactive Levels of Cognitive Systems (MILCS) framework. The goal of MILCS is to explain the kinds of cognitive processes typically studied by cognitive scientists, such as perception, attention, memory, categorization, decision making, problem solving, and judgment. Rather than focusing on high-level constructs such as modules in an information processing (...)
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  4.  37
    Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either to reduce (...)
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  5.  39
    Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). How We Think and Act Together. Philosophical Psychology.
    Individualistic accounts of social cognition primarily focus on individual subjects’ mental representations in thinking about and interacting with other people. These accounts implicitly sterilize the environments in which we think and act with other people. They presuppose that situational contexts are neutral and do not significantly influence social cognition and interaction. In contrast, collectivist accounts focus on these environments, sometimes to the exclusion of an individual subject’s mental representations. Although I reject the most radical collectivist claims, individualistic accounts can benefit (...)
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  6.  5
    Ball Brian (forthcoming). On Representational Content and Format in Core Numerical Cognition. Philosophical Psychology:1-21.
    Carey has argued that there is a system of core numerical cognition – the analog magnitude system – in which cardinal numbers are explicitly represented in iconic format. While the existence of this system is beyond doubt, this paper aims to show that its representations cannot have the combination of features attributed to them by Carey. According to the argument from abstractness, the representation of the cardinal number of a collection of individuals as such requires the representation of individuals as (...)
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  7. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  8.  17
    Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Are Epistemic Emotions Metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    This article addresses the question whether epistemic emotions are in any sense inherently metacognitive. The paper begins with some critical discussion of a recent suggestion made by Joelle Proust, that these emotions might be implicitly or procedurally metacognitive. It then explores the theoretical resources that are needed to explain how such emotions arise and do their work. While there is a perennial temptation to think that epistemic emotions are somehow about the cognitive states of the person undergoing the emotion, we (...)
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  9.  2
    E. Fabry Regina (forthcoming). Transcending the Evidentiary Boundary: Prediction Error Minimization, Embodied Interaction, and Explanatory Pluralism. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In a recent paper, Jakob Hohwy argues that the emerging predictive processing perspective on cognition requires us to explain cognitive functioning in purely internalistic and neurocentric terms. The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the view that PP entails a wholesale rejection of positions that are interested in the embodied, embedded, extended, or enactive dimensions of cognitive processes. I will argue that Hohwy’s argument from analogy, which forces an evidentiary boundary into the picture, lacks the argumentative resources to (...)
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  10.  1
    Anika Fiebich (forthcoming). Pluralism, Social Cognition, and Interaction in Autism. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are (...)
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  11.  2
    Marcelo Fischborn (forthcoming). Neuroscience and the Possibility of Locally Determined Choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
    In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their (...)
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  12.  7
    Alexander Green (forthcoming). The Varieties of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
  13.  4
    Colin Klein (forthcoming). Brain Regions as Difference-Makers. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Contrastive neuroimaging is often taken to provide evidence about the localization of cognitive functions. After canvassing some problems with this approach, I offer an alternative: neuroimaging gives evidence about regions of the brain that bear difference-making relationships to psychological processes of interest. I distinguish between the specificity and what I call the systematicity of a difference-making relationship, and I show how at least some neuroimaging experiments can give evidence for systematic difference-making.
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  14. Jérémie Lafraire (forthcoming). Facing the Mirror: A Relativist Account of Immune Nonconceptual Self-Representations. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    There is a consensus among philosophers that some “I”-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. In some recent papers, this property has been formulated in the following deflationist way: an “I”-thought is immune to error through misidentification when it can misrepresent the mental or bodily property self-ascribed but cannot misrepresent the subject possessing that property. However, it has been put forward that the range of mental and bodily states that are immune in that limited sense cannot include nonconceptual forms of (...)
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  15.  3
    Charles Lassiter & Nathan Ballantyne (forthcoming). Implicit Racial Bias and Epistemic Pessimism. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    Implicit bias results from living in a society structured by race. Tamar Gendler has drawn attention to several epistemic costs of implicit bias and concludes that paying some costs is unavoidable. In this paper, we reconstruct Gendler’s argument and argue that the epistemic costs she highlights can be avoided. Though epistemic agents encode discriminatory information from the environment, not all encoded information is activated. Agents can construct local epistemic environments that do not activate biasing representations, effectively avoiding the consequences of (...)
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  16.  20
    John Michael (forthcoming). The Interaction Theory of Social Cognition–a Critique. Philosophical Psychology.
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  17.  2
    Voin Milevski (forthcoming). Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Psychology:1-10.
    The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this (...)
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  18.  4
    Jacek Olender (forthcoming). Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  19.  3
    Abel Wajnerman Paz (forthcoming). A Mechanistic Perspective on Canonical Neural Computation. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    Although it has been argued that mechanistic explanation is compatible with abstraction, there are still doubts about whether mechanism can account for the explanatory power of significant abstract models in computational neuroscience. Chirimuuta has recently claimed that models describing canonical neural computations must be evaluated using a non-mechanistic framework. I defend two claims regarding these models. First, I argue that their prevailing neurocognitive interpretation is mechanistic. Additionally, a criterion recently proposed by Levy and Bechtel to legitimize mechanistic abstract models, and (...)
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  20.  4
    Luis Rosa (forthcoming). Inferential Basing and Mental Models. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less (...)
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  21.  1
    Ronja Rutschmann & Alex Wiegmann (forthcoming). No Need for an Intention to Deceive? Challenging the Traditional Definition of Lying. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    According to the traditional definition of lying, somebody lies if he or she makes a believed-false statement with the intention to deceive. The traditional definition has recently been challenged by non-deceptionists who use bald-faced lies to underpin their view that the intention to deceive is no necessary condition for lying. We conducted two experiments to test whether their assertions are true. First, we presented one of five scenarios that consisted of three different kinds of lies. Then we asked participants to (...)
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  22.  1
    David Trafimow (forthcoming). Implications of an Initial Empirical Victory for the Truth of the Theory and Additional Empirical Victories. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    Psychologists take two propositions for granted. Specifically, empirical verification of predictions derived from a theory support that the theory is more likely to be true and support that additional predictions derived from the theory have an increased probability of being sustained if subjected to empirical testing. In contrast, I argue that both propositions depend strongly on whether auxiliary assumptions are taken into account. When auxiliary assumptions are not taken into account, the first proposition is valid but the second is not. (...)
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  23.  4
    Candace Upton (forthcoming). Meditation and the Cultivation of Virtue. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    In recent decades, social psychology has produced an expansive array of studies wherein introducing a seemingly morally innocuous feature into the situation a subject inhabits often yields morally questionable, dubious, or even appalling behavior. Several fascinating lines of philosophical enquiry issue from this research, but the most pragmatically salient question concerns how we ought most effectively to develop and maintain the virtues so that such putatively morally problematic behavior is less likely to occur. In this paper, I examine four empirically (...)
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  24.  21
    P. M. Verschure (forthcoming). Connectionist Explanation: Taking Positions in the Mind-Brain Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology.
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