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  1. The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief.C. J. Atkinson - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606.
    In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the ‘aim’ of belief—both the teleological and normative interpretations—have the resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief (suspension). I argue that, despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able (...)
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  2.  3
    Emotion’s Role in the Unity of Consciousness.Maria Doulatova - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):529-549.
    In this work I argue that emotion plays a key role in ensuring a unified perspective on the world. In particular, while many thoughts and feelings surface onto consciousness, it is not clear how they get combined into a unified point of view or what’s it’s like to be you at any given time. While many philosophers argue that reason or higher-order cognition plays a key role in delineating our point of view, I argue that higher-order cognition plays a subsidiary (...)
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  3.  12
    Against Neo-Cartesianism: Neurofunctional Resilience and Animal Pain.Phil Halper, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf & Perry N. Fuchs - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):474-501.
    Several influential philosophers and scientists have advanced a framework, often called Neo-Cartesianism (NC), according to which animal suffering is merely apparent. Drawing upon contemporary neuroscience and philosophy of mind, Neo-Cartesians challenge the mainstream position we shall call Evolutionary Continuity (EC), the view that humans are on a nonhierarchical continuum with other species and are thus not likely to be unique in consciously experiencing negative pain affect. We argue that some Neo-Cartesians have misconstrued the underlying science or tendentiously appropriated controversial views (...)
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  4.  12
    On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation.Alison Duncan Kerr - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):453-473.
    Much of the recent work in psychology (and affective science) has shown that humans regulate their emotions nearly constantly, sometimes well and sometimes poorly. I argue that properly regulating one’s emotions displays emotional rationality, and failing to do so displays emotional irrationality. If an agent feels an emotion that is obviously problematic for the agent to feel and she is aware that it is problematic, then the agent ought to regulate her emotions in future similar situations. To capture this aspect (...)
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  5.  6
    Joint Attention Without Recursive Mindreading: On the Role of Second-Person Engagement.Felipe León - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):550-580.
    On a widely held characterization, triadic joint attention is the capacity to perceptually attend to an object or event together with another subject. In the last four decades, research in developmental psychology has provided increasing evidence of the crucial role that this capacity plays in socio-cognitive development, early language acquisition, and the development of perspective-taking. Yet, there is a striking discrepancy between the general agreement that joint attention is critical in various domains, and the lack of theoretical consensus on how (...)
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  6.  1
    Psychopathic Personalities and Developmental Systems.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):502-528.
    Is psychopathy born or made? Contemporary psychopathy research shows that there is much wrong with this question. It is increasingly accepted that the development of psychopathy is dependent on multiple causal factors interacting with one another. However, there remains the major theoretical challenge of understanding the relations between these multiple causal factors in the developmental process. In this paper, I argue that the conventional picture of gene-environment interactionism does not offer an adequate account of psychopathy development. Instead, I propose that (...)
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  7.  18
    A Theory of Jerks and Other Philosophical Misadventures.Melanie Rosen - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):607-610.
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  8.  22
    Jokes Can Fail to Be Funny Because They Are Immoral: The Incompatibility of Emotions.Dong An & Kaiyuan Chen - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):374-396.
    Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have argued that to evaluate the funniness of a joke based on the consideration of whether it is morally appropriate to feel amused commits the “moralistic fallacy.” We offer a new and empirically informed reply. We argue that there is a way to take morality into consideration without committing this fallacy, that is, it is legitimate to say that for some people, witty but immoral jokes can fail to be funny because they are immoral. In (...)
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  9. Extended Control Systems: A Theory and its Implications.Hunter R. Gentry - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):345-373.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike have recently been interested in whether cognition extends beyond the boundaries of skin and skull and into the environment. However, the extended cognition hypothesis has suffered many objections over the past few decades. In this paper, I explore the option of control extending beyond the human boundary. My aim is to convince the reader of three things: (i) that control can be implemented in artifacts, (ii) that humans and artifacts can form extended control systems, and (...)
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  10. Can Hierarchical Predictive Coding Explain Binocular Rivalry?Julia Haas - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):424-444.
    Hohwy et al.’s (2008) model of binocular rivalry (BR) is taken as a classic illustration of predictive coding’s explanatory power. I revisit the account and show that it cannot explain the role of reward in BR. I then consider a more recent version of Bayesian model averaging, which recasts the role of reward in (BR) in terms of optimism bias. If we accept this account, however, then we must reconsider our conception of perception. On this latter view, I argue, organisms (...)
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  11.  5
    Reflective Intuition and the Copi Card Problem.Terence Horgan - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):327-344.
    In the 1970’s, a controversy arose about a probability problem posed by Irving Copi. One side argued that a common spontaneous intuition about the problem is correct; the other side argued that this intuition is mistaken. Here, I argue (1) that the naïve intuition yields the correct answer, but accidentally and for a wrong reason; (2) that a more reflective intuition yields a wrong answer, and hence, is also mistaken; and (3) that an even more reflective intuition yields the correct (...)
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  12.  5
    False Procedural Memory.Urim Retkoceri - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):397-423.
    Lately, it seems a number of philosophical memory theories are incorporating false memory phenomena into their conceptual frameworks. At the same time, scientific research is extending its analysis of false memories to nondeclarative forms of memory. However, both sides have paid little attention to the notion of false procedural memory. Yet, from everyday experience as well as from psychological investigation, we are aware of different ways procedural memory goes wrong. Here, I characterize the conceptual foundation of false procedural memory. First, (...)
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  13.  18
    Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past.Ben Springett - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):445-448.
    Kourken Michaelian is one of the principal architects in the emerging field of philosophy of memory. His book Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Know...
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  14.  13
    The Nature of Desire.Panos Theodorou - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):448-452.
  15.  14
    4E Cognition and the Dogma of Harmony.Jesper Aagaard - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):165-181.
    In recent years, we have witnessed the rise of a contemporary approach to cognitive psychology known as 4E cognition. According to this ‘extracranial’ view of cognition, the mind is not ensconced in the head, but dynamically intertwined with a host of different entities, social as well as technological. The purpose of the present article is to raise a concern about 4E cognition. The concern is not about whether the mind is in fact extended, but about how this condition is currently (...)
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  16.  19
    The Destructive Nature of Severe and Ongoing Trauma: Impairments in the Minimal-Self.Yochai Ataria & Omer Horovitz - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):254-276.
    This paper argues that severe and ongoing trauma (SOT) can lead to impairment at the level of the minimal self (MS), which is the core element in the structure of subjectivity. In the long-term, such impairments can result in complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) and schizophrenia. The paper tackles this issue while trying to create meaningful bridges between phenomenology and neuroscience.
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  17.  14
    The Representations of the Approximate Number System.Stefan Buijsman - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):300-317.
    The Approximate Number System (ANS) is a system that allows us to distinguish between collections based on the number of items, though only if the ratio between numbers is high enough. One of the questions that has been raised is what the representations involved in this system represent. I point to two important constraints for any account: (a) it doesn’t involve numbers, and (b) it can account for the approximate nature of the ANS. Furthermore, I argue that representations of pure (...)
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  18.  16
    How Do We Know What Babies Know? The Limits of Inferring Cognitive Representations From Visual Fixation Data.Isaac Davis - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):182-209.
    Most infant cognitive studies use visual fixation time as the measure of interest. There are, however, some serious methodological and theoretical concerns regarding what these studies reveal about infant cognition and how their results ought to be interpreted. We propose a Bayesian modeling framework which helps address these concerns. This framework allows us to more precisely formulate hypotheses about infants’ cognitive representations, formalize “linking hypotheses” that relate infants’ visual fixation behavior with stimulus complexity, and better determine what questions a given (...)
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  19. The Complexity of Neural Responses to Visual Stimuli: On Carruthers’ Challenge to Block’s Overflow Argument.Damiano La Manna - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):233-253.
    Ned Block’s Overflow Argument purports to establish that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access consciousness. In a recent paper, Block’s argument has been challenged by Peter Carruthers. Carruthers concedes the truth of one of the argument’s key steps, namely, that phenomenal consciousness overflows what is in working memory. At the same time, he rejects the conclusion of the argument by developing an account of this overflow that is alternative to Block’s. In this (...)
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  20.  7
    Online Education as a “Mental Institution”.Michelle Maiese - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):277-299.
    Work on situated cognition and affectivity holds that cognitive and affective processes always occur within, depend upon, and, perhaps, are even partially constituted by the surrounding social and environmental contexts. What some philosophers call a ‘mental institution’ consists of various tools and technologies that help people to solve a particular problem and scaffold their cognitive and affective processes in various ways. Examples include legal systems, scientific practice, and educational systems. I propose that insofar as it centers around technology and involves (...)
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  21.  15
    The First Minds: Caterpillars, ‘Karyotes and Consciousness. Miller Jr - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):322-325.
  22. Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.
    Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong representationalists often (...)
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  23.  8
    Lectures on Perception: An Ecological Perspective.Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):318-325.
  24.  16
    Beyond Objectivism: New Methods for Studying Metaethical Intuitions.Taylor Davis - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):125-153.
    Moral realists often assume that folk intuitions are predominantly realist, and they argue that this places the burden of proof on antirealists. More broadly, appeals to intuition in metaethics typically assume that folk judgments are generally consistent across individuals, such that they are at least predominantly something, if not realist. A substantial body of empirical work on moral objectivism has investigated these assumptions, but findings remain inconclusive due to methodological limitations. Objectivist judgments classify individuals into broad categories of realism and (...)
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  25.  11
    My Friend’s True Self: Children’s Concept of Personal Identity.Michaela Jirout Košová, Robin Kopecký, Pavel Oulovský, Matěj Nekvinda & Jaroslav Flegr - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):47-75.
    Our study explores the folk concept of personal identity in the developmental context. Two hundred and seventeen Czech children participated in an interview study based on a hypothetical scenario about a sudden change in their friend, someone they know, or some other unspecified person. The children were asked to judge to what extent particular changes (from six categories of traits) would change the identity core of their friend or some other person on a seven-point scale. We introduced both positive and (...)
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  26.  20
    The Seven Deadly Sins of Psychology a Manifesto for Reforming the Culture of Scientific Practice.David M. Kaplan, Paul F. Sowman, Lance Abel, Spencer Arbige, Celeste Bernard Chandler, Christopher Chen, Tim Chard, Wendy C. Higgins, Samuel Jones, Lyndall Murray, Mitchell Robinson & Benjamin Taylor - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):158-163.
  27.  24
    The Value of Emotions for Knowledge.Benedetta Magro - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):154-158.
  28.  4
    Question Framing Effects and the Processing of the Moral–Conventional Distinction.Francesco Margoni & Luca Surian - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):76-101.
    Prominent theories in moral psychology maintain that a core aspect of moral competence is the ability to distinguish moral norms, which derive from universal principles of justice and fairness, from conventional norms, which are contingent on a specific group consensus. The present study investigated the psychological bases of the moral-conventional distinction by manipulating the framing of the test question, the authority’s license, and the historical context. Participants evaluated moral and conventional transgressions by answering an ‘okay for you’ test question (i.e., (...)
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  29.  22
    The Method(s) of Cases.Jeffrey Maynes - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):102-124.
    Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the “method of cases,” and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and (...)
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  30. Tactful Animals: How the Study of Touch Can Inform the Animal Morality Debate.Susana Monsó & Birte Wrage - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):1-27.
    In this paper, we argue that scientists working on the animal morality debate have been operating with a narrow view of morality that prematurely limits the variety of moral practices that animals may be capable of. We show how this bias can be partially corrected by paying more attention to the touch behaviours of animals. We argue that a careful examination of the ways in which animals engage in and navigate touch interactions can shed new light on current debates on (...)
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  31.  10
    Can Induced Reflection Affect Moral Decision-Making?Daniel Spears, Yasmina Okan, Irene Hinojosa-Aguayo, José César Perales, María Ruz & Felisa González - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):28-46.
    Evidence about whether reflective thinking may be induced and whether it affects utilitarian choices is inconclusive. Research suggests that answering items correctly in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) before responding to dilemmas may lead to more utilitarian decisions. However, it is unclear to what extent this effect is driven by the inhibition of intuitive wrong responses (reflection) versus the requirement to engage in deliberative processing. To clarify this issue, participants completed either the CRT or the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT) – (...)
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