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  1.  29
    The Ontology of Emotions. [REVIEW]Gary Bartlett - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):187-189.
    The Ontology of Emotions. Edited by Naar Hichem, Teroni Fabrice.. Price £75.00.).
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  2.  12
    Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation.Michael Cholbi - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):189-192.
    Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation. By Robert Stern.
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  3.  52
    Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, Christopher Shields. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):192-193.
  4. On What It Takes to Be an Expert.Michel Croce - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21.
    This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I (...)
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  5.  34
    Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.
    It is widely thought that, to be morally responsible for some action or omission, an agent must have had, at the very least, the general ability to do otherwise. As we argue, however, there are counterexamples to the claim that moral responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise. We present several cases in which agents lack the general ability to do otherwise and yet are intuitively morally responsible for what they do, and we argue that such cases raise problems (...)
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  6.  18
    The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method. [REVIEW]Hossein Dabbagh - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):195-197.
    The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method. By Deutsch Max.
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  7.  2
    Why Doxastic Dependence Defeats Grue: A Response to Dorst's Reply.Wolfgang Freitag - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):156-165.
    In a recent paper on Goodman's paradox, I have argued that ‘grue’ is unprojectible because the grue-evidence is doxastically dependent on the evidence that the samples are examined before t. Christopher Dorst replies that doxastic dependence is unable to yield a language-independent asymmetry with respect to ‘green’ and ‘grue’ and hence cannot resolve Goodman's paradox. In this response I hope to show that Dorst's considerations are flawed: his argument for the language-relativity of doxastic dependence is inconclusive at best—even if his (...)
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  8. How NaÏve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.Craig French & Anil Gomes - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):41-63.
    Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it —that particular object—looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views cannot account for the (...)
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  9.  12
    Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Christian Kietzmann - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):197-199.
    Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. By Marušić Berislav.
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  10.  1
    Moral Realism, Speech Act Diversity, and Expressivism.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):166-174.
    In his highly engaging book, Speech and Morality, Terence Cuneo advances a transcendental argument for moral realism from the fact that we speak. After summarizing the major moves in the book, I argue that its master argument is not as friendly to non-naturalist versions of moral realism as Cuneo advertises and relies on a diet of insufficient types of speech acts. I also argue that expressivists have compelling replies to each of Cuneo's objections individually, but taken together, Cuneo's objections provide (...)
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  11. Making Things Up. [REVIEW]Manuel Lechthaler - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):200-202.
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  12.  6
    An Ecumenical Matter?James Lenman - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):175-186.
    Ridge defends a form of hybrid expressivism where normative judgements are constituted by two elements, normative perspectives and representational beliefs that invoke standards our normative perspectives determine. He thinks this view will enable him to ‘offload logical complexity’ onto the latter, representational components of our judgements, thereby taming the Frege-Geach Problem and conferring a dialectical advantage over non-hybrid, ‘pure’ forms of expressivism. But this will only work if our normative perspectives are themselves consistent in ways that are resistant to such (...)
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  13.  32
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling.Errol Lord - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):202-206.
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling. By Sinhababu Neil.
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  14.  11
    Liars, Tigers, and Bearers of Bad News, Oh My!: Towards a Reasons Account of Defeat.Emelia Miller - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):82-99.
    The standard reliabilist line on defeat is open to counterexamples regarding its necessity and sufficiency. In this paper, I present three problems for the standard reliabilist line from the recent literature on defeat before arguing that reliabilists can solve those problems by adopting an account of justification that ties defeat to the evidence possessed by the relevant agent. In doing so, I show that there is a conception of having evidence that reliabilists can adopt without giving up on the core (...)
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  15.  8
    Recursion: A Computational Investigation Into the Representation and Processing of Language.Ryan M. Nefdt - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):206-209.
    Recursion: A Computational Investigation into the Representation and Processing of Language. By Lobina David.
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  16. Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch?Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):100-120.
    This paper examines three reasons to think that Craig's genealogy of the concept of knowledge is incompatible with knowledge-first epistemology and finds that far from being incompatible with it, the genealogy lends succour to it. This reconciliation turns on two ideas. First, the genealogy is not history, but a dynamic model of needs. Secondly, by recognizing the continuity of Craig's genealogy with Williams's genealogy of truthfulness, we can see that while both genealogies start out from specific needs explaining what drives (...)
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  17.  6
    Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework.Tony Reeves - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):209-212.
    Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework. By John Oberdiek.
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  18.  4
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.William Roche - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):212-215.
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem. By Atkinson David, Peijnenburg Jeanne.
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  19.  3
    J. M. E. McTaggart: Substance, Self and Immortality.Gerald Rochelle - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):216-217.
    J. M. E. McTaggart: Substance, Self and Immortality. By Sharma Ramesh K.
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  20. Modality is Not Explainable by Essence.Carlos Romero - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):121-141.
    Some metaphysicians believe that metaphysical modality is explainable by the essences of objects. In §II, I spell out the definitional view of essence, and in §III, a working notion of metaphysical explanation. Then, in §IV, I consider and reject five natural ways to explain necessity by essence: in terms of the principle that essential properties can't change, in terms of the supposed obviousness of the necessity of essential truth, in terms of the logical necessity of definitions, in terms of Fine's (...)
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  21.  3
    Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Shlomi Segall - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):142-155.
    Utilitarians are said to be indifferent between interpersonal and intrapersonal transfers. In doing so, they fail to register the separateness of persons. This ‘separateness of persons’ objection has been traditionally used against utilitarianism, but more recently against prioritarianism. In this paper, I examine how yet another distributive view, namely sufficientarianism, fares in this respect. Sufficientarians famously believe that while inequality as such does not matter, what does matter is that all individuals meet some adequate threshold. It is often taken for (...)
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  22.  15
    Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice. [REVIEW]Isaac Wiegman - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):217-220.
    Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice. By Nussbaum Martha.
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  23.  22
    Review of David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg’s Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem (2017, Springer). [REVIEW]William Roche - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69:212-215.
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