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  1.  9
    Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind.István Aranyosi - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):138-141.
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  2.  67
    Choosing Normative Concepts.Matthew S. Bedke - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):121-126.
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  3.  23
    The Subject of Experience.Robert J. Howell - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):134-138.
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  4.  12
    The Social Turn in Moral Psychology.Alex Madva - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):116-121.
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  5. Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.
    What does 'might' mean? One hypothesis is that 'It might be raining' is essentially an avowal of ignorance like 'For all I know, it's raining'. But it turns out these two constructions embed in different ways, in particular as parts of larger constructions like Wittgenstein's 'It might be raining and it's not' and Moore's 'It's raining and I don't know it', respectively. A variety of approaches have been developed to account for those differences. All approaches agree that both Moore sentences (...)
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  6.  15
    Visual Phenomenology.Neil Mehta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):131-134.
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  7. Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.
    The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as (...)
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  8.  33
    The Rationality of Perception.Casey O'Callaghan - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):126-130.
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  9. I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again.Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):107-111.
    review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
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  10.  4
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race.Julie K. Ward - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):111-116.
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