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  1.  72
    The Normativity of Rationality.John Brunero - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):313-317.
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  2.  44
    The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy.Eddy Keming Chen - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):302-308.
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  3.  19
    Ontology Without Borders.Andrew Cortens - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):309-313.
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  4.  61
    False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):159-210.
    The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally (...)
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  5.  18
    The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.
    According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? (...)
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  6. The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
    It is plausible that there are epistemic reasons bearing on a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there are a range of practical reasons bearing on what to believe. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. Most significantly for our purposes, it is obscure how epistemic reasons and practical reasons might interact in the explanation of what one ought to believe. We draw an analogy with a similar distinction between (...)
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  7.  19
    Contextualizing Knowledge.Geoff Pynn - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):317-322.
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  8.  4
    Aristotle on Religion.Harald Thorsrud - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):299-302.
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  9.  88
    Scientific Ontology. [REVIEW]Vera Flocke - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):144-149.
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  10.  35
    Probabilistic Knowledge.Melissa Fusco - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):139-144.
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  11.  23
    Virtue and Law in Plato and Beyond.Mi-Kyoung Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):131-135.
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  12.  41
    Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism About Reasons.Eden Lin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):95-130.
    Extant discussions of subjectivism about reasons for action have concentrated on presentist versions of the theory, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present desires. In this article, I motivate and investigate the prospects of futurist subjectivism, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument, and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a (...)
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  13.  98
    Vagueness and Thought. [REVIEW]John MacFarlane - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):153-158.
  14.  31
    Sparing Civilians. [REVIEW]Jonathan Parry - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):135-139.
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  15. Names Are Variables.Anders J. Schoubye - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):53-94.
    MILLIANISM and DESCRIPTIVISM are without question the two most prominent views with respect to the semantics of proper names. However, debates between MILLIANS and DESCRIPTIVISTS have tended to focus on a fairly narrow set of linguistic data and an equally narrow set of problems, mainly how to solve with Frege's puzzle and how to guarantee rigidity. In this article, the author focuses on a set of data that has been given less attention in these debates—namely, so-called predicative uses, bound uses, (...)
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  16.  85
    The Fragmentation of Being. [REVIEW]Kelly Trogdon - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):149-153.
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