Year:

  1.  13
    On the Relative Value of Human and Animal Lives.Mark Bernstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1517-1538.
    It has become virtually a matter of dogma—among both philosophers and laypersons—that human lives are more valuable than animal lives. One argument for this claim dominates the philosophical literature and, despite its employment by a host of philosophers, should be found wanting. I try to show that this line of reasoning, as well as one that is less popular but still with significant appeal, are faulty. The errors in each argument seem fatal: the pervasive argument begs the question, and the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  11
    Good-Making and Organic Unity.Johan Brännmark - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1499-1516.
    Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable wholes and it is suggested (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  22
    Pragmatic Force in Semantic Context.Elisabeth Camp - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1617-1627.
    Stalnaker’s Context deploys the core machinery of common ground, possible worlds, and epistemic accessibility to mount a powerful case for the ‘autonomy of pragmatics’: the utility of theorizing about discourse function independently of specific linguistic mechanisms. Illocutionary force lies at the peripherybetween pragmatics—as the rational, non-conventional dynamics of context change—and semantics—as a conventional compositional mechanism for determining truth-conditional contents—in an interesting way. I argue that the conventionalization of illocutionary force, most notably in assertion, has important crosscontextual consequences that are not (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Skill and Motor Control: Intelligence All the Way Down.Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1539-1560.
    When reflecting on the nature of skilled action, it is easy to fall into familiar dichotomies such that one construes the flexibility and intelligence of skill at the level of intentional states while characterizing the automatic motor processes that constitute motor skill execution as learned but fixed, invariant, bottom-up, brute-causal responses. In this essay, I will argue that this picture of skilled, automatic, motor processes is overly simplistic. Specifically, I will argue that an adequate account of the learned motor routines (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  58
    Expressivism and Realist Explanations.Camil Golub - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1385-1409.
    It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  4
    Erratum To: Expressivism and Realist Explanations.Camil Golub - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1411-1411.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  14
    Conversation and Common Ground.Mitchell Green - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1587-1604.
    Stalnaker’s conception of context as common ground possesses unquestionable explanatory power, shedding light on presupposition, presupposition accommodation, the behavior of certain types of conditionals, epistemic modals, and related phenomena. The CG-context approach is also highly abstract, so merely pointing out that it fails to account for an aspect of communication is an inconclusive criticism. Instead our question should be whether it can be extended or modified to account for such a phenomenon while preserving its spirit. To that end, this essay (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality.Neil McDonnell - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1459-1474.
    Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to “independently plausible” and “well grounded” theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional to their effects. I argue that this feature is a bug, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  12
    Reasonable Foreseeability and Blameless Ignorance.Daniel J. Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1561-1581.
    This paper draws attention to a fundamental problem for a version of the tracing strategy defended by a number of theorists in the current literature :295–313, 2004; Fischer and Tognazzini in Noûs, 43:531–556, 2009). I argue that versions of the tracing strategy that require reasonable foreseeability are in tension with the view that blameless ignorance excuses. A stronger version of the tracing strategy is consistent with the view that blameless ignorance excuses and is therefore preferable for those tracing theorists who (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  39
    Why Moral Psychology is Disturbing.Regina A. Rini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1439-1458.
    Learning the psychological origins of our moral judgments can lead us to lose confidence in them. In this paper I explain why. I consider two explanations drawn from existing literature—regarding epistemic unreliability and automaticity—and argue that neither is fully adequate. I then propose a new explanation, according to which psychological research reveals the extent to which we are disturbingly disunified as moral agents.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  7
    An Unresolved Problem: Freedom Across Lifetimes.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1413-1438.
    Freedom is one of the central values in political and moral philosophy. A number of theorists hold that freedom should either be the only or at least one of the central distribuenda in our theories of distributive justice. Moreover, many follow Mill and hold that a concern for personal freedom should guide, and limit, how paternalist public policy can be. For the most part, theorists have focussed on a person’s freedom at one specific point in time but have failed to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Consequentializing and its Consequences.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1475-1497.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that we can and should “consequentialize” non-consequentialist moral theories, putting them into a consequentialist framework. I argue that these philosophers, usually treated as a group, in fact offer three separate arguments, two of which are incompatible. I show that none represent significant threats to a committed non-consequentialist, and that the literature has suffered due to a failure to distinguish these arguments. I conclude by showing that the failure of the consequentializers’ arguments has implications (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  18
    Responses.Robert Stalnaker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1629-1639.
  14.  15
    Précis of Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1583-1585.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  15
    Prospective Interpretation.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1605-1616.
    Semantic and pragmatic theories tend to deal with context-change in two radically opposing ways. Some view it as theoretically irrelevant, interpreting each sentence relative to the context as it happens to be at the moment of its utterance. Others view it as theoretically fundamental, proposing to view context-change as the very subject-matter of the theory of interpretation. Robert Stalnaker’s book Context steers a middle course between the extremes–to keep the semantics mostly static while letting the pragmatics go mostly dynamic. Within (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  65
    How to Think About Satisficing.Chris Tucker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1365-1384.
    An agent submaximizes with motivation when she aims at the best but chooses a less good option because of a countervailing consideration. An agent satisfices when she rejects the better for the good enough, and does so because the mere good enough gets her what she really wants. Motivated submaximization and satisficing, so construed, are different ways of choosing a suboptimal option, but this difference is easily missed. Putative proponents of satisficing tend to argue only that motivated submaximization can be (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  53
    Abortion and Miscarriage.Amy Berg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1217-1226.
    Opponents of abortion sometimes hold that it is impermissible because fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. But miscarriage, which ends up to 89 % of pregnancies, is much deadlier than abortion. That means that if opponents of abortion are right, then miscarriage is the biggest public-health crisis of our time. Yet they pay hardly any attention to miscarriage, especially very early miscarriage. Attempts to resolve this inconsistency by adverting to the distinction between killing and letting die or to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  12
    Fundamental Ontological Structure: An Argument Against Pluralism.Bertrand Michael - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1277-1297.
    In recent years, a hierarchical view of reality has become extremely influential. In order to understand the world as a whole, on this view, we need to understand the nature of the fundamental constituents of the world. We also need to understand the relations that build the world up from these fundamental constituents. Building pluralism is the view that there are at least two equally fundamental relations that together build the world. It has been widely, though tacitly, assumed in a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Is There Introspective Evidence for Phenomenal Intentionality?Davide Bordini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1105-1126.
    The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e., the view that phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the phenomenal intentionality view (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  39
    Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.
    We use recent interventionist theories of causation to develop a compatibilist account of causal sourcehood, which provides a response to Manipulation Arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Our account explains the difference between manipulation and determinism, against the claim of Manipulation Arguments that there is no relevant difference. Interventionism allows us to see that causal determinism does not mean that variables outside of the agent causally explain her actions better than variables within the agent, whereas the causal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  48
    How to Undercut Radical Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1299-1321.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  11
    Science, God and Ockham’s Razor.David H. Glass - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1145-1161.
    In discussions about the existence of God, it is sometimes claimed that the progress of science has removed the need for God. This paper uses a Bayesian analysis of Ockham’s razor to formulate and evaluate this argument, which is referred to as the science explains away God argument. Four different strategies for responding to this argument are presented and evaluated. It is argued that one of these strategies highlights how difficult it is to show that the conditions for applying Ockham’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  11
    Aggregating Extended Preferences.Hilary Greaves & Harvey Lederman - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1163-1190.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi :434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules that violate Arrow’s Independence of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  31
    Propositional Apriority and the Nesting Problem.Jens Kipper - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1091-1104.
    According to the modal account of propositional apriority, a proposition is a priori if it is possible to know it with a priori justification. Assuming that modal truths are necessarily true and that there are contingent a priori truths, this account has the undesirable consequence that a proposition can be a priori in a world in which it is false. Epistemic two-dimensionalism faces the same problem, since on its standard interpretation, it also entails that a priori propositions are necessarily a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  48
    Difference-Making Grounds.Stephan Krämer & Stefan Roski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1191-1215.
    We define a notion of difference-making for partial grounds of a fact in rough analogy to existing notions of difference-making for causes of an event. Using orthodox assumptions about ground, we show that it induces a non-trivial division with examples of partial grounds on both sides. We then demonstrate the theoretical fruitfulness of the notion by applying it to the analysis of a certain kind of putative counter-example to the transitivity of ground recently described by Jonathan Schaffer. First, we show (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  23
    Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap.Jonathan Brink Morgan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1243-1253.
    Many arguments against naïve realism are arguments against its corollary: disjunctivism. But there is a simpler argument—due to Mehta —that targets naïve realism directly. In broad strokes, the argument is the following. There are certain experiences that are, allegedly, in no way phenomenally similar. Nevertheless, naïve realism predicts that they are phenomenally similar. Hence, naïve realism is false. Mehta and Ganson successfully defend this argument from an objection raised by French and Gomes :451–460, 2016). However, all parties to this dispute (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  1
    Erratum To: Go Figure: Understanding Figurative Talk.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1363-1363.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Folk Intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation.David Rose - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1323-1361.
    How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is an actual cause of some particular outcome? Many philosophers have wanted a view of actual causation which fits with folk intuitions of actual causation and those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and where the folk have gone wrong. In this paper, I provide a range of empirical evidence aimed at showing just (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  85
    The Function of Morality.Nicholas Smyth - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1127-1144.
    What is the function of morality? On this question, something approaching a consensus has recently emerged. Impressed by developments in evolutionary theory, many philosophers now tell us that the function of morality is to reduce social tensions, and to thereby enable a society to efficiently promote the well-being of its members. In this paper, I subject this consensus to rigorous scrutiny, arguing that the functional hypothesis in question is not well supported. In particular, I attack the supposed evidential relation between (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. False Reflections.Maarten Steenhagen - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1227-1242.
    Philosophers and psychologists often assume that mirror reflections are optical illusions. According to many authors, what we see in a mirror appears to be behind it. I discuss two strategies to resist this piece of dogma. As I will show, the conviction that mirror reflections are illusions is rooted in a confused conception of the relations between location, direction, and visibility. This conception is unacceptable to those who take seriously the way in which mirrors contribute to our experience of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  10
    Justification as Faultlessness.Beddor Bob - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.
    According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals and strong necessity modals to make progress on a question that has received surprisingly little discussion in the literature, namely: ‘What’s the best version of a deontological approach?’ The two most obvious hypotheses are the Permissive View, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  25
    Epistemic Akrasia and the Fallibility of Critical Reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  23
    Against Instantiation as Identity.Scott Brown - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):887-900.
    Some people object to realism about universals because they think that instantiation, the connection between something and the universals that characterize it, is too mysterious. Baxter and Armstrong try to make instantiation less mysterious by taking it to be a kind of partial identity. However, I argue that their accounts of instantiation, and any similar ones, fail.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  32
    Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited.Justin A. Capes & Philip Swenson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):967-981.
    Frankfurt cases are supposed to provide us with counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities. Among the most well known responses to these cases is what John Fischer has dubbed the flicker of freedom strategy. Here we revisit a version of this strategy, which we refer to as the fine-grained response. Although a number of philosophers, including some who are otherwise unsympathetic to Frankfurt’s argument, have dismissed the fine grained response, we believe there is a good deal to be said (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  22
    On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument Against Closure.Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  49
    Elaboration and Intuitions of Disagreement.Alex Davies - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):861-875.
    Mark Richard argues for truth-relativism about claims made using gradable adjectives. He argues that truth-relativism is the best explanation of two kinds of linguistic data, which I call: true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. Richard claims that such data are generated by an example that he discusses at length. However, the consensus is that these linguistic data are illusory because they vanish when elaborations are added to examples of the same kind as Richard’s original. In this paper I (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  12
    Dualists Needn't Be Anti-Criterialists (nor Should They Be).Duncan Matt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):945-963.
    Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who hold the first view (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  11
    Erratum To: Dualists Needn’T Be Anti-Criterialists.Matt Duncan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):965-965.
  39.  56
    Counterfactual Reasoning and Knowledge of Possibilities.Dominic Gregory - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):821-835.
    Williamson has argued against scepticism concerning our metaphysically modal knowledge, by arguing that standard patterns of suppositional reasoning to counterfactual conclusions provide reliable sources of correct ascriptions of possibility and necessity. The paper argues that, while Williamson’s claims relating to necessity may well be right, he has not provided adequate reasons for thinking that the familiar modes of counterfactual reasoning to which he points generalise to provide a decent route to ascriptions of possibility. The paper also explores another path to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  76
    Evidence and the Openness of Knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.
    The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  31
    Replies to Comesaña and Yablo.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1073-1090.
    There are few indulgences academics can crave more than to have their work considered and addressed by leading researchers in their field. We have been fortunate to have two outstanding philosophers from whose work we have learned a great deal give ours their thoughtful attention. Grappling with Stephen Yablo’s, and Juan Comesaña’s comments and criticisms has helped us gain a better understanding of our ideas as well as their shortcomings. We are extremely grateful to them for the attentiveness and seriousness (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  8
    Metaphors and Martinis: A Response to Jessica Keiser.Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):853-859.
    This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  6
    Legal Punishment of Immorality: Once More Into the Breach.Kyle Swan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):983-1000.
    Gerald Dworkin’s overlooked defense of legal moralism attempts to undermine the traditional liberal case for a principled distinction between behavior that is immoral and criminal and behavior that is immoral but not criminal. According to Dworkin, his argument for legal moralism “depends upon a plausible idea of what making moral judgments involves.” The idea Dworkin has in mind here is a metaethical principle that many have connected to morality/reasons internalism. I agree with Dworkin that this is a plausible principle, but (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  14
    Does Excusable Ignorance Absolve of Liability for Costs?Joachim Wündisch - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):837-851.
    Excusable ignorance not only undermines moral culpability but also agent-responsibility. Therefore, excusable ignorance absolves of liability for costs. Specifically, it defeats liability that is meant to be derived from causal responsibility wherever strict liability cannot be justified. To establish these claims this paper assesses the potential of arguments for liability of excusably ignorant agents and thereby demarcates the proper domain of strict liability and traces the intuition that seemingly supports strict liability accounts to more general principles. The paper concludes that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  39
    Open Knowledge and Changing the Subject.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1047-1071.
    Knowledge is closed under implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness”? This paper compares two styles of explanation: evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  14
    Relativism, Translation, and the Metaphysics of Realism.Aristidis Arageorgis - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):659-680.
    Thoroughgoing relativists typically dismiss the realist conviction that competing theories describe just one definite and mind-independent world-structure on the grounds that such theories fail to be relatively translatable even though they are equally correct. This line of argument allegedly brings relativism into direct conflict with the metaphysics of realism. I argue that this relativist line of reasoning is shaky by deriving a theorem about relativistic inquiry in formal epistemology—more specifically, in the approach Kevin Kelly has dubbed “logic of reliable inquiry”. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  86
    A Solution to Knowledge’s Threshold Problem.Michael Hannon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):607-629.
    This paper is about the ‘threshold problem’ for knowledge, namely, how do we determine what fixes the level of justification required for knowledge in a non-arbitrary way? One popular strategy for solving this problem is impurism, which is the view that the required level of justification is partly fixed by one’s practical reasoning situation. However, this strategy has been the target of several recent objections. My goal is to propose a new version of impurism that solves the threshold problem without (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  45
    Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  70
    Partial Content and Expressions of Part and Whole. Discussion of Stephen Yablo: Aboutness.Friederike Moltmann - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):797-808.
    In 'Aboutness' (MIT Press 2014), Yablo argues for the importance of the notions of partial content and partial truth. This paper argues that they are involved in a much greater range of entities than acknowledged by Yablo. The paper also argues that some of those entities involve a notion of partial satisfaction as well as partial existence (validity).
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  20
    Yablo’s Semantic Machinery.Daniel Rothschild - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):787-796.
    Yablo’s Aboutness introduces powerful new set of tools for analyzing meaning. I compare his account of subject matter to the related ideas employed in the semantics literature on questions and focus. I then discuss two applications of subject matter: to presupposition triggering and to ascriptions of shared content.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  51.  57
    The Causal Metaphor Account of Metaphysical Explanation.Jonathan L. Shaheen - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):553-578.
    This paper argues that the semantic facts about ‘because’ are best explained via a metaphorical treatment of metaphysical explanation that treats causal explanation as explanation par excellence. Along the way, it defends a commitment to a unified causal sense of ‘because’ and offers a proprietary explanation of grounding skepticism. With the causal metaphor account of metaphysical explanation on the table, an extended discussion of the relationship between conceptual structure and metaphysics ends with a suggestion that the semantic facts about ‘because’ (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  52.  35
    A Puzzle About Demonstratives and Semantic Competence.Jeff Speaks - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):709-734.
    My aim in this paper is to lay out a number of theses which are very widely held in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and to argue that, given some extra theses for which I’ll argue, they are inconsistent. Some of this will involve going through some very well-trodden territory—my hope is that presenting this familiar ground in the way that I do will help to make plain the problem that I aim to identify.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  53.  17
    Finding the Question.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):779-786.
    Yablo gives us an account of subject-matter - a characterization of what declarative sentences are about. I argue that this account can be seen as a way of adjusting Frege’s theory of meaning, so as it no longer carries the implausible commitment that declarative sentences refer to their truth-values. I also point out that Yablo’s approach faces an unpleasant choice: give up a uniform compositional semantics for interrogative sentences or abandon the idea that ordinary characterizations of subject matter are literally (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  54.  28
    Positive Truthmakers for Negative Truths: A Solution to Molnar’s Problem.Jonas Waechter - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):579-592.
    The present paper addresses Molnar’s problem :72–86, 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called, is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible variants of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  55.  20
    Identity and Quantification.Kai F. Wehmeier - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):759-770.
    It is a philosophical commonplace that quantification involves, invokes, or presupposes, the relation of identity. There seem to be two major sources for this belief: the conviction that identity is implicated in the phenomenon of bound variable recurrence within the scope of a quantifier; memories of Quine’s insistence that quantification requires absolute identity for the values of variables. With respect to, I show that the only extant argument for a dependence of variable recurrence on identity, due to John Hawthorne, fails. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  56.  32
    Rethinking Expressive Theories of Punishment: Why Denunciation is a Better Bet Than Communication or Pure Expression.Bill Wringe - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):681-708.
    Many philosophers hold that punishment has an expressive dimension. Advocates of expressive theories have different views about what makes punishment expressive, what kinds of mental states and what kinds of claims are, or legitimately can be expressed in punishment, and to what kind of audience or recipients, if any, punishment might express whatever it expresses. I shall argue that in order to assess the plausibility of an expressivist approach to justifying punishment we need to pay careful attention to whether the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  57.  32
    Precis of Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):771-777.
    A lightning fast summary of Yablo, Aboutness, cutting many corners in the interests of brevity. The emphasis is on “ways.” Substituting “ways for S to be true” in for “worlds in which S is true” improves a number of philosophical explanations. The subject matter of S is identified with S’s ways of holding in a world, or failing, as the case may be. S contains T iff T is implied by S, and T’s ways of being true are implied by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  58.  17
    Replies to Commentators.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):809-820.
    I reply to three commentators—Friederike Moltmann, Daniel Rothschild, and Zoltán Szabó—on six topics—sense and reference, the unity of subject matter, questions, presupposition, partial truth, and content mereology.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  59.  15
    On Fraud.Liam Kofi Bright - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):291-310.
    Preferably scientific investigations would promote true rather than false beliefs. The phenomenon of fraud represents a standing challenge to this veritistic ideal. When scientists publish fraudulent results they knowingly enter falsehoods into the information stream of science. Recognition of this challenge has prompted calls for scientists to more consciously adopt the veritistic ideal in their own work. In this paper I argue against such promotion of the veritistic ideal. It turns out that a sincere desire on the part of scientists (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  60.  19
    Secession and Distributive Justice.Amandine Catala - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):529-552.
    The philosophical debate on secession has hitherto revolved primarily around the question of self-determination rather than that of distributive justice. Normative theorists of secession have approached the question of secession mostly in terms of the right that the secessionist group has to secede. Much less attention has been paid to the extent and the nature of obligations or duties that the seceding group might have toward the group it is leaving behind. At best, secession theorists have introduced clauses to the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  61.  32
    Good to Know.Earl Conee - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):311-331.
    Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. This conception is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  62.  22
    Rethinking Freedom of Contract.Jessica Flanigan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):443-463.
    Many liberal egalitarians support laws that prevent people from making exploitative and unconscionable contracts. These contracts may include low-wage labor agreements or payday loans, for example. I argue that liberal egalitarians should rethink their support for laws that limit the freedom to make these illiberal contracts, as long as the contracts are voluntary and do not violate people’s other enforceable rights. Paternalistic considerations cannot justify limits on illiberal contracts because they are not only likely to misfire; they also express condescending (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  63.  29
    Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought?Peter V. Forrest - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):403-424.
    According to a number of popular intentionalist theories in philosophy of mind, phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically intentional: phenomenal properties are identical to intentional properties of a certain type, or at least, the phenomenal character of an experience necessarily fixes a type of intentional content. These views are attractive, but it is questionable whether the reasons for accepting them generalize from sensory-perceptual experience to other kinds of experience: for example, agentive, moral, aesthetic, or cognitive experience. Meanwhile, a number of philosophers (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  64. No Need to Know.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):391-401.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  65.  25
    What Desires Are, and Are Not.Alan H. Goldman - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):333-352.
    This paper criticizes the account of desire defended by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder in their recent book, In Praise of Desire. It contrasts their account with one that I favor, a cluster analysis listing various criteria that are together sufficient for having paradigm desires, but none of which is necessary or sufficient for desiring. I argue that their account fails to state necessary or sufficient conditions, that it is explanatorily weaker than the cluster account, that it fails to provide (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  66.  13
    Mentalizing Animals: Implications for Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics.T. J. Kasperbauer - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):465-484.
    Ethicists have tended to treat the psychology of attributing mental states to animals as an entirely separate issue from the moral importance of animals’ mental states. In this paper I bring these two issues together. I argue for two theses, one descriptive and one normative. The descriptive thesis holds that ordinary human agents use what are generally called phenomenal mental states to assign moral considerability to animals. I examine recent empirical research on the attribution of phenomenal states and agential states (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  67.  16
    A Dilemma for Morally Responsible Time Travelers.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):379-389.
    In this paper I argue that new attempts to undermine the principle of alternative possibilities via appeal to time travel fail. My argument targets a version of a Frankfurt-style counterexample to the principle recently developed by Spencer. I argue that in avoiding one prominent objection to standard Frankfurt-style counterexamples Spencer’s time travel case runs afoul of another. Furthermore, the very feature of the case which makes it initially appealing also makes it impossible to revise the case such that it can (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  68.  55
    Direct Control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.
    This article’s aim is to shed light on direct control, especially as it pertains to free will. I sketch two ways of conceiving of such control. Both sketches extend to decision making. Issues addressed include the problem of present luck and the relationship between direct control and complete control.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  69.  79
    Responsibility and Vigilance.Samuel Murray - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):507-527.
    My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  70.  91
    Deontological Evidentialism, Wide-Scope, and Privileged Values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.
    Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  71.  31
    Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  72.  24
    A Nonconceptualist Reading of the B-Deduction.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):425-442.
    In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  73.  77
    Why Metaphors Make Good Insults: Perspectives, Presupposition, and Pragmatics.Elisabeth Camp - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):47--64.
    Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ”framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ”complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are rhetorically (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  74.  28
    Imagery, Expression, and Metaphor.Mitchell Green - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):33--46.
    Metaphorical utterances are construed as falling into two broad categories, in one of which are cases amenable to analysis in terms of semantic content, speaker meaning, and satisfaction conditions, and where image-construction is permissible but not mandatory. I call these image-permitting metaphors, and contrast them with image-demanding metaphors comprising a second category and whose understanding mandates the construction of a mental image. This construction, I suggest, is spontaneous, is not restricted to visual imagery, and its result is typically somatically marked (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  75.  41
    The What and the How of Metaphorical Imagining, Part One.David Hills - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):13--31.
    We humans are remarkably interested in and skilled at games of make believe, games whose rules make what we are called on to imagine depend on what’s actually perceivably true about things and people that have what it takes to assume various fictional roles and that thereby function in the games as props. For the most part we play these games on an improvised pickup basis, working out the rules we play by in the very act of playing by them. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  76.  39
    Compound Figures: Priority and Speech-Act Structure.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):141-161.
    Compound figures are a rich, and under-explored area for tackling fundamental issues in philosophy of language. This paper explores new ideas about how to explain some features of such figures. We start with an observation from Stern that in ironic-metaphor, metaphor is logically prior to irony in the structure of what is communicated. Call this thesis Logical-MPT. We argue that a speech-act-based explanation of Logical-MPT is to be preferred to a content-based explanation. To create this explanation we draw on Barker’s (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  77.  50
    Go Figure: Understanding Figurative Talk.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):1-12.
    We think and speak in figures. This is key to our creativity. We re-imagine one thing as another, pretend ourself to be another, do one thing in order to achieve another, or say one thing to mean another. This comes easily because of our abilities both to work out meaning in context and re-purpose words. Figures of speech are tools for this re-purposing. Whether we use metaphor, simile, irony, hyperbole, and litotes individually, or as compound figures, the uses are all (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  78.  23
    The Animal, the Corpse, and the Remnant-Person.Andrea Sauchelli - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):205–218.
    I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal, it is still appealing to those (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  79.  2
    Erratum To: Meiosis, Hyperbole, Irony.Kendall L. Walton - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):121-121.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  80.  59
    The Emotion Account of Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):257-273.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  81.  8
    Reasons for and Reasons Against.Snedegar Justin - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    What an agent ought to do is determined by competition between reasons bearing on the options open to her. The popular metaphor of balancing or weighing reasons on a scale to represent this competition encourages a focus on competition between reasons for competing options. But what an agent ought to do also depends on the reasons against those options. The balancing metaphor does not provide an obvious way to represent reasons against. Partly as a result of this, there is a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  82.  31
    Downward Mobility and Rawlsian Justice.Govind Persad - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Technological and societal changes have made downward social and economic mobility a pressing issue in real-world politics. This article argues that a Rawlsian society would not provide any special protection against downward mobility, and would act rightly in declining to provide such protection. Special treatment for the downwardly mobile can be grounded neither in Rawls’s core principles—the basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle—nor in other aspects of Rawls’s theory (the concept of legitimate expectations, the idea of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  83.  14
    Does Hallucinating Involve Perceiving?Rami Ali - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  84.  3
    Why It is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory.Janis David Schaab - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues