In this paper I investigate the limits of toleration using the example of the German debate on dealing with opponents of the covid vaccination. First, I present central elements of Rainer Forst’s conception of tolerance. I then refer to an important historical context of the emergence of tolerance and, using Pierre Bayle’s conception, show that the demand for tolerance of his time was limited to a specific context, but allows for some generalizations. Finally, I argue that we have to tolerate (...) those who see themselves as “Querdenker” (“lateral thinkers”) as long as their opposition does not violate applicable laws and thus endanger the framework of our democratic and constitutional order. Keywords: Toleration, limits of toleration, societal cohesion, covid vaccination, Pierre Bayle, Rainer Forst, Wendy Brown. (shrink)

The analogous unity between God and creature, which Eckhart assumes in his doctrine of the analogy of the communissima 'Being', 'One', 'True', 'Good' does not consist in a causal relation ('analogous causality'), as understood in recent studies, but in a sign relation: The creature functions as a medium, which indicates and manifests the being, one, true, good, which is God. This relation, however, is based on a causal relation which Eckhart interprets as participation. His understanding of participation differs fundamentally from (...) that of Aquinas. Eckhart unfolds the practical consequences of his doctrine of analogy in his reflections on the ethos of seclusion. Keywords: doctrine of analogy, analogous unity (of God and creature), analogy of the transcendentals, participation (Eckart versus Thomas Aquinas), creature as sign, ethos of seclusion. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that there are some strong philosophical and exegetical reasons to argue that according to the view developed in the first chapter of Aristotle’s De Memoria, the objects of memory are non-present, or absent, things and events rather than our past acts of awareness of them. We argue that on Aristotle’s account, the objects of memory can be particulars or universals, perceptibles or intelligibles, and that all these kinds of things are past in the same sense, (...) namely, in the sense of previously having been present to the perceiver or knower. Aristotle’s claim that we remember that we previously learned or saw something is the description of how, rather than what, we remember. Keywords: Aristotle, memory, past, pathos, present. (shrink)

One implication of Vetter's theory of modality is that necessity and possibility are regarded as unitary natural kinds. In this paper, I argue that from the perspective of the philosophy of causation, there are good reasons to distinguish between different kinds of necessity: causal necessity, which is nomologically necessary, and non-causal necessity, which is metaphysically necessary. One challenge for Vetter's approach is to explain this distinction. Keywords: nomological necessity, metaphysical necessity, causation, metaphysical dependence, natural kinds.

The paper discusses Barbara Vetter’s strategy of grounding metaphysical modalities in the capacities or potentialities of individual things. The first concern is the direction of explanation in tautological and contradictory potentialities. It is argued that the possible and necessary truth of tautologies grounds the possession of tautological potentialities, not vice versa; and that the impossibility of contradictions explains why nothing has contradictory potentialities, not vice versa. It is also argued that Vetter cannot adhere to providing constraints on the existence of (...) uninstantiated properties. Keywords: metaphysical modality, dispositional account of modality, grounding, tautological potentiality, uninstantiated properties. (shrink)

Barbara Vetter has argued that the notion of a metaphysical possibility functions like a natural-kind concept that picks out whatever kind is instantiated by the large majority of paradigmatic examples. Vetter holds that proponents of such a view can reject appeals to intuition and a priori reasoning as ways of supporting claims about the extension of metaphysical possibility, and that the attractiveness of a natural-kind account is consequently undiminished by intuitive counterexamples. This paper argues that that is far from obvious. (...) It may be true on a natural kind view that the claim that it is metaphysically possible that p can be established only on the basis of empirical evidence about which kind is instantiated by most paradigm examples and what the members of this kind are. However, that leaves open the possibility that intuition and a priori reasoning can be used to evaluate conditional claims of the following form: If the kind instantiated by most paradigm examples includes (fails to include) X, then it is possible (not possible) that p. If intuition and a priori considerations can be used in this manner, then they are relevant to the assessment of the natural-kind view. Keywords: modality, natural kinds, the a priori, intuition, potentiality. (shrink)

Do essence-based accounts of necessity and Vetter’s potentiality-based account of possibility in fact lead to the same result, viz., a single derived notion of necessity that is interdefinable with possibility or vice versa? And does each approach independently have the ability to reach its desired goal without having to rely on the primitive notion utilized by the other? In this essay, I investigate these questions and Vetter’s responses to them. Contrary to the “separatist” position defended by Vetter, I argue that (...) there are reasons to favor “Combination”, according to which an essence-based account of necessity should be combined with a potentiality-based account of possibility, or vice versa. According to this alternative approach, essentialism and potentialism should be regarded as allies, rather than as competitors, in a theory of derived modality, since both notions are needed in order to give a full account of necessity and possibility. Keywords: possibility, necessity, potentiality, essence, interdefinability, actuality, dependence, artifact-functions. (shrink)

Barbara Vetter proposes that certain epistemic and metasemantic challenges to our theorizing about metaphysical modality can be met by an approach which generalizes from every day paradigms of objective modality – notably the abilities and dispositions familiar to us “from the context of action” – to give content to the more abstract notion of a most general objective modality: metaphysical modality. I argue that the ability ascriptions which are central to our day to day practical reasoning are permeated with opacity (...) and therefore make for problematic paradigms of an objective modality. While Vetter could retrospectively “purify” her sample of paradigms, this would leave her in a similar position as those who seek to restrict a particularly broad modality, e.g. a priori conceivability, to its objective core. I conclude by taking on Vetter’s pessimistic conjecture that proponents of different approaches to the metasemantic challenge operate under assumptions so dramatically different that we should not expect them to even share a subject matter. Against this, I give an argument which suggests that so long as there is agreement regarding the theoretical role of metaphysical modality, it would be surprising if it made a difference whether one approached metaphysical modality by generalizing from one well-understood modality rather than by restricting another. Keywords: objective modality, abilities, opacity, broadest necessity. (shrink)

With the comeback of metaphysics on the agenda of analytical philosophy a renewed interest for modalities and their specific properties was not lagging far behind. Yet, their indispensability in debates, say for example on identity and essence, stands in marked contrast to the explanatory meagerness when modalities are introduced by reference to ‘possible worlds’. However, what is required for an appropriate understanding of modalities is not, or so I try to argue, a philosophical account in any ambitious sense of the (...) word but rather a specification of their ‘structural’ properties, which allow us to differentiate between various types of modalities. The proper framework for such a specification is conveniently offered by proof theory, and here specifically by Gentzen methods. Therein we find not only all that is needed to understand modalities, modalities are thereby also handed back to where once they originated: logic. Keywords: modalities, modal logic, possibilities, possible worlds, proof-theoretic meaning. (shrink)

Tolerance is not a problem of medieval philosophy. In addition to discussing reasons for this, the article refers to several texts, not coincidentally dialogues, in which elements of a sophisticated tolerance concept become apparent: For example the consideration of the outside perspective, i.e. less in specific theses than the discussion environment and the insight, although not represented, yet indicated, that the relation to claims of truth can only be a free one. Keywords: pluralism, truth claims, rationalism, philosophy of religion, assent.

The idea that human beings possess a moral sense is the characteristic of a certain branch of moral philosophy of the British Enlightenment. In this context, the question of tolerance appears as a condition that enables the moral sense to work properly. This article traces the connection between toleration and morality along Shatesbury's philosophy of politeness, via Hutcheson's conception of a moral philosophy based on “benevolence”, to Smith's development of the “impartial spectator”. Keywords: toleration, politeness, moral sense, humour, benevolence.

The aim of this article is twofold: First, it is argued that Tyler Burge’s case for externalism in the philosophy of mind, which is based on Hilary Putnam’s twin-earth thought experiment, fails. Second, it is shown that a convincing argument for externalism can be nonetheless construed by relying on Putnam’s thought experiment.

In this paper I reconstruct Hegel’s famous critique of irony by drawing on present-day vice epistemology. I argue that the categories of contemporary theories of epistemic vices are sufficient to classify a type of irony as a vicious stance. Yet they fail to grasp the property in virtue of which irony deserves criticism. I show that, for Hegel, this feature is intellectual pride. In the remainder of the paper, I specify the axiological, metaphysical, and epistemological background assumptions which guide the (...) self-assessment of proud persons according to Hegel. Finally, I throw some light on the theoretical presuppositions of Hegel’s account of irony and pride. (shrink)

According to our everyday concept, a morally attributable action has two prerequisites, namely the free decision between different options for action and the knowledge of what is being done, especially regarding the goal of action. During an intense debate on this topic at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century, William of Ockham takes into account this double requirement in his theory of action by understanding will and reason as partial causes of human activity. Thereby (...) he asserts neither a voluntaristic intensification of the freedom of will, as he is often accused of doing so, nor a dominance of practical knowledge. (shrink)

Human rights thinking interprets absolute human dignity as the moral reason for respecting oneself and all other persons. In the current dignity debate, this justification is increasingly being criticised. It is claimed that human dignity is not the moral reason but a consequence of acts of respect. In this regard, the explosive question arises as to which moral reason should replace human dignity. It must be noted that the concept of human dignity as a consequence of personal conduct are not (...) able to close this ethical justification gap. A reflective line of argumentation can show that the founding value of human dignity is indispensable. (shrink)