Year:

  1.  5
    The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  7
    Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Precis of Fixing Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):722-724.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  1
    Reply to Hofweber and Ninan.Imogen Dickie - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):745-760.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  7
    Against Radical Quantum Ontologies.Nina Emery - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):564-591.
    Some theories of quantum mechanical phenomena endorse wave function realism, according to which the physical space we inhabit is very different from the physical space we appear to inhabit. In this paper I explore an argument against wave function realism that appeals to a type of simplicity that, although often overlooked, plays a crucial role in scientific theory choice. The type of simplicity in question is simplicity of fit between the way a theory says the world is and the way (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  7
    A Deliberative Approach to Causation.Fernandes Alison Sutton - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):686-708.
    Fundamental physics makes no clear use of causal notions; it uses laws that operate in relevant respects in both temporal directions and that relate whole systems across times. But by relating causation to evidence, we can explain how causation fits in to a physical picture of the world and explain its temporal asymmetry. This paper takes up a deliberative approach to causation, according to which causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  3
    Cognitive Hunger: Remarks on Imogen Dickie's Fixing Reference.Richard G. Heck - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):738-744.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  2
    Dickie's Epistemic Theory of Reference.Thomas Hofweber - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):725-730.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  31
    Love and the Moral Error Theory: Is Love a Mistake?Simon Keller - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):709-721.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. ‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All.Alex King - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):637-661.
    Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Grounding the Unreal.Louis deRosset - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):535-563.
    The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a picture on which our scientific theories exhibit a layered structure of dependence and determination. Economics is dependent on and determined by psychology; psychology in its turn is, plausibly, dependent on and determined by biology; and so it goes. It is tempting to explain this layered structure of dependence and determination among our theories by appeal to a corresponding layered structure of dependence and determination among the entities putatively treated by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  5
    Aboutness and Justification.Dilip Ninan - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):731-737.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
    One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  15.  70
    Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets.Alexander Gebharter - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):353-375.
    In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  16.  6
    Jeff Speaks: The Phenomenal and the Representational.Levin Janet - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):478-484.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  80
    On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit.Errol Lord - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):436-464.
    In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for the right reasons. Conceptualization (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. What Was the Syntax‐Semantics Debate in the Philosophy of Science About?Sebastian Lutz - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):319-352.
    The debate between critics of syntactic and semantic approaches to the formalization of scientific theories has been going on for over 50 years. I structure the debate in light of a recent exchange between Hans Halvorson, Clark Glymour, and Bas van Fraassen and argue that the only remaining disagreement concerns the alleged difference in the dependence of syntactic and semantic approaches on languages of predicate logic. This difference turns out to be illusory.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  77
    Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):261-284.
    Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of authenticity that places special demands on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  10
    Sensing, the Senses, and Attention.Casey O'Callaghan - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):485-491.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  12
    The Perceptual Representation of Objects and Natural Kinds: Comments on Speaks.Pautz Adam - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):470-477.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):408-435.
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23.  10
    Précis of The Phenomenal and the Representational.Jeff Speaks - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):465-469.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  7
    Reply to Critics.Jeff Speaks - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):492-506.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  1
    Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):395-407.
    I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism—the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana really gave Ernie free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non-nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to do otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  72
    Fichte on Conscience.Owen Ware - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):376-394.
    There is no question that Fichte's theory of conscience is central to his system of ethics. Yet his descriptions of its role in practical deliberation appear inconsistent, if not contradictory. Many scholars have claimed that for Fichte conscience plays a material role by providing the content of our moral obligations—the Material Function View. Some have denied this, however, claiming that conscience only plays a formal role by testing our moral convictions in any given case—the Formal Function View. My aim in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Indexicals and Reference‐Shifting: Towards a Pragmatic Approach.Jonas Åkerman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):117-152.
    I propose a pragmatic approach to the kind of reference-shifting occurring in indexicals as used in e.g. written notes and answering machine messages. I proceed in two steps. First, I prepare the ground by showing that the arguments against such a pragmatic approach raised in the recent literature fail. Second, I take a first few steps towards implementing this approach, by sketching a pragmatic theory of reference-shifting, and showing how it can handle cases of the relevant kind. While the immediate (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  2
    Précis of Outside Color.Chirimuuta Mazviita - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):215-222.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Replies.Chirimuuta Mazviita - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):244-255.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  1
    Outside Color From Just Outside.Joshua Gert - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):223-228.
    Chirimuuta's view and my own are as close as they are because we both take two quite controversial stances: pragmatism as against a correspondence-based view of perceptual success, and adverbialism as against a representational view of color experience. Unsurprisingly, of course, we do not understand these positions in precisely the same ways. In these comments I would like to see if I can persuade Chirimuuta to take two steps in my direction. The first step is to broaden her pragmatism so (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. M. Chirimuuta's Adverbialism About Color.Gupta Anil - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):229-235.
    M. Chirimuuta's Outside Color is a rich and lovely book. I enjoyed reading it and benefitted from reflecting on its provocative ideas. I begin by briefly placing the book's principal thesis in its historical context, and I go on to reflect on two objections that might be lodged against this thesis.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  7
    Inductive Learning in Small and Large Worlds.Simon M. Huttegger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):90-116.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  4
    Ressentiment, Imaginary Revenge, and the Slave Revolt.Scott Jenkins - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1).
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  3
    Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.Michela Massimi - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1).
    In this paper, I assess recent claims in philosophy of science about scientific perspectivism being compatible with realism. I clarify the rationale for scientific perspectivism and the problems and challenges that perspectivism faces in delivering a form of realism. In particular, I concentrate my attention on truth, and on ways in which truth can be understood in perspectival terms. I offer a cost-benefit analysis of each of them and defend a version that in my view is most promising in living (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  45
    Realism, Relativism, Adverbialism: How Different Are They? Comments on Mazviita Chirimuuta's Outside Color.Mohan Matthen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):236-243.
    Mazviita Chirimuuta proposes a new “adverbialist” ontology of color. I argue that ontological disputes in the philosophy of color are uniformly terminological. Chirimuuta's proposal too is a terminological variant on others, though it has some hortatory value in directing attention to aspects of color science that have hitherto been neglected. On a side note, I also take issue with Chirimuuta's laudatory take on early modern theories of color.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  20
    Hume's Fork, and His Theory of Relations.Peter Millican - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):3-65.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  47
    Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1).
    Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  45
    One's Modus Ponens: Modality, Coherence and Logic.Una Stojnić - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):167-214.
    Recently, there has been a shift away from traditional truth-conditional accounts of meaning towards non-truth-conditional ones, e.g., expressivism, relativism and certain forms of dynamic semantics. Fueling this trend is some puzzling behavior of modal discourse. One particularly surprising manifestation of such behavior is the alleged failure of some of the most entrenched classical rules of inference; viz., modus ponens and modus tollens. These revisionary, non-truth-conditional accounts tout these failures, and the alleged tension between the behavior of modal vocabulary and classical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.
    How should we account for self-knowledge of our inner lives? Some have argued that just as we have various senses that allow us to perceive the environment, we have an inner sense that allows us to perceive our inner lives. But others find such a view implausible and think that there are other ways to account for self-knowledge. With respect to all-or-nothing beliefs, some have held that we may account for self-knowledge by appealing to the claim that such beliefs are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  85
    Vagueness and the Laws of Metaphysics.Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):66-89.
    This is a paper about the nature of metaphysical laws and their relation to the phenomenon of vagueness. Metaphysical laws are introduced as analogous to natural laws, and metaphysical indeterminism is modeled on causal indeterminacy. This kind of indeterminacy is then put to work in developing a novel theory of vagueness and a solution to the sorites paradox.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  67
    ‘Not’ Again! Another Essay on the Metaphysics of Material Objects.Mahrad Almotahari - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):711-737.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  14
    Do Parental Licensing Schemes Violate the Rights of Biological Parents?Christian Barry & R. J. Leland - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):755-761.
  43. Sensitivity Actually.Michael Blome‐Tillmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):606-625.
    A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems”. I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for the defenders (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44.  37
    Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  1
    Rightholding, Demandingness of Love, and Parental Licensing.Liao S. Matthew - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):762-769.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Précis for The Right to Be Loved.S. Matthew Liao - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):738-742.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  7
    Human Rights and The Right to Be Loved.Japa Pallikkathayil - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):743-748.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  51
    Experimental Explication.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):672-710.
    Two recently popular metaphilosophical movements, formal philosophy and experimental philosophy, promote what seem to be conflicting methodologies. Nonetheless, I argue that the two can be mutually supportive. I propose an experimentally-informed variation on explication, a powerful formal philosophical tool introduced by Carnap. The resulting method, which I call “experimental explication,” provides the formalist with a means of responding to explication's gravest criticism. Moreover, this method introduces a philosophically salient, positive role for survey-style experiments while steering clear of several objections that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  26
    How Narrow is Aristotle's Contemplative Ideal?Matthew D. Walker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):558-583.
    In Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8, Aristotle defends a striking view about the good for human beings. According to Aristotle, the single happiest way of life is organized around philosophical contemplation. According to the narrowness worry, however, Aristotle's contemplative ideal is unduly Procrustean, restrictive, inflexible, and oblivious of human diversity. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has resources for responding to the narrowness worry, and that his contemplative ideal can take due account of human diversity.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  5
    The Supply Side of Love.Leif Wenar - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):749-754.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  51.  17
    Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard‐Snyder - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):509-539.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  52.  18
    The Problem of Self-Torture: What's Being Done?Stephen J. White - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):584-605.
    We commonly face circumstances in which the cumulative negative effects of repeatedly acting in a certain way over time will be significant, although the negative effects of any one such act, taken on its own, are insubstantial. Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer presents an especially clear example of this type of predicament. This paper considers three different approaches to understanding the rational response to such situations. The first focuses on the conditions under which it is rational to revise one's (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  53.  76
    Identity in Fiction.Richard Woodward - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):646-671.
    Anthony Everett () argues that those who embrace the reality of fictional entities run into trouble when it comes to specifying criteria of character identity. More specifically, he argues that realists must reject natural principles governing the identity and distinctness of fictional characters due to the existence of fictions which leave it indeterminate whether certain characters are identical and the existence of fictions which say inconsistent things about the identities of their characters. Everett's critique has deservedly drawn much attention and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  54.  23
    K ⊈ E.Elia Zardini - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):540-557.
    In a series of very influential works, Tim Williamson has advanced and defended a much discussed theory of evidence containing, among other claims, the thesis that, if one knows P, P is part of one's evidence. I argue that K ⊆ E is false, and indeed that it is so for a reason that Williamson himself essentially provides in arguing against the thesis that, if one has a justified true belief in P, P is part of one's evidence: together with (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  55.  63
    Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality.Lei Zhong - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):626-645.
    Semantic normativism, which is the view that semantic properties/concepts are some kind of normative properties/concepts, has become increasingly influential in contemporary meta-semantics. In this paper, I aim to argue that semantic normativism has difficulty accommodating the causal efficacy of semantic properties. In specific, I raise an exclusion problem for semantic normativism, inspired by the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind. Moreover, I attempt to show that the exclusion problem for semantic normativism is peculiarly troublesome: while we can solve mental-physical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  56.  28
    Defending Exclusivity.Sophie Archer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):326-341.
    ‘Exclusivity’ is the claim that when deliberating about whether to believe that p one can only be consciously motivated to reach one's conclusion by considerations one takes to pertain to the truth of p. The pragmatist tradition has long offered inspiration to those who doubt this claim. Recently, a neo-pragmatist movement, Keith Frankish (), and Conor McHugh ()) has given rise to a serious challenge to exclusivity. In this article, I defend exclusivity in the face of this challenge. First, I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  57.  30
    Language, Ontology, and Metaphysics.Karen Bennett - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):466-473.
    Thomas Hofweber's Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics is ambitious, thought-provoking, and a good read. It expands upon a project he's developed in several previous papers—a project that seamlessly weaves together both metaphysics and metametaphysics. The book is as much about methodology as it is about the substantive conclusions he draws about what there is. As a consequence, it is a long book that covers a lot of ground. Since I cannot do justice to all of it, I hope my (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  58. Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  59. Grief's Rationality, Backward and Forward.Michael Cholbi - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):255-272.
    Grief is our emotional response to the deaths of intimates, and so like many other emotional conditions, it can be appraised in terms of its rationality. A philosophical account of grief's rationality should satisfy a contingency constraint, wherein grief is neither intrinsically rational nor intrinsically irrational. Here I provide an account of grief and its rationality that satisfies this constraint, while also being faithful to the phenomenology of grief experience. I begin by arguing against the best known account of grief's (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  60.  66
    The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism.Nina Emery - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):399-432.
    A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to ensure that the relevant (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  61.  8
    Replies to Bennett, Rayo, and Sattig.Hofweber Thomas - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):488-504.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  62.  17
    Précis of Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics.Thomas Hofweber - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):463-465.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  63.  56
    Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.
    Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  64. Aesthetic Adjectives: Experimental Semantics and Context-Sensitivity.Shen-yi Liao & Aaron Meskin - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):371–398.
    One aim of this essay is to contribute to understanding aesthetic communication—the process by which agents aim to convey thoughts and transmit knowledge about aesthetic matters to others. Our focus will be on the use of aesthetic adjectives in aesthetic communication. Although theorists working on the semantics of adjectives have developed sophisticated theories about gradable adjectives, they have tended to avoid studying aesthetic adjectives—the class of adjectives that play a central role in expressing aesthetic evaluations. And despite the wealth of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  65.  2
    The Elusive Case for Relationalism About the Attitudes: Reply to Rattan.Robert J. Matthews - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):453-462.
    The question I address here is whether there is anything about what Rattan describes as the normative and perspectival aspects of propositional attitudes that demands a relational account of the attitudes, specifically anything that cannot equally well be explained on measurement-theoretic accounts of the sort that I (and others) have defended which do not incorporate or presume a cognitive relation to a proposition. I argue that there is not.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  66.  3
    Are Propositions Mere Measures Of Mind?Gurpreet Rattan - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):433-452.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  67.  9
    Hofweber's Philosophy of Mathematics.AgustÍn Rayo - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):474-480.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  68.  24
    Metaphysical Ambitions in the Ontology of Objects.Thomas Sattig - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):481-487.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  69.  11
    Activating the Mind: Descartes' Dreams and the Awakening of the Human Animal Machine.Anik Waldow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):299-325.
    In this essay I argue that one of the things that matters most to Descartes' account of mind is that we use our minds actively. This is because for him only an active mind is able to re-organize its passionate experiences in such a way that a genuinely human, self-governed life of virtue and true contentment becomes possible. To bring out this connection, I will read the Meditations against the backdrop of Descartes' correspondence with Elisabeth. This will reveal that in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  70.  23
    Kierkegaard on Time and the Limitations of Imaginative Planning.Daniel W. Brinkerhoff Young - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):144-169.
    In Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard claims that the imaginative planning of projects that require ongoing effort over time always fails to represent them accurately. This paper explores one particular reason Kierkegaard gives for thinking this—that the imagination is incapable of capturing the temporality of such endeavors, and it is this temporality that constitutes their greatest difficulty. This is significant for Kierkegaard because he believes that the tasks of the moral life and the religious life belong to this class of endeavors. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  71.  11
    Comments on Strange Tools by Alva Noë.Noël Carroll - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):214-221.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  72. The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Miller - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1).
    The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  73. Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.
    True beliefs and truth-preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth-preserving, but truth-preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: the orthodox definition given (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  74.  86
    Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.
    Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  75.  4
    Strange Tools Vs. Plain Tools?: Comments on Alva Noë.A. W. Eaton - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):222-229.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  76.  8
    Alva Noë, Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature.Paul Guyer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):230-237.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  77.  58
    Maudlin's Mathematical Maneuver: A Case Study in the Metaphysical Implications of Mathematical Representations.Robert J. Hirsch - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):170-210.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  78.  63
    Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data.Neil Levy - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):3-26.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  79.  14
    Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature: A Précis.Alva Noë - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):211-213.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  80.  11
    Art and Entanglement in Strange Tools: Reply to Noël Carroll, A. W. Eaton and Paul Guyer.Alva Noë - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):238-250.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  81. Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review.David Pineda & Agustín Vicente - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):97-120.
    Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: how the physical grounds the mental; and why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  82. No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  83. Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1).
    According to a view I’ll call Epistemic Normativism, knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues against EN in two stages and defends a positive non-normativist alternative. After clarifying the target in §1, I consider in §2 some arguments for EN from the premise that knowledge entails justification. I first raise some worries about inferring constitution from entailment. I then rehearse the reasons why some epistemologists reject the Entailment Thesis (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  84. The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  85.  7
    Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-28.
    A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision-making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call “Classical Inferentialism”, holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  86.  11
    Aesthetic Testimony and the Test of Time.Jon Robson - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues