Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

ISSNs: 0031-8205, 1933-1592

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  1. Hume's Skeptical Philosophy and the Moderation of Pride.Charles Goldhaber - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (6):621–36.
    Hume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these mechanisms, I argue, sheds light on how, why, when, and for whom skeptical philosophy can be useful. It also illuminates the value (...)
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  2.  55
    In defense of guilt‐tripping.Rachel Achs - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):792-810.
    It is tempting to hold that guilt‐tripping is morally wrong, either because it is objectionably manipulative, or because it involves gratuitously aiming to make another person suffer, or both. In this article, I develop a picture of guilt according to which guilt is a type of pain that incorporates a commitment to its own justification on the basis of the subject's wrongdoing. This picture supports the hypothesis that feeling guilty is an especially efficient means for a wrongdoer to come to (...)
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  3. Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight.Christopher Bottomley & Timothy Luke Williamson - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):697-725.
    No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly restrictive in prohibiting a range of reasonable preferences. And theories designed to accommodate such preferences (for example, Buchak's (2013) Risk‐Weighted Expected Utility Theory) violate the Betweenness axiom, which requires that you are indifferent to randomizing over two options between which you are already indifferent. Betweenness has been overlooked by philosophers, and we argue that it is a compelling normative constraint. Furthermore, neither Expected nor Risk‐Weighted Expected Utility Theory (...)
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  4. Faith and rational deference to authority.Lara Buchak - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):637-656.
    Many accounts of faith hold that faith is deference to an authority about what to believe or what to do. I show that this kind of faith fits into a more general account of faith, the risky‐commitment account. I further argue that it can be rational to defer to an authority even when the authority's pronouncement goes against one's own reasoning. Indeed, such deference is rational in typical cases in which individuals treat others as authorities.
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  5.  32
    Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind.Lucy Campbell - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):851-857.
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  6.  73
    On penance.Justin A. Capes - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):607-620.
    Penance is often said to be a part of the process of making amends for wrongdoing. Here I clarify the nature of penance as a remedial action, highlighting the differences between it and more familiar corrective actions such as reparation and apology, and I offer an account of how penance contributes to the expiation of wrongdoing. In doing so, I reject a popular view according to which one does penance primarily by either punishing oneself or voluntarily submitting to punishment at (...)
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  7.  68
    De se names.Maite Ezcurdia & Carla Merino-Rajme - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):726-750.
    We argue that there are names with de se contents and that they are theoretically fruitful. De se names serve to challenge intuitive and otherwise plausible orthodoxies such as Stalnaker's view of communication and Bayesian views of belief update. These implications are also significant for those already sympathetic to the irreducibility of de se content.
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  8. Regulative Rules: A Distinctive Normative Kind.Reiland Indrek - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):772-791.
    What are rules? In this paper I develop a view of regulative rules which takes them to be a distinctive normative kind occupying a middle ground between orders and normative truths. The paradigmatic cases of regulative rules that I’m interested in are social rules like rules of etiquette and legal rules like traffic rules. On the view I’ll propose, a rule is a general normative content that is in force due to human activity: enactment by an authority or acceptance by (...)
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  9.  50
    Some challenges raised by unconscious belief.Adam Leite - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):838-843.
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  10. Precis of belief, inference, and the self‐conscious mind.Eric Marcus - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):833-837.
  11. Replies to Leite, Shaw, and Campbell.Eric Marcus - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):858-868.
  12. Charitable Matching and Moral Credit.Daniel Nolan - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):687-696.
    When charitable matching occurs, both the person initially offering the matching donation and the person taking up the offer may well feel they have done something better than if they had donated on their own without matching. They may well feel they deserve some credit for the matched donation as well as their own. Can they both be right? Natural assumptions about charitable matching lead to puzzles that are challenging to resolve in a satisfactory way.
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  13.  31
    Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief.James R. Shaw - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):844-850.
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  14.  26
    Précis of Seeing and Saying.Berit “Brit” Brogaard - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):524-527.
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    Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi.Berit “Brit” Brogaard - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):556-581.
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  16. Seeing or Saying?Alex Byrne - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):528-535.
    Comment on Brogaard's Seeing and Saying (OUP 2018).
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  17. Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account.Laura Frances Callahan - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):320-337.
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  18.  46
    Two sorts of biological kind terms: The cases of ‘rice’ and ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’.Michael Devitt & Brian Porter - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):479-505.
    Experiments have led some philosophers to conclude that the reference determination of natural kind terms is neither simply descriptive nor simply causal-historical. Various theories have been aired to account for this, including ambiguity, hybrid, and different-idiolects theories. Devitt and Porter (2021) hypothesized that some terms are covered by one theory, some another, with a place for all the proposed theories. The present paper tests hypotheses that the term ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’ is simply causal-historical but the term ‘rice’ is hybrid. (...)
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  19. The aim of inquiry?Jane Friedman - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):506-523.
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  20. Recalibrating evolutionary debunking.Justis Koon - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):456-478.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self-undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debunking as our moral beliefs. I argue that this objection suffers from several defects, the most (...)
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  21.  43
    Of seeming disagreement.M. G. F. Martin - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):536-548.
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  22. Ethics without numbers.Jacob M. Nebel - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):289-319.
    This paper develops and explores a new framework for theorizing about the measurement and aggregation of well-being. It is a qualitative variation on the framework of social welfare functionals developed by Amartya Sen. In Sen’s framework, a social or overall betterness ordering is assigned to each profile of real-valued utility functions. In the qualitative framework developed here, numerical utilities are replaced by the properties they are supposed to represent. This makes it possible to characterize the measurability and interpersonal comparability of (...)
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  23.  52
    Language and representationalism 1.Nico Orlandi - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):549-555.
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  24. Theories of Perceptual Content and Cases of Reliable Spatial Misperception.Andrew Rubner - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):430-455.
    Perception is riddled with cases of reliable misperception. These are cases in which a perceptual state is tokened inaccurately any time it is tokened under normal conditions. On the face of it, this fact causes trouble for theories that provide an analysis of perceptual content in non-semantic, non-intentional, and non-phenomenal terms, such as those found in Millikan (1984), Fodor (1990), Neander (2017), and Schellenberg (2018). I show how such theories can be extended so that they cover such cases without giving (...)
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  25. Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?David Thorstad - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):396-413.
    Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language (Carr, 2022; Pasnau, 2013). In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My (...)
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  26.  58
    An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains.Shane Ward - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):374-395.
    Deviant causal chain problems arise in many settings. The most famous instance of the problem is the Gettier problem, but the problem also arises in the philosophy of action and perception. Usually, attempts to tackle these problems try to solve them individually. This paper takes a different approach: I propose a general solution to the problem. I begin by providing a solution to the deviant causal chain problem for skillful performance, and I argue that the solution can be extended to (...)
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  27.  31
    Pascal's birds: Signs and significance in nature.Yuval Avnur - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):3-20.
    I address a puzzle in Pascal's Pensées. While Pascal emphasized that God is hidden, he also seemed to think that signs of God are everywhere in nature. How does he reconcile these two claims? I offer a novel solution which emphasizes the role of love and what I call “second-personal” significance, and which results in a distinctively Pascalian account of religious experience of nature. By distinguishing implication from various senses of ‘proof’, I explain why, though deeply significant, such experiences cannot (...)
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  28.  33
    Vows without a self.Kevin Berryman, Monima Chadha & Shaun Nichols - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):42-61.
    Vows play a central role in Buddhist thought and practice. Monastics are obliged to know and conform to hundreds of vows. Although it is widely recognized that vows are important for guiding practitioners on the path to enlightenment, we argue that they have another overlooked but equally crucial role to play. A second function of the vows, we argue, is to facilitate group harmony and cohesion to ensure the perpetuation of the dhamma and the saṅgha. However, the prominence of vows (...)
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  29. Desert of blame.Randolph Clarke - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):62-80.
    The blameworthy deserve blame. So runs a platitude of commonsense morality. My aim here is to set out an understanding of this desert claim (as I call it) on which it can be seen to be a familiar and attractive aspect of moral thought. I conclude with a response to a prominent denial of the claim.
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  30. Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.
    I argue that when we use ‘probability’ language in epistemic contexts—e.g., when we ask how probable some hypothesis is, given the evidence available to us—we are talking about degrees of support, rather than degrees of belief. The epistemic probability of A given B is the mind-independent degree to which B supports A, not the degree to which someone with B as their evidence believes A, or the degree to which someone would or should believe A if they had B as (...)
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  31.  77
    Bias, norms, introspection, and the bias blind spot1.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):81-105.
    In this paper, I sketch a general framework for theorizing about bias and bias attributions. According to the account, paradigmatic cases of bias involve systematic departures from genuine norms. I attempt to show that the account illuminates a number of important psychological phenomena, including: the fact that accusations of bias frequently inspire not only denials but also countercharges of bias (“you only think that I'm biased because you're biased!”); the fact that we tend to see ourselves as less biased than (...)
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  32. The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics.Bar Luzon - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):217-237.
    This paper argues that functionalist metasemantic views, such as Conceptual Role Semantics and Interpretivism, face a Euthyphro challenge. The challenge, put roughly, is this: functionalist metasemantic views reverse the order of explanation. According to such views, representational mental states have the contents that they do partly because they play certain roles in our mental lives. According to an intuitive picture of the roles that representational mental states play in our mental lives, however, these states play the roles they do partly (...)
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  33. Grounding identity in existence.Ezra Rubenstein - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):21-41.
    What grounds the facts about what is identical to/distinct from what? A natural answer is: the facts about what exists. Despite its prima facie appeal, this view has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. Moreover, those who have discussed it have been inclined to reject it because of the following important challenge: why should the existence of some individuals ground their identity in some cases and their distinctness in others? (Burgess 2012, Shumener 2020b). This paper offers a sustained defense (...)
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  34. Commonsense Morality and Contact with Value.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1:1-21.
    There seem to be many kinds of moral duties. We should keep our promises; we should pay our debts of gratitude; we should compensate those we’ve wronged; we should avoid doing or intending harm; we should help those in need. These constitute, some worry, an unconnected heap of duties: the realm of commonsense morality is a disorganized mess. In this paper, we outline a strategy for unifying commonsense moral duties. We argue that they can be understood in terms of contact (...)
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  35.  72
    Two Concepts of Directed Obligation.Brendan de Kenessey - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-26.
    This paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non‐instrumental, agent‐relative reason not to do so, and which you are (...)
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