Year:

  1.  5
    Epistemic Agency and the Value of Knowledge and Belief.Aron Edidin - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    “Credit-worthiness” accounts of the value of knowledge focus on the exercise of agency as the source of value in question. This focus is shared by an approach suggested by Sally Haslanger to the value of belief. The standard examples and counterexamples from the “value of knowledge” literature treat the relevant sort of agency in fundamentally individualistic terms. But recent work on relational autonomy recommends that we think of agency as fundamentally socially embedded. This reorientation not only disarms a standard objection (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  35
    Normative Competence, Autonomy, and Oppression.Ji-Young Lee - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    Natalie Stoljar posits that those who have internalized oppressive norms lack normative competence, which requires true beliefs and critical reflection. A lack of normative competence makes agents nonautonomous, according to Stoljar. This framework is thereby meant to address what she calls the “feminist intuition”—the intuition that oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. On my view, however, Stoljar’s normative competence account of autonomy is subject to a worrying problem. Her account misattributes nonautonomy to those who perpetrate the oppression, making those who (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  5
    Blaming From Inside the Birdcage.Amy McKiernan - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    This article notices a trend in work done by philosophers who build on P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes; it looks as though philosophers supplement Strawson with a more robust ethical program in order to address questions concerning the moral appropriateness of the reactive attitudes. I argue feminist care ethics can serve as a promising moral supplement to Strawson. Then, I diagnose a problem in Strawson— namely, the assumption that members of moral communities will express all three kinds (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  1
    Normative Competence, Autonomy, and Oppression.J. Y. Lee - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    Natalie Stoljar posits that purely procedural theories of autonomy are unable to explain the ‘feminist intuition’, which is the idea that the internalization of false and oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. She claims instead that an account based on ‘normative competence’ – which requires true beliefs and critical reflection – can explain why oppressive norms should be excluded as legitimate decision-making inputs. On my view, however, the normative competence approach is subject to a worrying problem. While Stoljar's view successfully (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues