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  1.  2
    Hegel’s Reading of the Logic of Indian Philosophy.Purushottama Bilimoria - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):412-419.
    ABSTRACTThe commentary engages Hegel’s anxieties as discussed in Robert Pippin’s lead paper on the question of Western ‘modernity’ in early 19th century: how did we get there, to the ‘dissatisfactions of European high culture’, after all the promises of the teleology of world-spirit and hermeneutik that Hegel mapped in the inexorable march of history. More importantly, we ask how does the rest of the world – the non-European, non-modern regions – fare or compare? Where do they belong in the larger (...)
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  2.  2
    That Great Foe of Immediacy? Intellectual Intuition in Pippin’s Reading of Hegel.Gene Flenady - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):420-426.
    ABSTRACTThis commentary considers Robert Pippin's treatment of Hegel’s attempt to overcome Kant’s account of the distinction between conceptual and intuitional representation. Pippin reads Hegel as committed to Kant’s discursivity thesis, namely, that thought is mediate and general, and thus reliant on sensible intuition for singular immediate contents – a position broadly in line with Wilfrid Sellars’ famous portrayal of Hegel as “that great foe of immediacy.” It is suggested, however, that such a reading makes it difficult to provide an account (...)
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  3.  5
    Transcendental Ontology and Apperceptive Idealism.Markus Gabriel - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):383-392.
    ABSTRACTWhilst agreeing with Robert Pippin that Hegel undertakes his philosophical enterprise in light of Kant's insights into the failings of pre-critical metaphysics, this paper outlines the shortcomings of Pippin's Hegel interpretation by contrasting what I call 'apperceptive idealism' on the one hand with 'transcendental ontology' on the other. By privileging subject over substance, Pippin commits Hegel to an ontologically modest form of Kantianism that, in missing how reality as a whole is the main topic of Hegel’s philosophy, leaves no room (...)
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  4.  2
    Systematicity and Philosophical Interpretation: Hegel, Pippin, and Changing Debates.James Kreines - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):393-402.
    ABSTRACTThis paper argues that Robert Pippin’s work is an indispensable starting point for any engagement today with Hegel and German Idealism. His approach is unmatched when it comes to refusing to skip over or look away from the need to recover philosophical arguments, while actually finding arguments that could support the kind of unified philosophical system for which Hegel and the German Idealists aim. But the very success of Pippin’s work has also opened new possibilities for a competing kind of (...)
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  5.  1
    Reading Hegel.Robert Pippin - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):365-382.
    ABSTRACTThe project defended in this article is a forty-plus year attempt to argue for the continuing philosophical importance of the positions in theoretical and practical and aesthetic philosophy defended in what has come to be known as ‘German Idealism’ For the most part this has concerned Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the relations among them, with most of the attention focused on Hegel. The Hegel interpretation has been criticized for its claim about the influence of Kant on Hegel’s account of (...)
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  6. On Idealism: Responses to Markus Gabriel, James Kreines, Christopher Yeomans, Purushottama Bilimoria, Gene Flenady, Lorenzo Sala, and Jonathan Shaheen.Robert Pippin - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):440-457.
    Volume 2, Issue 4, December 2018, Page 440-457.
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  7. Robert Pippin’s Hegel as an Analytically Approachable Philosopher.Paul Redding - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):355-364.
    Volume 2, Issue 4, December 2018, Page 355-364.
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  8.  1
    Hegel’s Cocktail: From Metaphysics to Logic and Back Again.Lorenzo Sala - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):427-432.
    ABSTRACTI criticise Pippin’s understanding of the relation between Hegel, Kant, and pre-Kantian metaphysics. Contrary to Pippin’s view, I contend that Hegel did not see the pre-Kantian investigation of being qua being as essentially hopeless. On the contrary, through an analysis of Hegel’s criticisms of Kant and of Hegel’s notion of thought, I contend that Hegel is much closer to pre-Kantian metaphysics than to Kant.
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  9.  1
    Reading Hegel (Anti-)Metaphysically.Jonathan Shaheen - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):433-439.
    ABSTRACTThis paper characterizes two senses in which Hegel interpretations can be metaphysical. It argues that Pippin's seminal work misreads Hegel’s Being Logic through reading it anti-metaphysically, in one of these senses. But it also suggests that Pippin’s recent work makes room for a metaphysical reinterpretation of the Being Logic. So it pushes, in the spirit of a friendly amendment, for a fuller such reinterpretation, one that nevertheless coheres with Pippin’s deep commitments about Hegel as a post-Kantian philosopher, since the reading (...)
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  10. Modernity and the Inner-Outer Problem.Christopher Yeomans - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (4):403-411.
    ABSTRACTIn this appreciation of Robert Pippin’s work, I focus on locating his project by focusing on the way that the inner-outer distinction in action receives a distinctive shape in modernity. I profile Pippin’s view of this momentous change as a middle path between those who see it primarily in historical terms and those who see it in primarily linguistic terms. Pippin’s middle way has two aspects. First, purposiveness, rather than any specific goal, provides the speculative identity of inner and outer; (...)
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  11.  6
    Depiction in the Tractatus: The Dissolution of the Problem of Unity.María Cerezo - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):327-332.
    ABSTRACTI revise Zalabardo’s solution to the Tractarian problem of unity and raise some difficulties concerning the notion of logical instantiation, his understanding of the notion of expression (A...
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  12.  5
    Zalabardo on Wittgenstein and the Unity of the Proposition.Edmund Dain - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):333-337.
    ABSTRACTWhat explains the difference between a proposition and a mere list of the words it contains, presented in the same order? What unites the parts of a proposition to form a whole? José Zalaba...
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  13.  12
    Commentary on José Zalabardo’s ‘The Tractatus on Unity’.Cora Diamond - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):272-284.
    ABSTRACTJosé Zalabardo’s view of the aims of the Tractatus limits the options available to us for reading and understanding the book. I argue that an alternative kind of reading is possible, if we...
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  14.  2
    Wittgensteinian Facts as Ultimate Items of Tractarian Ontology?Giulia Felappi - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):338-342.
    ABSTRACTAccording to Zalabardo, Wittgenstein in TLP solves the metaphysical problem of the unity of facts by holding that facts are the only ultimate items of Tractarian ontology. With his intrigui...
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  15.  10
    ‘Ultimate’ Facts? Zalabardo on the Metaphysics of Truth.Juliet Floyd - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):299-314.
    ABSTRACTZalabardo argues that the Tractatus account of picturing is a direct and successful refutation of Russell’s ‘multiple relation’ theory of judgment, its role being ontological: Wittgenstein...
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  16.  22
    Wittgenstein on Truth and Meaning.Paul Horwich - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):285-298.
    ABSTRACTMy topic is Wittgenstein’s eventual abandonment of his Tractatus idea that a sentence is true if and only if it depicts a possible fact that obtains, and his coming...
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  17.  4
    Zalabardo on Semantic Unity and Metaphysical Unity.Colin Johnston - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):321-326.
    ABSTRACTZalabardo argues that the Tractatus makes an important contribution towards explaining how a representation doesn¹t merely introduce various objects, but furthermore represents them as comb...
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  18.  4
    Guest Editor’s Introduction.Alexander Miller - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):247-249.
    Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018, Page 247-249.
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  19.  2
    Zalabardo on Wittgenstein’s Programme, and the Resolute and Ineffabalist Readings.Daniel Simons - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):315-320.
    ABSTRACTThis essay compares and contrasts Zalabardo’s reading of the purpose of the Tractatus, and its use of nonsense, with the ‘resolute’ and ‘ineffabalist’ readings. First determining that it sh...
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  20.  5
    Response to Commentaries on ‘The Tractatus on Unity’.José L. Zalabardo - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):343-354.
    Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018, Page 343-354.
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  21.  9
    The Tractatus On Unity.José L. Zalabardo - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):250-271.
    ABSTRACTI argue that some of the central doctrines of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be seen as addressing the twin problems of semantic unity and...
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  22.  40
    Irreducible Aspects of Embodiment: Situating Scientist and Subject.Nick Brancazio - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):219-223.
    Feminist philosophers of science have long discussed the importance of taking situatedness into account in scientific practices to avoid erasing important aspects of lived experience. Through the example of Gillian Einstein’s [2012] situated neuroscience, I will add support to Gallagher’s [2019] claims that intertheoretic reduction is problematic and provide reason to think pluralistic methodologies are explanatorily and ethically preferable.
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  23.  10
    Context-Sensitive Ontologies for a Non-Reductionist Cognitive Neuroscience.Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):224-228.
    The target article criticises reductionist programs in cognitive science for failing to take into account important explanatory features of the organism's physical embodiment and task environment. My aim in this commentary is to show how such features are increasingly being taken seriously by researchers in cognitive neuroscience, who describe the functional activity of neural structures in terms that are context-sensitive rather than intrinsic. This approach can allow us to take seriously the concerns presented in Gallagher’s [2019] target article without having (...)
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  24.  35
    Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-Reductionist Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):125-137.
    Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological perspective it has been argued that phenomenology cannot be naturalized. In this context it makes sense to consider that the notion of scientific reduction is linked to a (...)
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  25.  15
    Rethinking Again.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):234-245.
    Volume 2, Issue 2, June 2018, Page 234-245.
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  26.  58
    Perception Is Not Always and Everywhere Inferential.Inês Hipólito - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):184-188.
    This paper argues that it is possible to embrace the predictive processing framework without reducing affordances to inferential perception. The cognitivist account of PP contends that it can capture relational perception, such as affordances. The rationale for this claim is that over time, sensory data becomes highly-weighted. This paper, however, will show the inconsistency of this claim in the face of the cognitivist premise that ‘encapsulated’ models can throw away ‘the body, the world, or other people’ [Hohwy 2016: 265]. It (...)
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  27.  19
    Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Don’T Fear the Reductionist Bogey-Man.Jakob Hohwy - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):138-144.
    Shaun Gallagher calls for a radical rethinking of the concept of nature and he resists reduction of phenomenology to computational-neural science. However, classic, reductionist science, at least in contemporary computational guise, has the resources to accommodate insights from transcendental phenomenology. Reductionism should be embraced, not feared.
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  28.  12
    Remarks on Gallagher’s Enactivist Philosophy of Nature.David Macarthur - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):179-183.
    Shaun Gallagher’s [2019] ‘Rethinking Nature’ is an attempt to make conceptual space for the relevance of the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc., to cognitive scientific explanation within an embodied enactivist approach to cognition. Since cognitive science currently presupposes orthodox scientific naturalism—for which nature is nothing over and above the objective posits of successful science—it makes no allowance for the lived first-person experiences or intersubjective agency that are central to phenomenology; and so, renders them unavailable to Gallagher’s enactivism. Gallagher leading (...)
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  29.  8
    Gallagher on Non-Reductive Naturalism: Complementarity, Integration or Multiscale Science?Patrick McGivern - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):159-170.
    Gallagher [2019] defends a form of naturalised phenomenology based on a non-classical view of science. A central component of this argument involves an analogy between phenomenology and quantum-mechanics: Gallagher suggests that both require us to give up key components of a classical view of the natural world. Here, I try to clarify this analogy and consider two associated problems. The first problem concerns the concept of subjectivity and its different roles in physics and phenomenology, and the second concerns the concept (...)
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  30.  12
    Embracing the Meta-Copernican Turn: Non-Decomposition and Mechanistic Explanations.Russell Meyer - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):214-218.
    In line with proponents of 4E cognition, Gallagher [2019] is concerned that many cognitive phenomena are not amenable to decomposition strategies since their very nature is to be constituted extensively. By contrast the received view on causal explanation—the mechanistic account [Craver 2007]—emphasises the necessity for decomposition in explaining natural phenomena and insists on a sharp distinction between causal versus constitutive relations. I propose that removing the requirement that constitutive relations cannot also be causes helps to ease this tension between explanation (...)
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  31.  17
    Phenomenology and Cognitive Neuroscience: Can a Process Ontology Help Resolve the Impasse?Ross Pain - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):204-208.
    Shaun Gallagher [2019] argues for a ‘non-classical’ conception of nature, which includes subjects as irreducible constituents. As such, first-person phenomenology can be naturalised and at the same time resist reduction to the third-person. In the first part of this paper, I raise three concerns for the claim that nature is irreducibly subject-involving. In the second part of the paper, I suggest that embracing a process ontology could help strengthen Gallagher’s proposal.
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  32.  36
    Phenomenology, Naturalism and Non-Reductive Cognitive Science.Jack Alan Reynolds, Cathy Legg, Sean Bowden & Patrick Stokes - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):119-124.
  33.  12
    The Hand of Nature in the Glove of Phenomenology: Reply to Gallagher.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):171-178.
    This article outlines several important agreements between Lynne Rudder Baker’s philosophical program and Shaun Gallagher’s target article, while also highlighting important differences. Like Gallagher, Baker does not believe that nature can be adequately understood from a reductive point of view. Unlike Gallagher, however, she argues against rethinking nature as a non-reductionist project, which instead focuses on ‘holistic relations ’ and not just on brains, for example. Regardless of whether the classic conception of nature is mainly a philosophical or a scientific (...)
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  34.  23
    The Role of Non-Reductive Naturalism: Cognitive Science or Phenomenology?Carl B. Sachs - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):229-233.
    Shaun Gallagher argues that we need a new philosophy of nature that accommodates the insights of existential phenomenology. On his view existential phenomenology needs a philosophy of nature that is holistic, relational, and non-reductionist. I argue that his reasoning is based on a misunderstanding of the difference between the manifest image and the scientific image. The reasons why we should prefer a non-reductionist philosophy of nature are internal to the historical development of the scientific image itself. We have good reasons (...)
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  35.  10
    Theory, Practice, and Non-Reductive (Meta)Science.Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):199-203.
    Are the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced? Gallagher [2019] poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher’s non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher’s two questions about phenomenology and (...)
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  36.  13
    ‘I Can’ Vs. ‘I Want’: What’s Missing From Gallagher’s Picture of Non-Reductive Cognitive Science.Javier Sánchez-Cañizares, Miguel García-Valdecasas & Nathaniel F. Barrett - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):209-213.
    We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the ‘relational turn’ defended by Gallagher is a necessary step in this direction. However, we believe that certain aspects of his relational concept of nature need clarification. In particular, Gallagher does not say whether or how teleology, affect, and other value-related properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that given the phenomenological (...)
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  37.  7
    Agency and the Metaphysics of Nature.Andrew Sims - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):194-198.
    Gallagher poses a phenomenologically-inspired challenge to a classical metaphysics of nature which is associated with contemporary natural sciences. This metaphysics can be reconstructed in terms of two distinct commitments: reductionism and individualism. This comment on Gallagher’s [2019] article attempts to show how a revision of the classical metaphysics can be made intelligible in light of those two commitments. It requires a strong interpretation of the ecological framework for understanding cognition. Such a revision would give agency a central place in the (...)
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  38.  11
    A Tale of Two Gaps.Murray Smith - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):189-193.
    In ‘Rethinking Nature,’ Shaun Gallagher makes the case for a non-reductive, naturalized phenomenology. In doing so, he seeks to close the metaphysical gap between world and mind by pursuing a ‘world > mind’ strategy, conforming the natural world to the world of reason and experience. Here I assess the merits of this approach by comparison with the alternative ‘mind > world’ strategy, whereby the the world of reason and experience is conformed to the natural world. This latter approach is exemplified (...)
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  39.  16
    Minding Nature: Gallagher and the Relevance of Phenomenology to Cognitive Science.Michael Wheeler & María Jimena Clavel Vázquez - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):145-158.
    In ‘Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science’, Gallagher [2019] sets out to overcome resistance to the idea that phenomenology is relevant to cognitive science. He argues that the relevance in question may be secured if we rethink the concept of nature. For Gallagher, this transformed concept of nature—which is to be distinguished from the classic scientific conception of nature in that it embraces irreducible subjectivity—is already at work in some contemporary enactive phenomenological approaches to cognitive science. Following a (...)
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  40.  12
    Transindividuality in Dispute: A Response to My Readers.Étienne Balibar - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):113-117.
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  41.  23
    Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud.Étienne Balibar - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):5-25.
    In this contribution, Balibar follows his seminal 1993 work applying the notion of the transindividual to Spinoza’s work, to produce a broader history of thinking the transindividual that brings both Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud into relation with Spinoza, devoting a section to each of these thinkers. Balibar positions the notion of the transindividual, here, as a solution to the opposing ontological errors of philosophical individualism that fails to attend to the social constitution of the individual, and the social organicism (...)
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  42.  12
    A Vindication of Simondon’s Political Anthropology.Andrea Bardin & Pablo Rodriguez - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):54-61.
    This article questions Balibar’s claim that Simondon’s concept of the transindividual does not fulfil all the requirements for a materialist ‘philosophical anthropology’. In fact, we demonstrate that Simondon’s philosophy of individuation, and notably his concept of the transindividual, can be, as it were, included in a genealogy of aleatory materialism. Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is indeed a philosophy of the transindividual insofar as it involves the constant revision of the different historical forms taken by social relations in the coevolution of (...)
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  43.  8
    From the Transindividual to the Imaginal: A Response to Balibar’s ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’.Chiara Bottici - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):69-76.
    This article explores the implications of Balibar’s strategic decision to add Freud to the series of the thinkers of the transindividual. This move, I argue, both illuminates the other philosophers’ contribution to our understanding of transindividuality, but also creates some tensions within the triad Spinoza, Marx, Freud. After exploring both aspects, the reciprocal tensions and the reciprocal illumination, I will move on to analysing the relationship between the transindividual and the imaginal, as both concepts signal a questioning of the dichotomy (...)
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  44.  51
    Freud’s Mass Hypnosis with Spinoza’s Superstitious Wonder: Balibar’s Multiple Transindividuality.Christopher Davidson - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):77-83.
    This response focuses on Balibar’s method of thinking transindividuality through multiple figures, in their similarities as well as their productive differences. His essay ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’ combines the three titular figures in order to better think the multifaceted idea of ‘classical’ transindividuality. Balibar’s method combines the three but nonetheless maintains their dissimilarities as real differences. This response attempts to test or apply that method in two ways. The first application links Balibar’s analysis of Freud’s hypnotic leader (...)
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  45.  9
    Property’s Props: A Response to Étienne Balibar’s ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual’.Ingrid Diran - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):32-38.
    This commentary focuses upon the ‘fetishism of persons’ in Marx which Balibar claims both mirrors and animates the better-known fetishism of things. Revisiting the chapter on exchange in which Balibar grounds his thesis, the essay attends to the theatrical metaphors by which Marx presents legal personhood as a pantomime of commodity fetishism. The essay demonstrates how the movable immobility of the commodity comes to life in its inverse, the mobile and immovable figure of the legal person; it then claims that (...)
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  46.  13
    Balibar’s Transindividualism: What Kind of Via Negativa?Mark G. E. Kelly - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):26-31.
    In this response, while agreeing with Balibar’s substantive positive position, I take issue with the way he situates it. Specifically, he casts it as a via negativa in relation to all previously existing thought. I suggest that it would be more accurate to say he is positioning the notion of the transindividual as a via media between two alleged extremes, individualism and organicism. I argue that the idea that there is an opposite and equal error to individualism is mistaken, and (...)
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  47.  11
    Balibar and Transindividuality.Mark G. E. Kelly & Dimitris Vardoulakis - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):1-4.
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  48.  9
    Response to Étienne Balibar, ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’.James Martel - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):101-106.
    In this short response to Balibar’s article, I discuss what I consider to be some of the most radical implications of Balibar’s notion of transindividualism. Specifically, I argue that in his reading of Marx, Spinoza and Freud, Balibar complicates not only the categories of the individual and the mass but also even the way that these two concepts are connected, along with a more general subversion of the most fundamental building blocks of capitalism. Balibar shows that communism is already present (...)
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  49.  13
    On Étienne Balibar’s ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual’.Vittorio Morfino - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):84-93.
    The article considers some explicit or implicit and yet fundamental references to Althusser in Balibar’s text about transindividuality. Of particular significance is the attempt to think of an articulation of ideology and the unconscious which brings into play the three authors Balibar evokes—Spinoza, Marx, and Freud—so as to reactivate them beyond Simondon’s own theory of transindividuality.
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  50.  3
    The Transindividual Unconscious.Jason Read - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):62-68.
    I follow Etienne Balibar in understanding Freud as not only an important thinker of transindividuality alongside Spinoza and Marx, but also the one that pushes an ontology of relations to its full development. In response to Balibar I critically examine Freud, who, outside of Group Psychology and the Analysis of Ego, often referred individual and collective development to the family as the primal scene. I also explore how it would be possible to conceive of a concept of social relations that (...)
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  51.  5
    Identification with Authority and the Transindividual in Rousseau: Critical Comments on Balibar’s Concept of the Transindividual.Spyridon Tegos - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):94-100.
    In his essay, ‘Aimances de Rousseau: Sur La Nouvelle Héloise comme traité des passions,’ Etienne Balibar analyses the structure of transition from love to friendship which are more than passions or sentiments; they are affective structures, interconnected within an affective network the political relevance of which transcends the dichotomy between the domestic and political sphere. Belonging to the genre of sentimental novel, Rousseaus Nouvelle Héloise transgresses the canonical structure of the genre in the eighteenth century. His innovative literary strategy, according (...)
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  52.  12
    Materialist Politics of Fetishism: Balibar’s Critique of Transindividuality’s Cryptonormativity.Yannik Thiem - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):39-46.
    This article takes up Balibar’s treatment of fetishism as central for understanding Marx as thinker of transindividuality and to develop a materialist account of the appearance of isolated individuality. The article shows how Balibar elaborates a critique of a cryptonormativity in those accounts of transindividuality that diagnose problems of capitalism as a loss of ‘proper’ forms of individuation. I argue that this critique rests in Balibar’s rereading of commodity fetishism that foregrounds the reality of imaginative effects, which is irreducible to (...)
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  53.  12
    Conflict as the Quasi-Transcendental: Or, Why Spinoza’s Theologcal Political Treatise Matters for Transindividuality.Dimitris Vardoulakis - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):107-112.
    Vardoulakis explores what Balibar means by designating transindividuality as ‘quasi-transcendental.’ He does so by turning to Balibar’s readings of Part IV of Spinoza’s Ethics, the Part that is central to Balibar’s understanding of the transindividual in Spinoza. Vardoulakis shows that the quasi-transcendental in Spinoza can only be a form of agonistic relations if his political theory in the Theological Political Treatise is to account for political change.
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  54.  5
    Disparate Politics: Balibar and Simondon.Daniela Voss - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (1):47-53.
    At the beginning of his essay ‘Philosophies of the Transindividual: Spinoza, Marx, Freud’, Balibar [2018] hints at some reasons why he will not be dealing with Simondon, despite agreeing with the latter’s program of going beyond ‘the metaphysics of the subject and of substance’ and towards an ‘ontology of relations’. In what follows I would like to outline Simondon’s concept of transindividuality and spell out more clearly why Balibar cannot follow Simondon’s trajectory. At the same time, I suggest a number (...)
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