Australasian Philosophical Review

ISSNs: 2474-0500, 2474-0519

46 found

View year:

  1.  5
    The ‘Psychological Dynamics’ for Sentiments: Seeing Confucian Emotions through Hume’s Analysis.Dobin Choi - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):396-404.
    In this paper, I examine the notion of the ‘psychological dynamics’ that Professor Shun uses for explicating Confucian moral anger, based on David Hume’s (1711–76) psychological account of mind, to reconsider the role that object-based distinctions of emotions play in the Confucian moral tradition. First, by appealing to Hume’s investigation of the mental processes involved in feeling moral sentiments, I suggest that imagination, as a component in the ‘psychological dynamics’, explains how ‘dust’ settles on the mind to yield inappropriate emotional (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Introduction.Hui-Chieh Loy - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):323-326.
    Professor Kwong-loi Shun is probably best known among contemporary researchers of Chinese philosophy for his book Mencius and Early Chinese Thought [Shun 2000], which presents an analytical treatme...
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  1
    Anger, Detachment and the First Person.Liu Pengbo - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):412-417.
    Shun argues that the distinction between first and third person is ill-suited to explain the complexities of anger. In this commentary, I first argue that, while the distinction is not uniquely important in characterizing anger and its variations, it can be distinctively important in illuminating the nature and normative significance of different forms of anger. Indeed, Shun’s own characterizations of anger in the paper seem to presuppose this importance. Secondly, I show that there are two related but distinct ways in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  3
    Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person.Kwong-Loi Shun - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):327-343.
    The paper presents a perspective on our relation to our environment that is inspired by Confucian thought and that stands in contrast to certain common strands in contemporary philosophical discussions. It conceptualizes our relation to what we encounter on a day-to-day basis primarily in terms of the way we experience and respond to situations, rather than to the objects affected in the situations. From this perspective, the contemporary philosophical distinction between a first- and a third-person point of view is often (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  5.  1
    Ethical Practitioners and Intellectual Commentators.Kwong-loi Shun - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):418-430.
    I am grateful to the commentators for their thoughtful comments. Space limitation prevents responding to many of these comments, and I will focus on some themes that clarify the nature of the proje...
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  3
    Why We Need Empathy.Michael A. Slote - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):366-373.
    Kwong-loi Shun argues that our reactions to situations of danger to others needn’t be understood in terms of empathy for those others, but can be fully anchored in what is bad about the situations themselves. My reply begins by pointing out cases where the desire to help and/or emotional reactions to what is bad for others don’t seem to involve empathy and then showing how empathy actually works in those cases. It goes on to argue that empathy allows a deeper (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Benevolent Situations and Gratitude.Daniel Telech - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):383-388.
    [Commentary on Kwong-loi Shun, “Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person” Australasian Philosophical Review 6.1 (Issue theme: Moral psychology— Insights from Chinese Philosophy), forthcoming.] -/- In maintaining that gratitude fails to reflect a perspectival distinction based on whether the grateful agent is the direct beneficiary of the benefactor’s good will, Kwong-loi Shun suggests that gratitude might be felt to benefactors for benefits bestowed to strangers. With an eye toward understanding the form that gratitude might take on this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Comment on Kwong-loi Shun, ‘Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person’.R. Jay Wallace - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):374-382.
    A critical discussion of Kwong-loi Shun’s account of anger as a response to situations rather than agents. The paper draws on a relational interpretation of the moral domain to argue that it makes a normative difference to one’s moral emotions whether one was the immediate victim of wrongful conduct, or merely a third-party observer of such conduct. Those who have been wronged by immoral actions have warrant for a kind of angry resentment that does not carry over to third parties. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. Grounding Confucian Moral Psychology in Rasa Theory: A Commentary on Shun Kwong-loi’s “Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third-Person.”.Lee Wilson - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):405–411.
    Shun Kwong-loi argues that the distinction between first- and third-person points of view does not play as explanatory a role in our moral psychology as has been supposed by contemporary philosophical discussions. He draws insightfully from the Confucian tradition to better elucidate our everyday experiences of moral emotions, arguing that it offers an alternative and more faithful perspective on our experiences of anger and compassion. However, unlike the distinction between first- and third-person points of view, Shun’s descriptions of anger and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  3
    Anger, Compassion, and One Body.David B. Wong - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):356-365.
    The issue of conceptual templates of Western philosophy has been prominently put forth by Kwong-loi Shun. This paper seeks to establish additional perspectives adopted in traditional concepts involving anger and compassion by both Confucianist and Western scholars to reconcile purported differences between Confucianist and Western interpretations of key concepts utilised in philosophical thought. Through reinforcing similarities between the different concepts, the author serves to highlight the inter-compatibility of Confucianist and Western interpretations of basic notions of anger and compassion and the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11.  2
    Comment on ‘Anger, Compassion and the Distinction between First and Third Person’.Chan Sin Yee - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):344-355.
    In my paper, I argue that a first-person perspective (the perspective of a patient/recipient of an action) pertaining to response analysis is significant in Confucianism given the deeply personal nature of Confucianism. It matters whether oneself or others is the patient of an action because Confucianism as a virtue theory emphasizes self-reflection and reflexivity of one’s response in self-cultivation. Moreover, as an account of role-ethics, Confucianism calls attention to one’s particular relationship with others—one reacts differently in kind, not just in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12.  1
    The Transformation of Emotion: First and Third Person Perspectives in Developmental Context.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):389-395.
    Shun argues that the distinction made between emotions experienced from the first-person perspective and those from the third-person perspective does not capture our everyday emotional experience. My proposal is that even if we accept this claim, first- and third-person perspective taking is still crucial in the development of our emotional psychology. This is so in two respects. First, the features of intimacy and impartiality that mark adult emotional response are a product of a developmental process that involves perspective taking. Second, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Zlatorog’s Deal: Introducing Callender on Discounting.Sam Baron - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):221-226.
    Suppose you are hiking in the mountains of Slovenia and encounter the forest god Zlatorog. Zlatorog wishes to bless you, but the nature of their blessing is time-dependent. You can accept the bless...
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Response to Critics.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):309-321.
    Let me begin by sincerely thanking the commentators for taking the time to share their insightful reactions to the target article [Callender 2022a]. I am very fortunate to have so many talented, di...
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  1
    The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):227-253.
    This paper challenges the conventional wisdom dominating the social sciences and philosophy regarding temporal discounting, the practice of discounting the value of future utility when making decisions. Although there are sharp disagreements about temporal discounting, a kind of standard model has arisen, one that begins with a normative standard about how we should make intertemporal comparisons of utility. This standard demands that in so far as one is rational one discounts utilities at future times with an exponential discount function. Tracing (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  16.  93
    ‘Pure’ Time Preferences Are Irrelevant to the Debate over Time Bias: A Plea for Zero Time Discounting as the Normative Standard.Preston Greene - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):254-265.
    I find much to like in Craig Callender's [2022] arguments for the rational permissibility of non-exponential time discounting when these arguments are viewed in a conditional form: viz., if one thinks that time discounting is rationally permissible, as the social scientist does, then one should think that non-exponential time discounting is too. However, time neutralists believe that time discounting is rationally impermissible, and thus they take zero time discounting to be the normative standard. The time neutralist rejects time discounting because (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. In Defence of Intertemporal Consistency. A Discussion of Craig Callender’s ‘The Normative Standard for Future Discounting’.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):266-276.
    While broadly in agreement with the conclusion that the exponentially discounted utility model (EDU) is not a universally valid rationality standard, I want to defend some intertemporal rationality criteria related to EDU, which Craig Callender might not share. My commentary explores the tension between these intuitions and Callender's arguments. In the first place, I show that many of the concerns that he raises are in fact compatible with intertemporal consistency (and sometimes even with EDU). Secondly, I rebut those arguments that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  86
    Pure and Impure Time Preferences.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):277-283.
    This paper investigates two assumptions of the exponential discounted utility theory (EDU) to which Callender draws our attention: namely that we can cleanly distinguish pure from impure temporal preferences, and that past discounting can be ignored. Drawing on recent empirical work in this area, we argue that in so far as one might have thought that past-directed preferences are more pure than future ones, then there is evidence that people’s pure preferences (in so far as we can make sense of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  4
    High Time for a Change? A Response to Callender on Rationality and Time Preferences.Ian Robertson - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):296-301.
    Craig Callender attempts to overturn conventional wisdom within decision theory by contending that rational intertemporal choices need not always conform to an exponential discounting function. He argues that there are cases in which hyperbolic discounting is the height of rationality. This paper does not seek to undermine Callender’s conclusions, but instead raises two interrelated theoretical concerns with his way securing them. The first concern is with his dismissal of influential dual-system explanations of rationality. It is argued that Callender’s criticisms of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20.  31
    Arbitrariness Arguments against Temporal Discounting.Tim Smartt - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):302-308.
    Craig Callender [2022] provides a novel challenge to the non-arbitrariness principle. His challenge plays an important role in his argument for the rational permissibility of a non-exponential temporal discounting rate. But the challenge is also of wider interest: it raises significant questions about whether we ought to accept the non-arbitrariness principle as a constraint on rational preferences. In this paper, I present two reasons to resist Callender’s challenge. First, I present a reason to reject his claim that the non-arbitrariness principle (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21.  1
    Why Time Discounting Should Be Exponential: A Reply to Callender.Katie Steele - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):284-295.
    According to Craig Callender [2022], the ‘received view’ across the social sciences is that, when it comes to time and preference, only exponential time discounting is rational. Callender argues that this view is false, even pernicious. Here I endorse what I take to be Callender’s main argument, but only in so far as the received view is understood in a particular way. I go on to propose a different way of understanding the received view that makes it true. In short: (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22.  8
    ‘Discrimination Preferred’: How Ordinary Verbal Bigotry Harms.Bianca Cepollaro & Laura Caponetto - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):189-195.
    ABSTRACT A widespread thesis in contemporary philosophy of language is that certain speech constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm. McGowan develops a prescriptive account of harm constitution, according to which harm-constituting speech enacts norms that prescribe harm. Ordinary verbal bigotry, she claims, is harmful in this sense. We submit that the norms enacted by ordinary racist utterances are not prescriptive. In our view, ordinary verbal bigotry enacts ‘non-neutrally’ permissive norms rendering harmful behaviours locally permitted—and indeed preferred over non-harmful options. We (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23.  4
    Sometimes, It Is Just Words: Norm-Setting as Negotiation.Lawrence Lengbeyer - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):196-202.
    ABSTRACT McGowan’s notion of norm ‘enactment’ is the linchpin of her practical project, designed to provide an objective standard that circumvents the need to assess actual subjective uptake of discriminatory norms proposed by racist utterances in public spaces. However, the essential role of uptake to potential norm-imposing utterances—and responses like dismissing, countermanding, and ignoring—cannot be waved away. Contributions to conversations, and even more so to other social interactions, do not exert the normative compulsion upon participants that McGowan’s theory needs. People’s (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24.  15
    Hateful Speech and Hostile Environments.Ishani Maitra - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):150-159.
    ABSTRACT This paper examines Mary Kate McGowan’s account of oppressive speech. McGowan argues that ordinary hateful speech can oppress by enacting discriminatory norms, and further, that this enactment sometimes renders the speech regulable under current United States law. In response, the paper raises two sets of questions. First, it asks about the contents of the norms enacted by a given hateful utterance, and specifically, about what determines those contents. Second, the paper also questions McGowan’s emphasis on the distinction between causing (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25.  23
    Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application.Mary Kate McGowan - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):129-149.
    ABSTRACT This paper argues for a hidden way in which speech constitutes harm by enacting harmful norms. The paper then explores the potential legal consequences of uncovering such instances of harm constitution. In particular, the paper argues that some public racist speech constitutes harm and is thus harmful enough to warrant legal remedy. Such utterances are actionable, it is contended, because they enact discriminatory norms in public spaces.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  26.  12
    Response to Critics.Mary Kate McGowan - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):211-220.
    McGowan here responds to essays written in critical engagement with her lead essay (Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application). She here responds to Caroline West, Ishani Maitra, Jeremy Waldron, Robert Mark Simpson, Lawrence Lengbeyer, Louise Richardsoon-Self, Laura Caponetto and Bianca Cepollaro.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27.  5
    What a ‘Boo’ Can Do: Adam Goodes, Discrimination, and Norm (R)evolution.Louise Richardson-Self - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):203-210.
    ABSTRACT In this commentary I evaluate what McGowan’s project would conclude with respect to the treatment of professional Australian Football League player Adam Goodes, who was incessantly ‘booed’ by crowds for the final two years of his career. Analysing Goodes’ case in light of McGowan’s argument leads me to two observations. First, McGowan’s norm-enactment approach is incredibly useful because it explains how words like ‘boo’ can constitute actionable discrimination. Second, however, I wonder if a narrow focus on whether such speech (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28.  8
    Just Words? Hate Speech, Harm, and the Justifiability of Legal Regulation.Sam Shpall & Sarah Sorial - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):117-128.
    Questions concerning what hate speech is, how it harms, whether it is protected by free speech principles, and how it might be legally regulated have been at the centre of debates about free speech...
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. The Conversational Character of Oppression.Robert Mark Simpson - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):160-169.
    McGowan argues that everyday verbal bigotry makes a key contribution to the harms of discriminatory inequality, via a mechanism that she calls sneaky norm enactment. Part of her account involves showing that the characteristic of conversational interaction that facilitates sneaky norm enactment is in fact a generic one, which obtains in a wide range of activities, namely, the property of having conventions of appropriateness. I argue that her account will be better-able to show that everyday verbal bigotry is a key (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30.  5
    Commentary on Mary Kate McGowan’s ‘Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application’.Jeremy Waldron - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):170-178.
    ABSTRACT This essay considers Mary Kate McGowan's contention that no account of hate speech is adequate if it does not explain how such speech constitutes harm to those targeted by it. ‘Constitutes’ is suppose dot mean something different than ‘causes.’ McGowan's suggestion that the speech enacts a norm offers an interesting dimension to our understanding of the harm of hate speech. But I argue that it is important to distinguish carefully between ‘norm-enactment’ and ‘norm-application’ in this model. Failure to attend (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31.  8
    Does Public Racist Speech Constitute Hostile Discrimination? Comments on McGowan.Caroline West - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):179-188.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application’, Mary Kate McGowan argues that some racist speech in public places should be made unlawful in the United States for the same reason that sexist behaviour in the workplace is already legally actionable—namely, to protect individuals from a hostile discriminatory environment. While McGowan may be correct that some public racist speech may constitute an act of discrimination in some morally significant sense, I present several reasons for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32.  26
    Evidence and Faith.Helen De Cruz - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):1-3.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  11
    The Doxastic Norms of Faith: Reply to Commentators.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):104-115.
    This paper responds to comments on the paper "True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defense of Evidentialism" (Australasian Philosophical Review). I begin with some clarifications on faith and its normativity (section 1). I then zero in on doxastic normativity (section 2), where an ideological rift emerges between evidentialism and partialist critiques (section 3). I then discuss evidentialist reason and its relationship to objectivity (section 4), and the sort of norms at issue (section (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34.  21
    True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defence of Evidentialism.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):4-28.
    ABSTRACT Is it good to form positive beliefs about those you have faith in, such as God or a religious community? Doxastic partialists say that it is. Some hold that it is good, from the viewpoint of faith, to form positive beliefs about the object of your faith even when your evidence favours negative ones. Others try to maintain respect for evidence by appealing to a highly permissive epistemology. I argue against both forms of doxastic partiality, on the grounds that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  35. Evidence Through a Glass, Darkly.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):56-61.
    ABSTRACT Dormandy’s ‘True Faith’ presents two views on the proper epistemological stance towards faith: doxastic-partialism and evidentialism. Here, I argue for a third option that cuts across the evidentialism/partialism distinction. I first analyze the Pascalian conception of faith, arguing that Pascal begins with the cognitive attitude of acceptance rather than belief. Next, I discuss Dormandy’s case for evidentialism, and contend that some evidence—the kind gained through transformative experiences—presents a difficulty for her argument. Finally, I offer my proposed view—Partialist Evidentialism—and argue (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  87
    Pascalian Faith.Alexander Jech - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):73-79.
    Katherine Dormandy aims both to classify possible modes of relating faith to epistemic norms in terms of three broad viewpoints: evidentialism, epistemological partialism, and anti-epistemological partialism. I advance two related claims: first, her categorization flattens the epistemological terrain by treating epistemic norms that operate at different levels as if they operated on the same level and thereby distorts the views she categorizes under Anti-Epistemological Partiality; and second, when rightly described, the noetic conflict involved in this view can be understood as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  4
    Kierkegaard’s Defence of Faith as Second-Order Partialism and Critique of Impartialism.Andrew Komasinski - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):80-85.
    ABSTRACT While Katherine Dormandy claims Kierkegaard is an anti-epistemological partialist, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling provides a second-order partialism that takes evidence and reason seriously but sees these considerations as exceeded for a self who stands in relationship with the absolute.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  11
    On the Harmony between Epistemology and Pistology.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):29-35.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I seek to retain many of Dormany's central claims about the excellent-making features of faith, without accepting her direct application of evidentialism to faith. In order to achieve that goal, I argue that we have to distinguish between the non-conflicting norms of epistemology and pistology. We also have to distinguish the often conflicting norms of epistemic and practical rationality.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Evidence Thresholds and the Partiality of Relational Faith.Finlay Malcolm - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):86-91.
    ABSTRACT This commentary shows how Dormandy’s ‘Partiality Norm of Belief for Faith’ can be made compatible with ‘Evidentialism about Faith’. Dormandy takes partiality to involve disrespect toward evidence—where evidence we are partial toward is given undue weight. I propose an alternative where partiality is to require more or less evidence for believing a proposition given the benefits or harms of holding the belief. Rather than disrespecting evidence, this partiality is simply to have variable ‘evidence thresholds’ that are partly set by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  68
    The Partiality of Faith.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):36-45.
    ABSTRACT Katherine Dormandy argues that there is no partiality in virtuous faith. Partiality biases and leads to noetic entrenchment. In response, I contend there is an important sense in which virtuous faith is partial towards its object. Namely, it disposes one to perceive the object as more trustworthy and to rely on this partialist evidence in forming beliefs, even when the impartialist evidence points in the other direction. There are, after all, situations in which impartialist evidence is apt to mislead (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. Faith: How to be Partial while Respecting the Evidence.Taylor-Grey Miller & Derek Haderlie - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):67-72.
    In her paper, “True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defense of Evidentialism,” Katherine Dormandy argues against the view that there is a partiality norm on faith. Dormandy establishes this by showing that partiality views can’t give the right responses to encounters with stubborn counter evidence. Either they (anti-epistemic-partiality views) recommend flouting the evidence altogether in order hold on to positive beliefs about the object of faith or they (epistemic-partiality views) lower the epistemic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  82
    Evidentialism, Stubborn Counterevidence and Horrendous Evils.Daryl Ooi - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):92-97.
    Dormandy argues that stubborn counterevidence provides a reason for Evidentialists to form negative beliefs about God. Focusing on ‘horrendous evils’ as a kind of stubborn counterevidence, I discuss two possible interpretations of Dormandy’s account (a stronger and a weaker view). Against the stronger view, I consider the case of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist, that is, an evidentialist who possesses a defeater belief against horrendous evils. I argue that it would be improbable that she would form negative beliefs about God on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. How to Make Norms Clash.Eva Schmidt - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):46-55.
    In this comment on Katherine Dormandy's paper «True Faith», I point out that the clash she describes between epistemic norms and faith-based norms of belief needs to be supplemented with a clear understanding of the pertinent norms of belief. I argue that conceiving of them as evaluative fails to explain the clash, and that understanding them as prescriptive is no better. I suggest an understanding of these norms along the lines of Ross’s (1930) prima facie duties, and show how this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  5
    Open Faith and Jealous God: Some Remarks on Faith and Evidentialism.Sylwia Wilczewska - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):98-103.
    ABSTRACT In response to Katherine Dormandy’s argument for the superiority of the kind of faith which respects the evidence against retaining faith, I argue that the necessity of deciding which way of weighting evidence for and against retaining faith is preferable leads to Pascal’s wager for evidentialists: the choice between closed and open faith based on the calculation of epistemic and non-epistemic losses and gains, disclosing the tension between the kind of faith grounded in God’s reality and the kind which (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  22
    Rationality and Kinds of Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):386-392.
    ABSTRACT In his ‘Rationality versus Normativity’, John Broome argues against the view that rationality is reducible to normativity. Broome’s argument rests on the claim that while rationality supervenes on the mind, normativity does not. In this commentary, I argue that Broome's arguments succeed only against views on which reasons and normativity are univocal. Once we admit of multiple kinds of normative reasons, some fact-given and others non-factive, a version of the reasons-responsiveness view emerges that is untouched by Broome's arguments. On (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. The Importance of Being Erroneous.Nils Kürbis - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):155-166.
    This is a commentary on MM McCabe's "First Chop your logos... Socrates and the sophists on language, logic, and development". In her paper MM analyses Plato's Euthydemos, in which Plato tackles the problem of falsity in a way that takes into account the speaker and complements the Sophist's discussion of what is said. The dialogue looks as if it is merely a demonstration of the silly consequences of eristic combat. And so it is. But a main point of MM's paper (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues