22 found

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  1. What has Transparency to Do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:221-242.
    This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
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  2. Pre-Reflectivite Self-Consciousness as a Bodily Trait.Marc Borner - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:445-462.
    A theory of pre-reflective self-consciousness can be made fruitful if pre-reflectivity is understood as a bodily trait. This approach helps to overcome certain blurry definitions of pre-reflective self-consciousness from the past, and can aid to a philosophical explanation of self-consciousness, which also goes in line with many psychological and cognitive neuro-scientific find­ings. Especially it can help to understand certain pathologies like neurodegenerative, affective or psychotic disorders from a different angle and thus might help to bring new insights into these fields.
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  3.  2
    Introduction.Marc Borner, Manfred Frank & Kenneth Williford - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:7-33.
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  4.  1
    Liminal Manifestation and the Elusive Nature of Consciousness.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:264-296.
    This programmatic essay sketches a few reasons for the elusive nature of conscious experience. It proposes that while neither introspection nor phenomenologically refined reflection delivers direct ‘observational’ access to intrinsic features of conscious experience, intrinsic features of consciousness, nonetheless, manifest themselves in our experience in a liminal way. Overall it proceeds in two movements. Negatively, it argues that implicit self-awareness renders any notion of reflective access methodologically superfluous but existentially irresistible. Positively, it argues that ‘reflective’ access to the liminal dimensions (...)
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  5. From “Fichte’s Original Insight” to a Moderate Defence of Self-Representationalism.Manfred Frank - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:36-78.
    Fifty years ago, Dieter Henrich wrote an influential little text on ‘Fichte’s Origi­nal Insight’. Seldom so much food for thought has been put in a nutshell. The essay, bearing such an unremarkable title, delivers a diagnosis of why two hundred years of penetrating thought about the internal structure of subjectivity have ended up so fruitless. Henrich’s point was: Self-consciousness cannot be explained as the result of a higher-order act, bending back upon a first-order one, given that “what reflection finds, must (...)
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  6.  9
    The Senses of a Bodily Self.Shaun Gallagher - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:414-433.
    I focus on the sense of ownership and ask whether this experience is some­thing over and above one’s bodily experiences, or something intrinsic to them. I consider liberal, deflationary, and phenomenological accounts of the sense of ownership, and I offer an enactive or action-oriented account that takes the sense of ownership to be intrinsic to the phenomenal background and our various bodily senses, including the sense of agency.
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  7.  1
    Varieties of Self-Apprehension.Anna Giustina - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:186-220.
    The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itself, which has been a central tenet of the phenomenological school, is a current topic in contemporary philosophical debates about consciousness and subjectivity, both in the continental and the analytic tradition. Typically, the self-awareness that accompanies every state of consciousness is char­acterized as pre-reflective. Most theorists of pre-reflective self-awareness seem to converge on a negative characterization: pre-reflective self-awareness is not a kind of reflective awareness. Whereas reflective (...)
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  8. From Metafact to Metaphysics in “the Heidelberg School”.James G. Hart - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:79-100.
    The works of Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank argue that consciousness is fundamentally a self-awareness antecedent to reflection. This essay picks up the suggestion that consciousness itself is a field or medium of manifestation. As such it is a “metafact,” the anonymity of which transcendental philosophy seeks to overcome. This is required because the “facts” of the light of the mind and the intelligibility of what the mind discloses elude philosophical investigation as long as the anonymity reigns. Clarifying self-consciousness illuminates (...)
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  9. Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness in Psychotic Disorders.Andreas Heinz - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:434-444.
    Disorders of the self figure prominently in psychotic experiences. Subjects de­scribe that “alien” thoughts are inserted in their mind by foreign powers, can sometimes hear their thoughts aloud or describe complex voices interacting with each other. Such experiences can be conceptualized in the framework of a Philosophical Anthropology, which suggests that human experience is characterized by centric and excentric positionality: subjects experience their environment centered around their enlived body and at the same time can reflect upon their place in a (...)
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  10.  2
    Stationen einer Freundschaft.Dieter Henrich - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:534-541.
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  11. Pre-Reflective Vs. Reflexive Self-Awareness.Terry Horgan - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:298-315.
    In this paper I propose an account pre-reflective self-awareness, both vis-à-vis onself and vis-à-vis one’s own phenomenally conscious mental states and processes. I argue that pre-reflective self-awareness is a form of acquaintance with oneself and with one’s phenomenal states that is distinctively direct in this sense: it is not mediated by mental representations of those states or of oneself. I also argue that there is an important kind of reflective self-awareness that is reflexive, in this sense: it involves mental representations (...)
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  12. Reflecting on Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness.Robert J. Howell - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:157-185.
    Most philosophers in the phenomenological tradition hold that in addition to the explicit self-consciousness we might get in reflection, there is also a pre-reflective self-consciousness. Despite its popularity, it can be a little difficult to get a grasp on this notion. It can seem impossibly thin—such that it really amounts to little more than a restatement of the notion of consciousness—or problematically robust—such that it seems to conflict with the apparent transparency of consciousness. This paper argues for a notion of (...)
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  13.  2
    Egological Ubiquity.Tomis Kapitan - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:516-531.
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  14. Nonconceptual Self-Awareness and the Constitution of Referential Self-Consciousness.Stefan Lang - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:491-515.
    This essay argues that persons not only have nonconceptual bodily self-awareness and nonconceptual mental anonymous self-awareness but also, at least if they produce the expression ‘I’, nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. It contains information of ‘I’ being produced by oneself. It is argued that this can be seen if we examine the constitution of referential self-consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of being the referent of ‘I’ oneself. The main argument is: A. It is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness (...)
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  15. From Non-Self-Representationalism to the Social Structure of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness.Kristina Musholt - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:243-263.
    Why should we think that there is such a thing as pre-reflective self-awareness? And how is this kind of self-awareness to be characterized? This paper traces a theoretical and a phenomenological line of argument in favor of the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and explores how this notion can be further illuminated by appealing to recent work in the analytical philosophy of language and mind. In particular, it argues that the self is not represented in the content of experience, but is (...)
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  16. Some Comments on Josh Weisberg’s ‘Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the Heidelberg Problem’.Gerhard Preyer - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:358-367.
    Josh Weisberg discusses what he calls the “Heidelberg Problem”. However, he mischaracterizes this problem and believes he is able so resolve the problem, as mischaracterized, as well as meet the de se constraint, in the theoretical frame of reference of the Higher-Order Thought Monitoring theory of consciousness. This commentary highlights the fundamental flaw in his approach, while encouraging further philosophical exchange with our American philosophical colleagues about the “Heidelberg Problem”.
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  17. The Logic of Conspiracy Thought.Luis Roniger & Leonardo Senkman - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:542-569.
    This article analyzes the logic of conspiracy theories, stressing that it would be erroneous to assume that such theories about collusions and intrigues are irrational in nature. On the contrary, they operate on a logic that is no less coherent than scientific discourse, although it differs from the latter in its verification and discard methodology as well as in its mobilizing role. Being part of a larger research that explains the recurrent spread of conspiracy narratives in one region of the (...)
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  18.  1
    Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:316-339.
    There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective self-awareness (...)
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  19. The ‘I Think’. What It is All About.Gerhard Seel - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:101-139.
    Kant distinguishes two kinds of knowledge of one-self: empirical self-knowledge due to inner sense and a priori self-knowledge achieved by transcendental apperception. This conception encounters a host of problems. I try to solve these problems from the perspective of today’s phenomenology and analytical philosophy. I first introduce a new conception of inner sense and time-consciousness and argue that empirical self-knowledge must be based on the category of person, a category Kant did not list in his table of categories. I explain (...)
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  20.  2
    Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the Heidelberg Problem.Josh Weisberg - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:340-357.
    It is widely held that consciousness is partially constituted by a “pre-reflective” self-consciousness. Further, it’s argued that the presence of pre-reflective self-consciousness poses a problem for “higher-order” theories of consciousness. Higher-order theories invoke reflective representation and so do not appear to have the resources to explain pre-reflective self-consciousness. This criticism is rooted in the Heidelberg School’s deep reflection on the nature of self-consciousness, and accordingly, I will label this challenge the “Heidelberg problem.” In this chapter, I will offer a higher-order (...)
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  21. Self-Acquaintance and Three Regress Arguments.Kenneth Williford - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:368-412.
    The three classic regress problems related to the Self-Awareness Thesis can all be elegantly resolved by a self-acquaintance postulate. This resolution, however, entails that consciousness has an irreducibly circular structure and that self-acquaintance should not be conceived of in terms of an independent entity bearing an external or mediated relation to itself but rather in terms of a realized relation-instance relating to itself as well as to something other than itself. Consciousness, on this account, has a categorially curious status. It (...)
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  22.  5
    Reflexivity, Transparency, and Illusionism.Dan Zahavi - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:142-156.
    The notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is much more accepted today than 20 years ago and has become part of the standard repertoire in philosophy of mind. The notion’s increasing popularity has not surprisingly also led to an increasing amount of criticism. My focus in the present contribution will be on a particular radical objection that can be found in Jay Garfield’s book Engaging Buddhism. It seeks to undercut the appeal to pre-reflective self-awareness by arguing that there ultimately is no such (...)
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