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  1.  5
    II—Ideology and Normativity.Clare Chambers - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):175-195.
    This paper investigates the possibility of what Sally Haslanger calls ‘ideology critique’. It argues that ideology critique cannot rely on epistemological considerations alone but must be based on a normative political theory. Since ideological oppression is denied by those who suffer from it is it is not possible to identify privileged epistemological standpoints in advance.
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  2.  3
    Moral Luck and Equality of Moral Opportunity.Roger Crisp - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):1-20.
    This paper concerns the problem of moral luck—the fact that our moral judgements appear to depend, perhaps unjustifiably, on matters of luck. The history and scope of the problem are discussed. It is suggested that our result-sensitive sentiments have their origin in views about moral pollution we might now wish to reject in favour of a volitionalist ethics.
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  3.  1
    I—European Philosophical History and Faith in God A Posteriori.Simon Glendinning - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):63-82.
    Studies of Europe and European identity today are dominated by the methods of the social sciences. Europe is understood as a geographical region of a global totality, and treated in political-economic terms; and European identity is largely investigated through social surveys. This paper explores the possibility of a philosophical contribution to understanding Europe: an understanding based on the idea that Europe is itself a distinctively philosophical phenomenon, and that its modern geopolitical condition has an irreducibly geophilosophical significance.
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  4.  2
    I—Culture and Critique.Haslanger Sally - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):149-173.
    How do we achieve social justice? How do we change society for the better? Some would argue that we must do it by changing the laws or state institutions. Others that we must do it by changing individual attitudes. I argue that although both of these factors are important and relevant, we must also change culture. What does this mean? Culture, I argue, is a set of social meanings that shapes and filters how we think and act. Problematic networks of (...)
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  5.  5
    I—Facts, Factives, and Contrafactives.Richard Holton - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):245-266.
    Frege begins his discussion of factives in ‘On Sense and Reference’ with an example of a purported contrafactive, that is, a verb that entails, or presupposes, the falsity of the complement sentence. But the verb he cites, ‘wähnen’, is now obsolete, and native speakers are sceptical about whether it really was a contrafactive. Despite the profusion of factive verbs, there are no clear examples of contrafactive propositional attitude verbs in English, French or German. This paper attempts to give an explanation (...)
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  6.  7
    II—Knowledge and Belief.John Hyman - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):267-288.
    In this article, I oppose the view that knowledge is a species of belief, and argue that belief should be defined in terms of knowledge, instead of the other way round. However, I reject the idea that the concept of knowledge has a primary or basic role or position in our system of mental and logical concepts, because I reject the hierarchical conception of philosophical analysis implicit in this idea. I approach the topic of knowledge and belief from a discussion (...)
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  7.  1
    I—Trinitarian Perception.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):21-41.
    We begin with a puzzle about how to intelligibly combine the active and passive elements of perception. For counsel, we turn to Augustine’s account of perception in De Trinitate. Augustine’s trinitarian account of perception offers an attractive resolution of our puzzle. Augustine’s resolution of our puzzle, however, cannot be straightforwardly adopted. It must be adapted. We end with speculation about how this might be done.
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  8.  1
    Depending on the Thick.Debbie Roberts - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):197-220.
    The claim that the normative depends on the non-normative is just as entrenched in metanormative theory as the claim that the normative supervenes on the non-normative. It is widely held to be a genuine truism, a conceptual truth that operates as a constraint on competence with normative concepts. Call it the dependence constraint. I argue that this status is unwarranted. While it is true that the normative is dependent, it is not a genuine truism, or a conceptual truth, that it (...)
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  9.  1
    II—Perceptiveness.José Filipe Silva - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):43-61.
    Augustine is often credited for upholding a theory of active perception, whereby our acquaintance with ordinary material objects and their properties cannot be explained by the causal efficaciousness of these objects. In a previous work, I attempted to connect this theory with the account of perception found in his treatise On the Trinity. Mark Kalderon has challenged this ‘reconciliationist’ reading, claiming that in this work Augustine admits to a strong causal role of the object in bringing about perceptual experiences. In (...)
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  10.  3
    I—Lucifer’s Logic Lesson: How to Lie with Arguments.Roy Sorensen - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):105-126.
    My thesis is that you can lie with ‘P therefore Q’ without P or Q being lies. For you can lie by virtue of not believing that P supports Q. My thesis is reconciled with the principle that all lies are assertions through H. P. Grice’s account of conventional implicatures. These semantic cousins of conversational implicatures are secondary assertions that clarify the speaker’s attitude toward his primary assertions. The meaning of ‘therefore’ commits the speaker to an entailment thesis even though (...)
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  11.  1
    II—Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying.Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):127-147.
    Responding to parts of Sorensen, it is argued that the connectives therefore and but do not contribute conventional implicatures, but are rather to be treated as presupposition triggers. Their special contributions are therefore not asserted, but presupposed. Hence, given the generic assumption that one lies only if one makes an assertion, one cannot lie with arguments in the way Sorensen proposes. Yet, since conventional implicatures are asserted, one can lie with conventional implicatures. Moreover, since conventional implicatures may be asserted by (...)
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  12.  1
    II—Europe and Eurocentrism.Stone Alison - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):83-104.
    In this article I explore how philosophical thinking about God, reason, humanity and history has shaped ideas of Europe, focusing on Hegel. For Hegel, Europe is the civilization that, by way of Christianity, has advanced the spirit of freedom which originated in Greece. Hegel is a Eurocentrist whose work indicates how Eurocentrism as a broader discourse has shaped received conceptions of Europe. I then distinguish ‘external’ and ‘internal’ ways of approaching ideas of Europe and defend the former approach, on which (...)
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  13.  4
    II—Moral Dependence and Natural Properties.Nick Zangwill - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):221-243.
    I explore the Because Constraint—the idea that moral facts depend on natural facts and that moral judgements ought to respect the dependence of moral facts on natural facts. I consider several issues concerning its clarification and importance.
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