The question, “Was Aristotle the first logicist?”, may appear anachronistic and elicit skepticism since the doctrine of logicism as a fully-fledged idea emerged only in the nineteenth century in the context of the debates surrounding the foundation of mathematics. Indeed, Bertrand Russell credits Gottlob Frege with being the first in “logicising” mathematics (Russell 1919, p. 7), where the thesis espouses that mathematical concepts and propositions are ultimately reducible to or derivable from a number of fundamental logical concepts and principles. However, (...) anachronistic appearances aside, in a fresh reexamination of some of the specific Aristotelian texts in Metaphysics and Prior Analytics, and especially focusing on Aristotle’s particular remarks on the status and significance of the principle of non-contradiction, one may textually argue for a nascent and burgeoning form of logicism in Aristotle, albeit within a much larger metaphysical context than mathematics. (shrink)

This paper is conceived in the footsteps of The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the ‘Mind-Body Problem’ by David Charles, OUP 2021. It examines the intricate relationship between mind and body through the lens of Aristotle’s ‘Snubness-structure’ (‘S-structure’) according to David Charles’s interpretation in The Undivided Self. I explore how this conceptual framework, exemplified by the distinction between nasal concavity and geometric concavity, provides a comprehensive approach to understanding the inseparability of form and matter in natural phenomena. The study extends this (...) analysis to various psychological faculties, including perception (aisthēsis), desire (epithymia), thought (nous) and emotions (pathē). By investigating the application of the S-structure across these domains, I aim to elucidate Aristotle’s nuanced view of the mind-body relationship, challenging both reductionist and dualist interpretations. This research contributes to ongoing debates in philosophy of mind, offering insights into how ancient philosophical concepts can inform contemporary discussions on the nature of consciousness and embodied cognition. (shrink)

This paper follows up on two previous contributions in Aristotelica (3 and 5) that focused on the early transmission of Phys. 250b13 as a case study. Here, the discussion broadens to general questions about the scribal hands behind Aristotle’s earliest manuscripts J (ms. Vindobonensis Phil. gr. 100) and E (ms. Parisinus gr. 1853), their roles in textual history, and their connections to the earliest reconstructable archetype. Current scholarship holds that while the sources of J and E overlap for the Metaphysics (...) (labeled Π by Jaeger’s 1957 critical apparatus), they diverge entirely for the other works held by both codices, i.e. Physics, De caelo, De generatione et corruptione, Meteorology. How can this be explained? A major, recent development is Ronconi’s (2012) identification of two distinct tenth-century volumes later combined into ms. E. Each has a main early scribe at work. Thereafter, no attempt has been made to differentiate their approaches to the text. In Aristotelica 5, E’s two early scribes are distinguished and labeled, the one, EMet (responsible for the Metaphysics) the other, EPhys (responsible for the Corpus Physicum). The two exhibit differing approaches. Through closer analysis of their methodologies, it is possible to investigate and eventually to detect what I call a “β agenda” in EPhys’s Corpus Physicum, by analogy with the socalled β manuscripts of the Metaphysics. (shrink)

The present note offers a brief new analysis of the well-known scholium found in codex Parisinus gr. 1853 (E) on folio 234r. My analysis will compare it to the exegetical approach that Alexander of Aphrodisias adopts at the outset of Alpha elatton – attested by two different recensiones – and to Asclepius’ exegesis of the first lemma of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

This article aims to shed light on the reception of Aristotle’s theory of the continuum in late antique thought. It starts with a brief introduction to Aristotle’s theory and then moves on to analyze its reassessment in the philosophy of Pseudo-Archytas, a thinker whose significance for the development of Neopythagorean thought was unprecedented but whose theoretical heritage, as far as the theory of the continuum is concerned, has not yet been fully scrutinized. The main thesis of this article is that (...) Pseudo-Archytas’s appropriation and creative reworking of Aristotle presents us with a fullfledged theory of the temporal continuum which at its core is a mathematical continuum. As such, this continuum is antithetical to that of Aristotle, as its key point is to substantiate the possibility of a continuum made of indivisibles (or, to use more up-to-date language, of infinitesimals) as a new philosophical orthodoxy. (shrink)

The contribution is a follow-up to my textual note in Aristotelica 3 (2023) on Physics VIII 1.250b1. What is at issue is a previously neglected lectio difficilior concerning cosmic motion, i.e., εἰ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, “if it was [always] there, it will also always be”, vs. ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, “it was there always and it will always be”. The theoretical relevance of the reading emerged more clearly in the subsequent debate: it may imply a hypothetical foundation of (...) Aristotle’s theory of the eternity of cosmic motion, hence, of the cosmos itself, and hence, of its first unmoved principle. The question is: how can this case study contribute to the evolving research field of Aristotelian textual criticism? I will provide a more comprehensive answer in ‘Aristotle’s Earliest Extant Manuscripts. New Doubts and Perspectives’ forthcoming in Aristotelica 6. (shrink)

This is a response to the article published by Silvia Fazzo, ‘A Hypothetical Premise about Eternal Cosmic Motion in Physics VIII 1.250b13’ in a previous issue of Aristotelica, in which she argues on the basis of the sources, Vind. Phil. gr. 100 in particular, that at Physica VIII 1.250b13 one should adopt the hypothetical reading ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, rather than the categorical reading ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται. We argue that a complete and methodologically sound consideration (...) of all the textual evidence available shows that the proposal is implausible. (shrink)

This article aims to explain the reception and reassessment of Aristotle’s philosophy of time during the first century BCE by Pseudo-Archytas, a thinker who exercised great influence over and laid the groundwork for Neopythagorean and Neoplatonist philosophies of nature. The article scrutinizes Pseudo-Archytas’ theory by examining his solution to the paradox of time’s existence. Through a comparative analysis of Aristotle’s and Pseudo-Archytas’ discourse, it seeks to demonstrate that their theories, despite apparent similarities (associated with their overall approach to the subject (...) matter, the terms utilized in discourse, etc.), exhibit different philosophical underpinnings and are in many ways antithetical. (shrink)

The discussion of the soul as a principle of life in ancient Greek philosophy was not limited to the soul’s relation to the body, the capacities of the soul, and the functions of the living organism. The debates about the soul and life also concerned issues of embryogenesis, such as the generation, formation, and animation of an organic body in the womb. The fragments of these debates can be traced in the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias, particularly in his treatise (...) On the Soul. In this paper, I examine Alexander’s views on animal reproduction, especially considering the problematic question of the life and animation of the embryo. Analyzing generation among the other capacities of the nutritive soul in On the Soul, Alexander considers the causes of embryogenesis. As the first cause, he indicates the nutritive capacity, which is transmitted from the parent through the seed and acts in the embryo. In addition, as Simplicius states in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Alexander claims that the soul of the parent acts as a paradeigma that specifies the order and the goal of the embryo’s development. Thus, I explain Alexander’s understanding of the causes of the embryo’s development and animation in the context of his idea of the soul as a capacity (δύναμις) and state (ἕξις). (shrink)

P. Hasper and R. Arnzen have mounted a spirited defense of what they call the categorical reading of Physics VIII 1.250b13 against a hypothetical reading of the text put forward by Silvia Fazzo in Aristotelica 3. The crucial phrase in Ross’s text reads ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται. Fazzo has argued in favor of ἀλλ’ εἰ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, a variant derived from a manuscript designated as J (Vind. Phil. gr. 100), the oldest manuscript of the Physica. On (...) Fazzo’s reading, with ἀλλ’ εἰ, Aristotle is completing a hypothetical pair of options rather than making a categorical assertion that motion is eternal. My question in this note is a methodological one. When interpretive stakes are considerable, when should a more plausible interpretation of a text’s larger argumentative context lead us to endorse a variant reading, even when the variant is at odds with a larger extant textual tradition? Having argued that Physics VIII 1displays a thoroughgoing dialectical structure, I conclude that emendation of 250b13 has in its favor that it makes clearer that Aristotle is framing a dichotomy between two mutually exclusive options, just as his theory of dialectical reasoning toward principles would dictate. In this case at least, interpretive considerations of the larger argumentative structure should be given special weight in evaluating textual variants. (shrink)