9 found

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  1. One Standard to Rule Them All?Marc‐Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):12-21.
    It has been argued that an epistemically rational agent’s evidence is subjectively mediated through some rational epistemic standards, and that there are incompatible but equally rational epistemic standards available to agents. This supports Permissiveness, the view according to which one or multiple fully rational agents are permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to a body of evidence). In this paper, I argue that the above claims entail the existence of a unique and more reliable epistemic standard. (...)
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  2.  14
    On Correctly Responding to All Decisive Reasons We Have.Davide Fassio - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):63-73.
    Benjamin Kiesewetter has recently provided an argument to the effect that necessarily, if one has decisive reason to φ, then one has sufficient reason to believe that she herself has decisive reason to φ. If sound, this argument has important implications for several debates in contemporary normative philosophy. I argue that the main premise in the argument is problematic and should be rejected. According to this premise (PRR), necessarily, one can respond correctly to all the decisive reasons one has. I (...)
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  3.  13
    On the Alleged Normative Significance of a Platitude.Benoit Gaultier - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):42-52.
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  4.  4
    Attention Norms in Siegel’s The Rationality of Perception.Zachary C. Irving - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):84-91.
    Can we be responsible for our attention? Can attention be epistemically good or bad? Siegel tackles these under‐explored questions in “Selection Effects”, a pathbreaking chapter of The Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, Siegel develops one of the first philosophical accounts of attention norms. Her account is inferential: patterns of attention are often controlled by inferences and therefore subject to rational epistemic norms that govern any other form of inference. Although Siegel’s account is explanatorily powerful, it cannot capture a core (...)
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  5.  16
    The Puzzle of Hyper‐Change.Andrew Law - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):1-11.
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  6.  7
    When Ignorance Excuses.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):22-31.
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  7.  16
    Egalitarian Nonconsequentialism and the Levelling Down Objection.David O'Brien - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):74-83.
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  8.  3
    Extreme Betting.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):32-41.
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  9.  24
    A Non‐Normative Account of Assertion.Dylan Black - 2019 - Ratio 32:53-62.
    Many contemporary philosophers argue that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm. In particular, many defend the knowledge account of assertion, which says that one should assert only what one knows. Here, I defend a non‐normative alternative to the knowledge account that I call the repK account of assertion. According to the repK account, assertion represents knowledge, but it is not governed by a constitutive epistemic rule. I show that the repK account offers a more straightforward interpretation of the conversational (...)
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