30 found

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  1.  2
    Introduction.James Andow - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
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  2.  3
    Why Hope is Not a Moral Virtue: Aquinas's Insight.A. Bobier Christopher - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers that hope is a moral virtue: the virtuously hopeful person experiences the right amount of hope for the right things. This moralization of hope presents us with a puzzle. The historical consensus is that hope is a passion and hope is a theological virtue, not a moral virtue. Thomas Aquinas, the philosopher who wrote most extensively on hope, offers an explanation for why hope is not a moral virtue. The aim of this paper (...)
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  3.  2
    Belief is Contingently Involuntary.Anthony Robert Booth - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):107-121.
    The debate between “Normativists” and “Teleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief (...)
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  4.  3
    Naturalist Political Realism and the First Political Question.Ben Cross - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    Many political realists reject the idea that the first task for political philosophy is to justify the existence of coercive political institutions. Instead, they say, we should begin with the factual existence of CPIs, and ask how they ought to be structured. In holding this view, they adopt a form of political naturalism that is broadly Aristotelian in character. In this article, I distinguish between two forms that this political naturalism might take - what I call a ‘strong’ form, and (...)
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  5.  2
    Stereotypes, Conceptual Centrality and Gender Bias: An Empirical Investigation.Del Pinal Guillermo, Madva Alex & Reuter Kevin - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    Discussions in social psychology overlook an important way in which biases can be encoded in conceptual representations. Most accounts of implicit bias focus on ‘mere associations’ between features and representations of social groups. While some have argued that some implicit biases must have a richer conceptual structure, they have said little about what this richer structure might be. To address this lacuna, we build on research in philosophy and cognitive science demonstrating that concepts represent dependency relations between features. These relations, (...)
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  6.  31
    Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit.Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    Stereotypes shape inferences in philosophical thought, political discourse, and everyday life. These inferences are routinely made when thinkers engage in language comprehension or production: We make them whenever we hear, read, or formulate stories, reports, philosophical case-descriptions, or premises of arguments – on virtually any topic. These inferences are largely automatic: largely unconscious, non-intentional, and effortless. Accordingly, they shape our thought in ways we can properly understand only by complementing traditional forms of philosophical analysis with experimental methods from psycholinguistics. This (...)
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  7.  1
    Pride and Moral Responsibility.Jeremy Fischer - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):181-196.
    Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and (...)
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  8.  1
    Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Ryan M. Miller & Fiery A. Cushman - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive (...)
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  9. A New Group Dutch Book Argument.Kopec Matthew - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):122-136.
    In this essay, I repair the group Dutch Book argument presented by Donald Gillies. I then examine what additional assumptions would be needed for the argument to generate genuinely normative prescriptions for groups of inquirers. Although the resulting norms will apply to fewer groups than Gillies originally intended, they are still an important addition to the normative landscape in social epistemology.
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  10.  10
    Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem.Miller Gregory - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos-sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de-combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned (...)
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  11.  8
    Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability , Pp. 224, £25. [REVIEW]Julia Mosquera - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):215-219.
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  12. Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love.Hichem Naar - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):197-214.
    Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes (...)
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  13. Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love.Hichem Naar - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):197-214.
    Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes (...)
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  14.  1
    Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief.Michele Palmira - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences and disagreements involving outright beliefs? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's doxastic attitude (...)
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  15.  2
    Presentism, Redemption, and Moral Development.Pezet Robert Edward - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    This paper explores what could justify some intuitive temporal asymmetries regarding redemption and the distribution of ills and goods throughout an agent's lifespan. After exposing the inadequacies of causal explanations – based on our differential ability to affect the future, but not the past – a metaphysical explanation is outlined in relation to three competing temporal-ontological profiles of agents, and their varying accounts of a being's development. Only one of those conceptions of agents – supported by Presentism, the thesis that (...)
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  16.  2
    Does Experimental Philosophy Have a Role to Play in Carnapian Explication?Mark Pinder - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    Shepherd and Justus argue that experimental philosophy has an important role to play in the method of Carnapian explication, facilitating the preparatory stage during which the concept to be explicated is clarified. I raise concerns about their specific proposal, before sketching an alternative. In particular, I suggest that experimental philosophy can directly aid the construction of fruitful concepts. This provides a clear practical role for experimental philosophy, both within the sciences and theoretical inquiry more generally. In this respect, experimental philosophy (...)
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  17.  1
    How Not to Characterise a Hard Choice.Reuter Kevin & Messerli Michael - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    People are often faced with so called hard choices – also known as hard cases of comparison. In trying to characterize these hard choices, philosophers have made two central claims. First, failure of transitivity underlies hard cases of comparison. Second, using a random procedure is considered inappropriate in order to arrive at a decision in hard cases. While having some argumentative support, both claims primarily rely on expert intuitions. The results of the experiments we present in this paper challenge both (...)
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  18.  91
    Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem.Travis Timmerman - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
    If earlier-than-necessary death is bad because it deprives individuals of additional good life, then why isn't later-than-necessary conception bad for the same reason? Deprivationists have argued that prenatal non-existence is not bad because it is impossible to be conceived earlier, but postmortem non-existence is bad because it is possible to live longer. Call this the Impossibility Solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the Impossibility Solution does not work by showing how it is possible to be conceived earlier in the (...)
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  19.  3
    Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):137-148.
    This paper concerns the apparent fact — discussed by Sinan Dogramaci and Brian Weatherson — that inductive reasoning often interacts in disastrous ways with patterns of reasoning that seem perfectly fine in the deductive case. In contrast to Dogramaci's and Weatherson's own suggestions, I argue that these cases show that we cannot reason inductively about arbitrary objects. Moreover, as I argue, this prohibition is neatly explained by a certain hypothesis about the rational basis of inductive reasoning — namely, the hypothesis (...)
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  20.  4
    Imogen Dickie, Fixing Reference , X+333 Pp., £37.50 Hb. [REVIEW]Eileen Walker - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2).
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  21.  2
    Intrinsic Value and the Last Last Man.Zach Weber - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):165-180.
    Even if you were the last person on Earth, you should not cut down all the trees—or so goes the Last Man thought experiment, which has been taken to show that nature has intrinsic value. But ‘Last Man’ is caught on a dilemma. If Last Man is too far inside the anthropocentric circle, so to speak, his actions cannot be indicative of intrinsic value. If Last Man is cast too far outside the anthropocentric circle, though, then value terms lose their (...)
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  22.  4
    What's Special About Moral Ignorance?Jan Willem Wieland - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):149-164.
    According to an influential view by Elizabeth Harman, moral ignorance, as opposed to factual ignorance, never excuses one from blame. In defense of this view, Harman appeals to the following considerations: that moral ignorance always implies a lack of good will, and that moral truth is always accessible. In this paper, I clearly distinguish these considerations, and present challenges to both. If my arguments are successful, sometimes moral ignorance excuses.
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  23.  5
    Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’.Vuko Andrić - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):72-87.
    This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally (...)
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  24.  6
    Is There Such a Thing as Relative Analyticity?Kai Michael Büttner - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):47-56.
    Fine bases his influential conception of essence on a particular account of definitions. And he complements it with a specific account of analyticity. I will argue that Fine's conception of relative analyticity confuses the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's definition with the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's meaning. His idea that correct definitions specify essential properties of meanings is mistaken. The correctness of definitions can only be assessed by (...)
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  25.  3
    Mental Causation is Not Just Downward Causation.Engelhardt Jeff - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):31-46.
    According to a popular model of mental causation, an irreducible mental cause M1 brings about an irreducible mental effect M2 by bringing about M2's supervenience base, P2. Call this ‘the Downward Causation View’. This paper raises doubts about the Downward Causation View on grounds that M1 does not cause M2 immediately and there is no causal chain from M1 to M2. Prima facie, then, M1 does not cause M2 on this view. But a theory of mental causation ought to account (...)
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  26. Particularism About Composition.John Gabriel - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):15-30.
    Unwilling to adopt the radical ontologies that leading answers to van Inwagen's special composition question imply, Ned Markosian proposes that there is no true, non-trivial, and finitely long answer to the SCQ. On my usage, this makes Markosian a particularist about composition. I argue that an improved version of Markosian's particularism fails because it cannot explain how sense perception justifies many of the ordinary-object beliefs we base on it. I further argue that psychologists' research on object perception suggests that general (...)
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  27.  24
    Formulating Emergence.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1).
    Emergence is intuitively characterized as dependent novelty. Yet, besides this intuition, several formulations of it were elaborated in the last decades. In this article, after having distinguished between two different varieties of emergence, I aim at providing two formulation schemes for emergence. This could help to explain what emergence is and to clarify and unify the suggested formulations. The general idea behind my schemes is that emergence is partial and qualified dependence of the emergent entities on their emergence bases. After (...)
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  28. David J. Stump, Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science: Alternative Interpretations of the A Priori , Xviii + 176 Pp., £85. [REVIEW]John Preston - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):100-106.
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  29.  4
    A Partial Defense of Permissivism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):57-71.
    Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify the debate by (...)
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  30. The Possibility of a Fair Play Account of Legitimacy.Justin Tosi - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):88-99.
    The philosophical literature on state legitimacy has recently seen a significant conceptual revision. Several philosophers have argued that the state's right to rule is better characterized not as a claim right to obedience, but as a power right. There have been few attempts to show that traditional justifications for the claim right might also be used to justify a power right, and there have been no such attempts involving the principle of fair play, which is widely regarded as the most (...)
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