14 found

Year:

  1.  50
    Reasoning's Relation to Bodily Action.David Jenkins - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):87-96.
    Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non‐mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out‐loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions (...)
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  2.  30
    The Problem with Descriptive Correctness.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):79-86.
    In the 1980s and early 1990s, the normativity of meaning was thought to be more-or-less 'incontestable.' But in the last 25 years, many philosophers of mind and language have contested it in several seemingly different ways. This, however, is somewhat illusory. There is an unappreciated commonality among most anti-normativist arguments, and this commonality, I argue, poses a problem for anti-normativism. The result, however, is not a wholesale rejection of anti-normativism. Rather, an insight from the anti-normativist position can be harnessed to (...)
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  3.  8
    Love, Reason and Morality.Eduardo Ortiz Llueca - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):125-128.
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  4.  3
    Morality, Reasoning and Upbringing.Anthony O'Hear - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):106-116.
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  5.  13
    How Permissive Consent Works.Peter Schaber - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):117-124.
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  6.  12
    Knowing What You Are Doing: Action‐Demonstratives in Unreflective Action.Markos Valaris - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):97-105.
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  7. Alien Worlds, Alien Laws, and the Humean Conceivability Argument.Lok‐Chi Chan, David Braddon‐Mitchell & Andrew James Latham - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):1-13.
    Monism is our name for a range of views according to which the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is intimate and necessary, or on which there are no categorical bases at all. In contrast, Dualist views hold that the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is distant and contingent. This paper is a defence of Monism against an influential conceivability argument in favour of Dualism. The argument suggests that the apparent possibility of causal behaviour coming apart from (...)
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  8.  2
    Flexible Moral Theories: Complexity, Domination, and Indeterminacy.Francisco Garcia‐Gibson & Eduardo Rivera‐López - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):46-55.
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  9.  10
    Guilt Feelings and the Intelligibility of Moral Duties.Andrew Tice Ingram - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):56-67.
    G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we should dispense with deontic concepts when doing ethics, if it is psychologically possible to do so. In response, I contend that deontic concepts are constitutive of the common moral experience of guilt. This has two consequences for Anscombe's position. First, seeing that guilt is a deontic emotion, we should recognize that Anscombe's qualification on her thesis applies: psychologically, we need deontology to understand our obligations and hence whether our guilt is warranted. Second, the fact that (...)
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  10.  40
    Knowledge, Reasoning, and Deliberation.Brian Kim - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):14-26.
    Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that the (...)
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  11.  13
    Interpreting Our Emotions.Julie Kirsch - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):68-78.
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  12.  14
    Standard and Alternative Error Theories About Moral Reasons.Kipros Lofitis - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):37-45.
    An error theory about moral reasons is the view that ordinary thought is committed to error, and that the alleged error is the thought that moral norms (expressing alleged moral requirements) invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons (for action). In this paper, I sketch two distinct ways of arguing for the error theorist's substantive conclusion that moral norms do not invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons. I am primarily interested in the somewhat neglected way, which I call the (...)
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  13.  27
    The Persuasiveness Puzzle About Bootstrapping.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):27-36.
    This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming (...)
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  14. Disagreement with a Bald‐Faced Liar.Teresa Marques - 2020 - Ratio:1-14.
    How can we disagree with a bald-faced liar? Can we actively disagree if it is common ground that the speaker has no intent to deceive? And why do we disapprove of bald-faced liars so strongly? Bald-faced lies pose problems for accounts of lying and of assertion. Recent proposals try to defuse those problems by arguing that bald-faced lies are not really assertions, but rather performances of fiction-like scripts, or different types of language games. In this paper, I raise two objections (...)
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