Friendship with the ancients is a set of imaginative exercises and engagements with the work of deceased authors that allows us to imagine them as friends. Authors from diverse cultures and times such as Mengzi, Niccolò Machiavelli, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Clare Carlisle have engaged in it. The aim of this article is to defend this practice, showing that friendship with the ancients is a species of philosophical friendship, which confers the unique benefits such friendships offer. It is conducive to (...) epistemic virtue, notably the related virtues of epistemic humility and of relational understanding. When we cultivate friendship with the ancients, we are not learning facts about them, but aim at understanding their views in their full scope in a way that a relationship between friends allows. (shrink)

Perfectionism, the view according to which the good for an x is constituted by flourishing as an x, is a venerable account of the good, the popularity of which has only grown in recent decades. In this paper, I assess the merits of perfectionism in its traditional form, and argue in favor of a refinement. Specifically, I focus on traditional perfectionism’s account of the Central Axiological Category (CAC)---the kind ("x") that subjects fall into for the purposes of determining their good. (...) I argue that shifting our understanding of the CAC from the traditional human category to the category of valuer is faithful to the most significant perfectionist insights, and does not succumb to the numerous and substantial challenges for the traditional understanding. (shrink)

This essay defends a new account of wrongful benefiting based on the principle of fair play. In particular, I argue that certain structurally-conferred group-based benefits or privileges can ground obligations on the part of innocent beneficiaries to relinquish specific gains for purposes of redistribution regardless of whether their receipt is sourced in wrongdoing or involves the imposition of harm upon relevant others. I call this approach to fair play reasoning externalist insofar as it turns on a novel conception of free-riding (...) that eschews necessary appeal to beneficiaries’ mental states or volition. After presenting an empirical example to help illustrate the sort of benefiting at issue and distinguishing my account from arguments rooted in the notion of structural injustice, I defend it via what I call the extension argument, respond to two salient objections, and close by suggesting its potential political utility in the American context specifically. (shrink)

Recent discussions of misanthropy consider misanthropy to be cognitive at its core, consisting of the judgment that humanity is a failure. If this judgment is justified, then one question is whether one can be both a misanthrope and virtuous. This article argues that cognitive misanthropes can adopt a sympathetic outlook on humanity which is a necessary step for being virtuous. This is because the sympathetic outlook requires the virtue of practical wisdom, a special virtue in being either necessary or necessary (...) and sufficient for other virtues. The article then argues that virtue is open to even some misanthropes whose misanthropy is also affective. Given that dislike is a common affective state among misanthropes, the article focuses on misanthropes who dislike humanity (as opposed to those who, say, hate it or view it with contempt) and argues that dislike is compatible with virtue. Misanthropes are thus not condemned to non-virtuous lives. (shrink)

In light of the complexity of some important matters, the best epistemic strategy for laypersons is often to rely heavily on the judgments of subject matter experts. However, given the contentiousness of some issues and the existence of fake experts, determining who to trust from the lay perspective is no simple matter. One proposed approach is for laypersons to attend to displays of intellectual virtue as indicators of expertise. I argue that this strategy is likely to fail, as non-experts often (...) display apparent intellectual virtues while legitimate experts often display apparent intellectual vices. Then, I argue that this challenge is difficult to overcome, as experts who attempt to better exhibit apparent intellectual virtues would likely compromise their own reliability in the process. Finally, I discuss two conclusions—one more optimistic and one more pessimistic—that one might draw concerning the role of intellectual virtue in the identification of experts. (shrink)

While political philosophers often assume that we need to imagine a better future in order to hope for it, philosophers of hope doubt that hope and imagination are constitutively intertwined. In order to solve this puzzle, the article introduces a particular kind of hope in which we imaginatively inhabit a desired future. Combining insights from the philosophy of hope and of imagination, I unpack what imaginative hope is and why it is particularly significant in political contexts. I contend that in (...) cases where we pursue a goal the realization of which requires collective action over a long time-scale (as it is paradigmatically the case in politics), the imagination has the potential to bolster the practical value of hope, i.e., its power to guide and sustain our agency. (shrink)

Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias. In this article, I argue that the possibility bias is not epistemically justified. We (...) should regard possibility with at least as much suspicion, that is to say as incurring at least as much of an explanatory demand, as necessity. In fact, I suggest that we might even be justified in reversing the burden of proof asymmetry and adopting a necessity bias. This has quite radical implications for philosophical methodology and hence for many first-order philosophical concerns. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to outline a new account of the virtue of patience. To help build the account, we focus on five important issues pertaining to patience: (i) goals and time, (ii) emotion, (iii) continence versus virtue, (iv) motivation, and (v) good ends. The heart of the resulting account is that patience is a cross-situational and stable disposition to react, both internally and externally, to slower than desired progress toward goal achievement with a reasonable level of calmness. (...) The article ends with an application of the account to better understanding the vices associated with patience. (shrink)

This essay situates Mary Astell’s understanding of women’s moral freedom in the context of her under-studied vocabulary of “Epicurism.” It foregrounds Astell’s engagement with two contemporaneous accounts of the will, both of which can be broadly characterized as hedonistic. On the first, developed by John Norris (1688, 1693), God ensures conformity between his will and the human will by endowing agents with a love of pleasure that moves them in his direction. On the second, delineated by John Locke (1690), human (...) wills are motivated by a morally neutral desire for pleasure, which acquires moral significance only when agents exercise their power of freedom or bring their reason to evaluate the goods that give them pleasure. In her writings of the 1690s, Astell develops a feminist ethics that is far closer to Locke’s than has been recognized. Like Locke, and unlike Norris, she suggests that agents are themselves responsible for aligning their wills with God’s, and they must do so by cultivating reason and a taste for virtuous pleasures. In a distinctively feminist move, she maps how patriarchal society corrupts women’s wills by directing their desires to sense-based goods only, preventing them from achieving the happiness due to them as rational beings. While Astell is routinely characterized as a rationalist philosopher, she is a rationalist who, like Locke, is highly aware of the limits of reason, and deeply interested in the potential of agents to transform their likes and dislikes so that they find pleasure in the exercise of virtue. (shrink)

Claims about what justice “requires” and the “requirements” of justice are pervasive in political philosophy. However, there is a highly significant ambiguity in such claims that appears to have gone unnoticed. Such claims may pick out either one of two categorically distinct and noncoextensive kinds of requirement that we call 1) requirements-as-necessary-conditions for justice and 2) requirements-as-demands of justice. This is an especially compelling instance of an ambiguity that John Broome has famously observed in the context of claims about other (...) requirements (notably the requirements of rationality and morality). But it appears to have been overlooked by political philosophers in the case of claims about the requirements of justice. The ambiguity is highly significant inasmuch as failing to notice it is liable to distort our normative thinking about politics and make us vulnerable to certain kinds of normatively consequential errors: both mistakenly drawing inferences about what justice demands of us from claims that certain states or societies are not just; and mistakenly drawing inferences about what states or societies are or would be just from claims that justice does not demand of states or societies that they do certain things. Paying greater attention to the distinction between these two different kinds of requirements and the ways in which they come apart is helpful, not merely in avoiding these distortions and errors, but also in resolving, or at least clarifying, a number of other notoriously murky meta-normative debates, especially various important debates about realism and idealism in political philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophers have conjectured that human cognitive limitations might preclude our ever resolving the hard problem of consciousness. Few, however, have offered suggestions as to what it might be about our conceptual apparatus that poses the problem. I do so in this essay, arguing that our central difficulties lie with two conceptual categories that pervade philosophical discussion of the hard problem. They are compositional concepts -- part/whole, constituents/constitution, and the like – and instantiational concepts: properties/objects, universals/particulars, and the like. I look (...) at the uses of these two conceptual categories in four contexts in which the hard problem is considered: multiple realizability, zombies, mental causation, and panpsychism. I show that the two conceptual categories run into the same kinds of obstacles in each case, which suggests that they might be key to the cognitive limitations about which some have speculated. (shrink)

This article examines Bolzano’s aesthetic cognitivism. It argues that, while reminiscent of German rationalist aesthetics and hence potentially appearing rigid and outdated, Bolzano’s version of cognitivism is, in fact, highly innovative and more flexible than the cognitivism championed by the rationalists. He imports from the rationalists the idea that aesthetic appreciation and creation are rule-governed, yet does not construe rule-following and engaging in free aesthetic activities as mutually exclusive. Furthermore, thanks to his nuanced treatment of the interaction between aesthetic values (...) and other types of values, Bolzano’s aesthetic cognitivism presents a fresh alternative to contemporary versions of aesthetic cognitivism. (shrink)

Do we owe anything to our genetic relatives qua genetic relatives? The philosophical literature has primarily addressed this question in the context of procreation. But genetic matching databases raise the question of whether we owe anything to previously unknown genetic relatives. This article argues that influential philosophical arguments regarding moral claims to know one’s genetic origins (sometimes referred to as a ‘right to know’) in the context of gamete donation have implications for a broader set of claims. First, these arguments (...) imply more than a claim to know the identity of a genetic relative; the interests which they invoke can only be satisfied through a relationship. Second, the scope of the claims is broader than tends to be acknowledged: even if procreators have special obligations towards their offspring, these arguments imply that weighty moral claims can be made against other genetic relatives in many different contexts. (shrink)

This article argues that our attention is pervasively biased by embodied affects and that we are normatively assessable in light of this. From a contemporary perspective, normative theorizing about attention is a relatively new trend (Siegel 2017: Ch. 9, Irving 2019, Bommarito 2018: Ch. 5). However, Buddhist philosophy has provided us with a well-spring of normatively rich theorizing about attention from its inception. This article will address how norms of attention are dealt with in Buddhaghosa’s (5th-6th CE) claims about how (...) wholesome forms of empathy can go wrong. Through this analysis, I will show that Buddhist philosophers like Buddhaghosa think there is an existential norm of attention, one that commands us not just to pay attention to ourselves and the world properly, but one whereby we are exhorted to attend to ourselves in a way that gradually transforms our cognitive-emotional constitution so that we become liberated from suffering. (shrink)