33 found

Year:

  1.  10
    Three Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice.Naima Chahboun - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):431-452.
    The feasibility constraint on the concept of justice roughly states that a necessary condition for something to qualify as a conception of justice is that it is possible to achieve and maintain given the conditions of the human world. In this paper, I propose three alternative interpretations of this constraint that could be derived from different understandings of the Kantian formula ‘ought implies can’: the ability constraint, the motivational constraint and the institutional constraint. I argue that the three constraints constitute (...)
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  2.  10
    Rational Persuasion, Paternalism, and Respect.Ryan W. Davis - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):513-522.
    In ‘Rational Persuasion as Paternalism', George Tsai argues that providing another person with reasons or evidence can be a morally objectionable form of paternalism. I believe Tsai’s thesis is importantly correct, denying the widely accepted identification of rational persuasion with respectful treatment. In this comment, I disagree about what is centrally wrong with objectionable rational persuasion. Contrary to Tsai, objectionable rational persuasion is not wrong because it undermines the value of an agent’s life. It is wrong because it is contrary (...)
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  3.  2
    Misinformation as Immigration Control.Mollie Gerver - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):495-511.
    It is wrong to force refugees to return to the countries they fled from. It is similarly wrong, many argue, to force migrants back to countries with life-threatening conditions. I argue that it is additionally wrong to help such refugees and migrants voluntarily return whilst failing to inform them of the risks. Drawing on existing data, and original data from East Africa, I describe distinct types of cases where such a wrong arises. In ‘Misinformation Cases’ officials tell refugees that it (...)
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  4. Who Should Intervene?D. Hjorthen Fredrik - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):391-407.
    The objective of this paper is to develop a novel account of how the duty to undertake humanitarian intervention should be assigned to states. It takes as its point of departure two worries about the best existing answer to this question, namely: that it is insensitive to historical considerations, and that its distribution is unfair. Against this background I propose that the duty to intervene should be assigned to states based on the strength of their claim to reject the burden (...)
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  5.  1
    Pluralist Partially Comprehensive Doctrines, Moral Motivation, and the Problem of Stability.A. Mittiga Ross - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):409-429.
    Recent scholarship has drawn attention to John Rawls’s concern with stability—a concern that, as Rawls himself notes, motivated Part III of A Theory of Justice and some of the more important changes of his political turn. For Rawls, the possibility of achieving ‘stability for the right reasons’ depends on citizens possessing sufficient moral motivation. I argue, however, that the moral psychology Rawls develops to show how such motivation would be cultivated and sustained does not cohere with his specific descriptions of (...)
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  6.  15
    A Critical Review of Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory.Liam Moore - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):523-529.
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  7.  9
    Political Integrity and Dirty Hands: Compromise and the Ambiguities of Betrayal.Demetris Tillyris - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):475-494.
    The claim that democratic politics is the art of compromise is a platitude but we seem allergic to compromise in politics when it happens. This essay explores this paradox. Taking my cue from Machiavelli’s claim that there exists a rift between a morally admirable and a virtuous political life, I argue that: a ‘compromising disposition’ is an ambiguous virtue—something which is politically expedient but not necessarily morally admirable; whilst uncongenial to moral integrity, a ‘compromising disposition’ constitutes an essential aspect of (...)
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  8.  8
    Karl Marx and Wilt Chamberlain, Or: Luck Egalitarianism, Exploitation, and the Clean Path to Capitalism Argument.Paul Warren - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):453-473.
    This paper focuses on the claim that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with Marxian theory because it allows for the possibility of a ‘clean path’ to capitalism. It explores the nature and structure of the clean path argument generally and critically discusses luck egalitarian versions of the argument. It contends that the Marxian theory of exploitation can meet the challenge of the clean path to capitalism argument, that luck egalitarianism and the Marxian theory of exploitation are not incompatible, and that luck (...)
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  9.  2
    Worth Your Time: Free Time by Julie Rose.Bamford Douglas - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):387-390.
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  10.  4
    Finding Space for the Truth: Joshua Cohen on Truth and Public Reason.Jethro Butler - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):329-347.
    One of the most distinctive and startling claims of Rawlsian political liberalism is that truth has no place in public political deliberation on matters of basic justice. Joshua Cohen thinks there is a tension between Rawls’s exclusion of truth in public political deliberation and the importance accorded to truth in the conception of morally serious political deliberation held by most citizens. Cohen claims that this apparent tension can be resolved by constructing and introducing a suitably political, non-divisive and neutral, conception (...)
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  11.  3
    Religiosity and Public Reason: The Case of Direct Action Animal Rights Advocacy.J. Hadley - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):299-312.
    Recent social science research indicates that animal rights philosophy plays the functional role of a religion in the lives of the most committed animal rights advocates. In this paper, I apply the functional religion thesis to the recent debate over the place of direct action animal rights advocacy in democratic theory. I outline the usefulness of the functional religion thesis and explain its implications for theorists that call for deliberative theories to be more inclusive of coercive forms of activism.
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  12. In Defence of Conceptual Integration.Rasmus Sommer Hansen - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):349-365.
    According to the ‘integration approach’, interpretations of political concepts should explain that they stand for rights we ought to respect and be both compatible and mutually supporting. I start by clarifying what this means, and proceed to an examination of Ronald Dworkin’s latest argument for value holism. I argue that his argument fails to provide a convincing case for the integration approach. I go on to argue that we nonetheless should accept that interpretations of political concepts should be compatible, because (...)
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  13.  1
    Responsibility and Self-Defense: Can We Have It All?Adam Hosein - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):367-385.
    The role of responsibility in our common-sense morality of self-defense is complex. According to common-sense morality, one can sometimes use substantial, even deadly, force against people who are only minimally responsible for posing a threat to us. The role of responsibility in self-defense is thus limited. However, responsibility is still sometimes relevant. It sometime affects how much force you can use against a threatener: less if they are less responsible and more if they are more responsible. Is there a well-motivated (...)
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  14.  1
    Animal Rescue as Civil Disobedience.Tony Milligan - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):281-298.
    Apparently illegal cases of animal rescue can be either open or covert: ‘open rescue’ is associated with organizations such as Animal Liberation Victoria and Animal Liberation New South Wales; ‘covert rescue’ is associated with the Animal Liberation Front. While the former seems to qualify non-controversially as civil disobedience I argue that at least some instances of the latter could also qualify as civil disobedience just so long as various norms of civility are satisfied. The case for such a move is (...)
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  15.  4
    Animal Activists, Civil Disobedience and Global Responses to Transnational Injustice.Siobhan O’Sullivan, Clare McCausland & Scott Brenton - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):261-280.
    Traditionally, acts of civil disobedience are understood as a mechanism by which citizens may express dissatisfaction with a law of their country. That expression will typically be morally motivated, non-violent and aimed at changing their government’s policy, practice or law. Building on existing work, in this paper we explore the limits of one well-received definition of civil disobedience by considering the challenging case of the actions of animal activists at sea. Drawing on original interviews with advocates associated with Sea Shepherd, (...)
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  16.  7
    Markets in Votes and the Tyranny of Wealth.James Stacey Taylor - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):313-328.
    A standard objection to a market in political votes is that it will enable the rich politically to dominate the poor. If a market in votes was allowed then the poor would be the most likely sellers and the rich the most likely buyers. The rich would thus accumulate the votes of the poor, and so the candidates elected and the policies passed would represent only their interests and not those of the electorate as a whole. To ensure that the (...)
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  17.  41
    On the Theoretical Significance of G. A. Cohen’s Fact-Insensitivity Thesis.Kyle Johannsen - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):245-253.
    G. A. Cohen’s claim that fundamental principles are ‘fact-insensitive’ has not received an especially warm welcome from the philosophical community. While some philosophers have expressed doubts about the plausibility of his claim, others have complained that even if his thesis is true, it is also relatively insignificant. In my paper, I argue that the fact-insensitivity thesis, if true, provides considerable support for value pluralism, and is thus of interest for that reason. Though Cohen himself assumes a plurality of fundamental principles, (...)
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  18.  8
    Time to Battle International Tax Evasion and Avoidance.Kin-wai Leung - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):255-260.
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  19. Brain Privacy, Intimacy, and Authenticity: Why a Complete Lack of the Former Might Undermine Neither of the Latter!Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):227-244.
    In recent years, neuroscience has been making dramatic progress. The discipline holds great promise but also raises a number of important ethical concerns. Among these is the concern that, some day in the distant future, we will have brain scanners capable of reading our minds, thus making our inner thoughts transparent to others. There are at least two reasons why we might regret our resulting loss of privacy. One is, so the argument goes, that this would undermine our ability to (...)
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  20.  2
    Privacy, Neuroscience, and Neuro-Surveillance.Adam D. Moore - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):159-177.
    The beliefs, feelings, and thoughts that make up our streams of consciousness would seem to be inherently private. Nevertheless, modern neuroscience is offering to open up the sanctity of this domain to outside viewing. A common retort often voiced to this worry is something like, ‘Privacy is difficult to define and has no inherent moral value. What’s so great about privacy?’ In this article I will argue against these sentiments. A definition of privacy is offered along with an account of (...)
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  21.  1
    Privacy and Self-Presentation.Juha Räikkä - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):213-226.
    It has often been argued that one of the reasons why we should value privacy is that it enables self-presentation and impression management. According to this approach, it is valuable to be able to govern the impression one gives, as the capacity to govern impressions is an instrument by which people take care of their various social relationships. In this paper I will take a closer look at that approach on privacy, with specific reference to the alleged threats to privacy (...)
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  22.  12
    Neuroscience, Mind Reading and Mental Privacy.Jesper Ryberg - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):197-211.
    Many theorists have expressed the view that current or future applications of neurotechnology may prompt serious ethical problems in terms of privacy. This article concerns the question as to whether involuntary neurotechnological mind reading can plausibly be held to violate a person’s moral right to mental privacy. It is argued that it is difficult to specify what a violation of a right to mental privacy amounts to in a way that is consistent with the fact that we usually regard natural (...)
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  23. Neuroethics and Brain Privacy: Setting the Stage.Jesper Ryberg - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):153-158.
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  24.  2
    Brain Privacy and the Case of Cannibal Cop.Mark Tunick - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):179-196.
    In light of technology that may reveal the content of a person’s innermost thoughts, I address the question of whether there is a right to ‘brain privacy’—a right not to have one’s inner thoughts revealed to others–even if exposing these thoughts might be beneficial to society. I draw on a conception of privacy as the ability to control who has access to information about oneself and to an account that connects one’s interest in privacy to one’s interests in autonomy and (...)
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  25.  17
    Contractualism and the Right to Strike.David A. Borman - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):81-98.
    This paper explores the moral and legal status of the right to strike from a contractualist perspective, broadly construed. I argue that rather than attempting to ground the right to strike in the principle of association, as is commonly done in the ongoing legal debate, it ought to be understood as the assertion of a second-order moral right to self-determination within economic life. The controversy surrounding the right to strike thus reflects and depends upon a more basic question of the (...)
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  26.  14
    Group Virtues: No Great Leap Forward with Collectivism.Sean Cordell - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):43-59.
    A body of work in ethics and epistemology has advanced a collectivist view of virtues. Collectivism holds that some social groups can be subjects in themselves which can possess attributes such as agency or responsibility. Collectivism about virtues holds that virtues are among those attributes. By focusing on two different accounts, I argue that the collectivist virtue project has limited prospects. On one such interpretation of institutional virtues, virtue-like features of the social collective are explained by particular group-oriented features of (...)
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  27.  5
    Hohfeldian Infinities: Why Not to Worry.Visa A. J. Kurki - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):137-146.
    Hillel Steiner has recently attacked the notion of inalienable rights, basing some of his arguments on the Hohfeldian analysis to show that infinite arrays of legal positions would not be associated with any inalienable rights. This essay addresses the nature of the Hohfeldian infinity: the main argument is that what Steiner claims to be an infinite regress is actually a wholly unproblematic form of infinite recursion. First, the nature of the Hohfeldian recursion is demonstrated. It is shown that infinite recursions (...)
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  28.  3
    Fact-Sensitivity and the ‘Defining-Down’ Objection.Andrew Lister - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):117-135.
    This paper aims to clarify what it means for a normative theory to be fact-sensitive, and what might be wrong with such sensitivity, by examining the ways in which ‘justice as fairness’ depends upon facts. While much of the fact-sensitivity of Rawls’s principles consists of innocent limitations of generality, Rawls’s appeal to stability raises a legitimate worry about defining justice down in order to make ‘justice’ stable. If it should turn out that the correct principles of justice are inconsistent with (...)
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  29.  2
    John Hadley: Animal Property Rights: A Theory of Habitat Rights for Wild Animals.Josh Milburn - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):147-151.
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  30.  9
    The Gauthier Contract: Applicable or Not?Jeremy Neill - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):1-22.
    In a 2013 article, David Gauthier noted upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Morals by Agreement that his contractarian approach to morality had found a niche among ‘some of those who remain unpersuaded by either Kantianism or utilitarianism’. In this article I will focus on Pareto optimization and I will argue that the Gauthier contract, even in spite of the article’s revisions, is still less useful for consultation purposes than Gauthier is assuming. To highlight the conceptual distance that (...)
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  31.  5
    A Defense of the Human Right to Adequate Food.Sandra Raponi - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):99-115.
    I argue that recognizing a human right to adequate food and enforcing it as a legal right is an important way to promote and ensure sustainable food security. I consider objections that have been raised against subsistence rights and socio-economic rights, including the argument that such rights are not feasible, that they are not justiciable, and that they are too amorphous—that it is not clear what is required to fulfill these rights and by whom. I defend the right to adequate (...)
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  32.  20
    Second Person Rules: An Alternative Approach to Second-Personal Normativity.Kevin Vallier - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):23-42.
    Stephen Darwall’s moral theory explains moral obligation by appealing to a “second-person” standpoint where persons use second-person reasons to hold one another accountable for their moral behavior. However, Darwall claims obligations obtain if and only if hypothetical persons endorse them, despite tying the second-person standpoint to our real-world moral practices. Focus on hypothetical persons renders critical elements of his account obscure. I solve this problem by distinguishing two ideas quietly working in tandem, the hypothetical endorsement of moral norms and the (...)
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  33.  12
    Sharing in a Common Life: People with Profound and Multiple Learning Difficulties.John Vorhaus - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):61-79.
    There is a view that what we owe to other people is explained by the fact that they are human beings who share in a common human life. There are many ways of construing this explanatory idea, and I explore a few of these here; the aim is to look for constructions that contribute to an understanding of what we owe to people with profound and multiple learning difficulties and disabilities. In exploring the idea of sharing in a common life (...)
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