7 found

Year:

  1.  8
    Naturally and Socially Caused Inequalities: Is the Distinction Relevant for Assessments of Justice?Fernando de los Santos Menéndez - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):95-109.
    In ‘Justice and Nature’, Thomas Nagel claims that social institutions are not responsible for inequalities caused primarily by nature, as opposed to socially caused inequalities. I evaluate this claim. To do so, I distinguish causal responsibility from substantive responsibility. I argue that Nagel rightly identifies conditions in virtue of which social institutions are not substantively responsible for an inequality, but the causal responsibility of nature is irrelevant for that assessment. The natural/social distinction is, I hold, misleading, and I offer two (...)
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  2.  7
    Extrinsic Democratic Proceduralism: A Modest Defence.Chiara Destri - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):41-58.
    Disagreement among philosophers over the proper justification for political institutions is far from a new phenomenon. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that there is substantial room for dissent on this matter within democratic theory. As is well known, instrumentalism and proceduralism represent the two primary viewpoints that democrats can adopt to vindicate democratic legitimacy. While the former notoriously derives the value of democracy from its outcomes, the latter claims that a democratic decision-making process is inherently valuable. This (...)
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  3.  1
    The Impact of Trade Policy Decisions on Social Justice.Sarah C. Goff - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):59-76.
    Some recent trade decisions, such as the U.S.’s imposition of protectionist measures against China, have attracted fervent popular support as well as outrage. Critics of these trade policies argue that they fail to promote society’s own interests. This paper catalogues the different ways that trade decisions can hinder and facilitate a society’s pursuit of social justice. I adopt a simple description of trade liberalization: a society forgoes the use of certain policy options, in order to pursue greater economic productivity through (...)
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  4.  8
    Lying, Misleading, and the Argument From Cultural Slopes.Lisa Herzog - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):77-93.
    This paper discusses a novel kind of argument for assessing the moral significance of acts of lying and misleading. It is based on considerations about valuable social norms that might be eroded by these actions, because these actions function as signals. Given that social norms can play an important role in supporting morality, individuals have a responsibility to preserve such norms and to prevent ‘cultural slopes’ that erode them. Depending on whether there are norms against lying, misleading, or both, and (...)
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  5.  4
    Conflicts and Reasons in Contextual Normative Theory: A Reply to Modood and Thompson.Peter Matthew Hills - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):145-150.
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  6.  12
    Equality of Resources and Non-domination: Can the Two be Compatible?Sotiria Skarveli - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):3-24.
    Social egalitarians hold that one fundamental requirement of the ideal of social equality is that people should stand in relations of non-domination to one another. In the light of this, they reject luck egalitarian principles of justice as incompatible with a society of equals, because the former violate the non-domination requirement. I call this the domination objection. In this paper I examine its force against Dworkinian resource egalitarianism. There are two reasons why equality of resources might be thought to be (...)
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  7.  11
    A Buck-Passing Account of ‘Moral Equality’.Elaine Lok-Lam Yim - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):25-40.
    The belief that all human beings are ‘moral equals’ is widespread within the canon of Western liberal philosophy. However, it is unclear precisely what ‘moral equality’ or its associate terms mean, what grounds our ‘moral equality’ and what the implications of being ‘moral equals’ are. In this paper, I distinguish between three ways of understanding ‘moral equality’: the ‘buck-passing’, ‘explanatory’ and ‘reverse-explanatory’ accounts. The buck-passing account of moral equality is in parallel with Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value. It holds that (...)
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