Towards the end of fragment 1 of his Poem, Parmenides puts forward two methods or paths that a priori explain the same object of study: the existence of the fact or state of being. One of the options leads to the core of the truth and is, therefore, pursued. The other is merely a set of contradictory opinions and is, accordingly, abandoned. These two paths are expounded in the rest of the Poem, while fragment 4 shows that even the erroneous (...) conception, which had to be set aside, can still be fruitful. Once the firm foundation of truth has been established, fragments 10 and 11 propose to widen the inquiry to the whole of reality. This interpretation suggests a rejection of the arrangement of the Poem that has become canonical, and a criticism of the doxographic tradition that since Aristotle has “Platonised” the philosophy of Parmenides by assimilating the “opinions” (which are only points of view) to the “appearances” (in the Platonic sense of the term). (shrink)

The article deals with several issues related to the concept of happiness that emerge from Plato’s triptych: the Gorgias, the Republic and the Laws. The focus is on (1) the question of the alleged overcoming of the eudaimonistic imperative, i.e., natural human pursuit of happiness, in the didactic message of the Republic; (2) the question of to what extent the path of cognition ending in the contemplation of the perfect being is at the same time a strive for the supreme (...) happiness; (3) the dilemma of choosing between a reductive and a cumulative model of complete satisfaction in human life; and finally (4) the problem of affiliative condi­tions of full life satisfaction. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the concept of alētheia, or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic alētheia is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral educa­tion. While the ‘truth’ of a logos indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of (...) alētheia is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is ‘true’ when it promotes virtue (aretē) by being expressive of virtue. The principle stated in the opening passage of the Encomium of Helen, that a speaker has ‘to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, explains precisely this understand­ing of alētheia. (shrink)

In this study, I show how Plato in the Parmenides reprises the encounter with the Phaedo’s Antisthenes, whom I elsewhere assumed to be one of the various tis that get examined in the dialogue. Now, with the Parme­nides’ tis, a similar situation arises: this Antisthenes embodies such characteristics as being “an expert in many areas”, “not without natural gifts” and “capable of following with critical intelligence” the logoi taken from “distant premises.” In the four logoi of the gumnasia, I highlight (...) how Plato, in developing his exercise, proceeds on his own way without openly arguing with any tis and how, despite his detached attitude, his hodos, while interweaving with that of his colleague Antisthenes, enters into a conflict. I then demonstrate how the two paths, despite having a common aporetic beginning (the objections of Gorgias to Parmenides and the testimony of Proclus against Antisthenes), at times overlap and at times are mutually exclusive. From this, I also argue that whoever wrote the dialogue must have been aware that the path, although appar­ently linear and rectilinear, was in fact bumpy and tortuous. (shrink)

Numenius is one of the most important authors who, in the Imperial Age, deal with the figure of Socrates. Socrates is important in the Platon­ic tradition, in particular in the sceptical tradition, when the Socratic dubitative “spirit” of the first Platonic dialogues became important to justify the “suspension of judgement.” Numenius criticises the whole Academic tradition by saying that the Academics (particularly the sceptics) betrayed the original doctrine of Plato and formulated a new image of Socrates. For Numenius, Socrates plays (...) a central role because Plato would have inherited his doctrine. What does Socrates’s doctrine consist in? According to Numenius, Socrates theorised a “doctrine of three Gods” (which can be likely found in the second Platonic epistle) which is strictly bound up with the main aspect of Plato’s thought. In fact, in Numenius’s view, Plato belongs to a genealogy which can be linked to Pythagoras himself. From this perspective, Numenius says that Socrates’s original thought is a theology which also belongs to the Pythagorean tradition and which Plato further developed. For Nume­nius, Socrates is not the philosopher of doubt, but a theologian who first theorised the existence of three levels of reality (Gods), which is also the kernel of Numenius’s metaphysical system. For this reason, Numenius puts Socrates within a theological genealogy that begins with Pythago­ras and continues with Socrates and Plato, and that the Academics and the Socratics failed to understand. (shrink)

The present article consists of two parts. First, we provide some general information on the life and views of Philolaus. This serves as an intro­duction to the second part which offers a new Polish translation of the most important ancient testimonies on Philolaus and the preserved fragments from his book On Nature (the latter are quoted along with the Greek original). According to the most recent research, these fragments are authentic and give an important insight into the Pythagorean and early (...) Greek philosophy. The present selection of Philolaus’ testimonies and fragments has been arranged in a novel and accessible manner. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence on Cyrenaic solipsism and show how and why some views endorsed by the Cyrenaics appear to be committing them to solipsism. After evaluating the fascinating case for Cyrenaic solipsism, the paper shall deal with an (often) underestimated argument on language attributed to the Cyrenaics, whose logic – if I reconstruct it well – implies that after all the Cyrenaics cannot have endorsed a radical solipsism. Yet, by drawing an illuminating parallel (...) with Wittgenstein’s argument on private language and inner sensations, a case is to be made for the Cyrenaics to have subscribed to a sort of ‘residual solipsism’, which in turn helps us to understand the notion of Cyrenaic privacy at a fuller extent. (shrink)