This paper argues that recent advancements in value theory can inform discussions on the interrelation of human rights. More precisely it is argued that the importance of human rights, i.e., the ranking of their priority, cannot be fully accounted for by “more important” and “equally as important”. The concept of “on a par importance” is introduced and it is argued that this concept captures implicitly held intuitions in the debate. Furthermore, with this new conceptual insight, it is possible to justify (...) certain assumptions that previously lacked a justificatory ground. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an argument for the thesis that evil activity, unlike its less extremely immoral counterparts, cannot endow the agent’s life with any measure of meaning. I first review two other important arguments for this thesis that can be drawn from the recent literature. I then articulate my own argument and show how it avoids the problems of these others. According to my argument, meaning-endowing activity cannot be of the worst sort, along any of the basic ways (...) in which we evaluate activity, but evil activity is of the worst sort along one of these ways, namely, the moral one. Because it is grounded in a traditional concept of meaning for which there is much to be said, I note, my argument should hold broad appeal. I also note that my argument is consistent with various contemporary conceptions of evil activity. (shrink)

Age is determined by the amount of time that someone or something has existed. For example, a person born in 1980 and a 1980 vintage wine would each be 40 years old in 2020. Recently, Joona Räsänen has challenged this belief, arguing that in some cases one’s age is not determined by how long one has existed, but by some feature or set of features about one’s biology, experiences, and/or beliefs about themselves. In many cases, age is an ad hoc (...) indicator of physical health, psychological development, and the like, but for Räsänen, it seems age isn’t merely an indicator of such things; it’s derived from these things! Here I argue Räsänen’s alternatives to chronological age are ontologically burdensome and inconsistent with our intuitions in both normal and weird cases. (shrink)

This article critically examines two different answers to the ancient question, why be moral. The first suggests that valid reasons refer to a specific relation between human beings and God. Here, being moral means to treat oneself and others with the respect that is the due of God’s closest friend. The second argues that we have good reasons for being moral when being moral makes us happy (realizes Eudaimonia). The investigation offers two results, one critical and the other constructive. The (...) critical shows how and why both theistic accounts of bestowed human dignity and eudaimonistic accounts offer no relevant reasons for being moral. The constructive result builds on an observation; both accounts presuppose the inherent force of the obligation to act morally right. It shows that the reasons for being moral should be explicated as internal to the very meaning of being moral. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability has become widely acknowledged as a fundamental concept for medical ethics and research ethics, yet rarely considered with respect to ethical assessments of human germline genome editing. A first aim of this paper is to make vulnerability ethics considerations fruitful for issues related to these technical innovations. The possibility of altering the genome promises to overcome forms of vulnerability inherently connected to our existence as physical beings and would hence allow to increase the resilience of human (...) nature or even to move evolution forward by equipping people with new character traits and enhanced capabilities. I suggest a more fine-grained distinction of various applications purposes than the dichotomy of therapeutic and enhancement. I support the rejection of most application purposes as ‘therapeutic’ and claim that framing them as ‘therapeutic’ in the context of the current discursive constellation runs the risk of accentuating existing vulnerabilities. With respect to intergenerational responsibilities, I reject the view that editing the germline necessarily leads to corrupt intergenerational relations based on which it must be categorically excluded. I conclude that it is nevertheless important to take a very close look at the challenges that arise, especially from a vulnerability perspective, before irreversible facts are created overhastily. (shrink)

This essay explores how vulnerability, understood not as precarity but as capacious responsiveness, much as the Philosopher Judith Butler identifies it, and recognition are key moral concepts that are prior conditions for the expression of conscience. Appreciating Thomas Aquinas' argument that conscience is neither a power or a habit, but rather an act, the essay argues that Aquinas' inclination synderesis, that prompts us to the good and away from evil, functions in a way similar to vulnerability. Fundamentally, vulnerability prompts us (...) to recognize the neighbor who needs our response. (shrink)

My focus on vulnerability and bioethics – which acknowledges but goes beyond mainstream feminist ethics - will take a phenomenological perspective that understands the self as having no meaning or existence beyond its embodiment. As such we are always open, and therefore vulnerable, to the constant changes of embodied experience. The transformations in embodiment are both necessary for development and continuous over the life course, but it is only when something breaks the cycle of normative development that the intimation of (...) vulnerability and disorder arise. Corporeal disorder operates in a highly individual and differentiated way as it manifests, for example, in the experience of disability, pain, ageing and dying. These are not exceptional moments of vulnerability in a life otherwise secure and predictable, but they do clearly set out the limits of the western imaginary, and more particularly of modern western biomedicine and conventional healthcare. In offering a critique of the positivist enterprise of biomedicine, I want to suggest a different understanding of the embodiment that has radical implications for bioethics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the evolving discussion surrounding vulnerability and flourishing. This conversation has gained significant relevance in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and amid global uncertainties, including the effects of violence and war-trauma. The central idea here is to reconsider vulnerability and flourishing not simply as universal experiences tied to one's own humanity and social context, but rather as co-existing, interdependent, and contingent aspects of human existence. Without proposing that human flourishing is conditioned by (...) vulnerability, this perspective seeks to challenge the notion that vulnerability and flourishing are fundamentally separate. The following discussion will not only examine vulnerability and flourishing as theoretical concepts but will also address their practical significance as integral components of the human experience, and how they intersect in a real-life situation. It's important to note that both vulnerability and flourishing are influenced by specific contexts and circumstances, including personal, social, economic and cultural factors. In the course of this discussion, I will provide examples to illustrate these points. The first section will focus on vulnerability, while the second will delve into the concept of flourishing from a Christian perspective, drawing on Miroslav Volf's ideas about a flourishing life. (shrink)