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  1. Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger.Nicole Dular - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):29-51.
    Much work in moral epistemology is devoted to explaining apparent asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology. These asymmetries include testimony, expertise, and disagreement. Surprisingly, these asymmetries have been addressed in isolation from each other, and the explanations offered have been piecemeal, rather than holistic. In this paper, I provide the only unified account on offer of these asymmetries. According to this unified account, moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs. This means, roughly, that it is typically (...)
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    Stakes-Shifting Cases Reconsidered—What Shifts?Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):53-76.
    It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view that one’s epistemic (...)
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    On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism (...)
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  4. Gettier Beliefs and Serious Beliefs.James Simpson - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):113-118.
    In a recent exchange in the pages of this journal, John Biro responds to Gabor Forrai’s argument against Biro’s argument that in most, if not all, Gettier cases the belief condition, contra popular opinion, isn’t satisfied. In this note, I’ll argue that Biro’s response to Forrai satisfactorily resolves the first of Forrai’s two central objections to Biro’s argument that the belief condition isn’t satisfied in most, if not all, Gettier cases. But Biro’s response leaves mostly unaddressed the most plausible way (...)
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    Luck, Knowledge, and Epistemic Probability.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):97-109.
    Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account. He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck, which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen’s (...)
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