An Argument for the Many

Authors
Robert Williams
University of Leeds
Abstract
If one believes vagueness to be an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many: in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many 'mountain-candidates', all, apparently, with more or less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all these billions of mountain-candidates are mountains. I argue that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis's proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites paradox
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00157.x
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Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles About Material Objects.Bradley Rettler - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
The Hard Problem of the Many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.

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