Animal Minds, Skepticism and the Affective Stance


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External descriptions, which approach animals via external mechanisms rather than internal mental states, have gained a prominent position. However, according to strong objectivism, attention needs to be placed on the presumptions that lay behind given beliefs. When applied to the topic of animal minds, it reveals that perhaps inter-nal rather than external descriptions would offer a fruitful option. This claim is sup-ported by the Wittgensteinian criticism of skepticism, which seeks to avoid “deflection” and brings forward an “affective stance”. Still, in order to avoid relativ-ism and conservatism, internal descriptions and the affective stance need to place em-phasis on the epistemological ramifications behind beliefs concerning animal minds, and centralise the animal as the reference point of inquiry.
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References found in this work BETA

The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan & Mary Midgley - 1986 - The Personalist Forum 2 (1):67-71.
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?Sandra Harding - 1991 - Cornell University Press.
Animal Liberation.Bill Puka & Peter Singer - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):557.

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