Authors
Ali Abasnezhad
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
A naïve perspective on the world suggests that the world we live in is full of vague objects. In this chapter, a version of the supervaluationist framework will be proposed to provide a systematic conception of such a naïve perspective. Precisifications of a vague object will be characterized as objects that, were they actual objects, every determinate truth about the vague object would be true about them. It will be argued that this view is more effective than other versions of supervaluationism at accommodating commonsensical and metaphysical considerations. The view leaves room for vague identity as a kind of “no fact of the matter.” Thus, Evans’ argument against ontic vagueness fails in a natural way.
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