Presuppositions and common ground

Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):523-538 (2008)

Abstract
This paper presents problems for Stalnaker’s common ground theory of presupposition. Stalnaker (Linguist and Philos 25:701–721, 2002) proposes a 2-stage process of utterance interpretation: presupposed content is added to the common ground prior to acceptance/rejection of the utterance as a whole. But this revision makes presupposition difficult to distinguish from assertion. A more fundamental problem is that the common ground theory rests on a faulty theory of assertion—that the essence of assertion is to present the content of an utterance as new information. Many examples are presented of utterances which are felicitous but not informative in this way.
Keywords Presupposition  Assertion  Common ground
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Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.1007/s10988-008-9048-8
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References found in this work BETA

Common Ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
On the Representation of Context.Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (1):3-19.
What is Presupposition Accommodation, Again?Kai von Fintel - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):137--170.

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Citations of this work BETA

Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.
Prospective Interpretation.Zoltán Szabó - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1605-1616.

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