Catharine Abell
Oxford University
It is generally recognised that an adequate resemblance-based account of depiction must specify some standard of correctness which explains how a picture’s content differs from the content we would attribute to it purely on the basis of resemblance. For example, an adequate standard should explain why stick figure drawings do not depict emaciated beings with gargantuan heads. Most attempts to specify a standard of correctness appeal to the intentions of the picture’s maker. However, I argue that the most detailed such attempt to date is incomplete. I argue that an adequate standard can be given only if one construes a picture’s content as being pictorially implicated, in a way analogous to that in which Grice explains an utterance’s meaning as being conversationally implicated. I propose a theory of pictorial implicature and use it as the basis for an intention-based standard of correctness. I show how this standard is able to explain both the ways in which the content of pictures differs from the content we would attribute to them solely on the basis of resemblance, and how we are able to apply an intention-based standard of correctness even though we lack any independent knowledge of the intentions of pictures’ makers.
Keywords pragmatics  conversational implicature  depiction  pictures  interpretation  resemblance
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DOI 10.1111/j.0021-8529.2005.00181.x
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References found in this work BETA

Depiction.Christopher Peacocke - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):383-410.
Pictorial Representation: A Matter of Resemblance.Karen Neander - 1987 - British Journal of Aesthetics 27 (3):213-226.
Natural Generativity and Imitation.Crispin Sartwell - 1991 - British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (1):58-67.
Passing Likeness.Tony Skillen - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (2):73-93.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Canny Resemblance.Catharine Abell - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (2):183-223.
Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.

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Pictorial Realism.Catharine Abell - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):1 – 17.


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