Are empirical evidence claims a priori?

Abstract
An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, if true, confirms h is an empirical, not a priori, fact
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/46.4.447
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,300
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic.Michael Huemer - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
A Priori Knowledge.George Bealer - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:1-12.
Is Apriority Context-Sensitive?Nenad Miščević - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):55-80.
Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism.George Bealer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection.Elliott Sober - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):571 - 589.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
260 ( #13,515 of 2,193,280 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,647 of 2,193,280 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature