The Book of Evidence

Oxford University Press (2001)
Abstract
What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, and characterizes the latter using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is then applied to philosophical and historical issues. Solutions are provided to the "grue," "ravens," "lottery," and "old-evidence" paradoxes, and to a series of questions. These include whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight, whether individual hypotheses or entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support, what counts as a scientific discovery, and what sort of evidence is required for it. The historical questions include whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for the existence of molecules, what type of evidence J. J. Thomson offered for the existence of the electron, and whether, as is usually supposed, he really discovered the electron. Achinstein proposes answers in terms of the concepts of evidence introduced. As the premier book in the fabulous new series Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science, this volume is essential for philosophers of science and historians of science, as well as for statisticians, scientists with philosophical interests, and anyone curious about scientific reasoning.
Keywords Evidence
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Reprint years 2003, 2004
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Call number BC173.A34 2001
ISBN(s) 0195171713   9780195171716  
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Citations of this work BETA
The Perils of Perrin, in the Hands of Philosophers.C. van Fraassen Bas - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):5 - 24.
The Problem of Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (4):425-436.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.

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Similar books and articles
Stronger Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
Explanation V. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?Peter Achinstein - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:156 - 164.
Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori?Peter Achinstein - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
Carnap and Achinstein on Evidence.Frederick M. Kronz - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):151 - 167.
Discussion Note: Positive Relevance Defended.Sherrilyn Roush - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (1):110-116.
Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence.Steven Gimbel - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.
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