Why philosophical theories of evidence are (and ought to be) ignored by scientists

Philosophy of Science 67 (3):192 (2000)
Abstract
There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation
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DOI 10.1086/392818
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