ZUSAMMENFASSUNGEs werden aus der Theologiegeschichte vier Typen von Willensfreiheit erhoben: der Typus liberum arbitrium , der Typus des nominalistischen Willensbegriffs , der Typus des mystischen Willensbegriffs und der Typus der Rechtfertigungslehre. Die ersten drei Typen werden psychologisch interpretiert im Sinne der Ichentwicklung als präautonom, autonom und transautonom. Nach der Darstellung und Diskussion der gegenwärtigen neurowissenschaftlichen Debatte um die Willensfreiheit wird ein systemisch verstandener Personbegriff als Brückenkonzept vorgeschlagen.SUMMARYFour types of free will are identified from the history of theology: The type of the liberum arbitrium, the type of nominalism, the type of mysticism and the type of justification. For the first three types a psychological interpretation in terms of pre-autonomy, autonomy, and trans-autonomy is offered, based on self-transcendence as a religious feature. Two basically opposing interpretations of the same empirical data favoring free will and favoring a non-free will are discussed and compared with the theological tradition. A new notion of the person, based on the system theory, is suggested as a bridging concept to link the theological and neuro-scientific ideas of free will
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DOI 10.1515/nzst.2011.009
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