Concepts and nativism


Abstract
Jerry Fodor has argued that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. I argue against this position, but not, as other have done, on the grounds that the arguments against lexical decomposition upon which Fodor relies are flawed. Rather, I argue that even if lexical concepts cannot be decomposed, the possession conditions for having lexical concepts are nonetheless not innately satisfied.
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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Innate Mind Need Not Be Within.Riin Kõiv - 2020 - Acta Analytica:1-21.

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