Causal theories of mental content

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010)
Authors
Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
Fred Adams
University of Delaware
Abstract
Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs cause the mental representations of dogs.
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Propositional Content in Signalling Systems.Jonathan Birch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.
The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
Teleosemantics, Infotel-Semantics and Circularity.Marc Artiga - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):583-603.
Descartes Among the Robots.Graham White - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (2):179-202.

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