Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437 (1997)

Fred Adams
University of Delaware
Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.
Keywords Asymmetry  Causation  Content  Dependence  Language  Fodor, J
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1997.tb00845.x
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Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.

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