Grice on indicative conditionals

Grice's arguments that ordinary language indicative conditionals are logically equivalent to material conditionals are criticized. It is agreed that 'indirectness conditions' going beyond the material conditional can "sometimes" be detached' from ordinary language conditionals, but it is argued that this is not always possible. An example in which a speaker who knows that some mushrooms are non-poisonous tells a hearer "if you eat those mushrooms you will be poisoned", causing the hearer not to eat the mushrooms, is discussed, and it is argued that this utterance should be regarded as factually unsatisfactory', and therefore, by Grice's own standards, false.
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Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language.Stephen Neale - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):509 - 559.

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