How Colour Qualia Became a Problem

Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):14-25 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have problem intuitions about consciousness, why we intuitively think that conscious experience cannot be scientifically explained. In his discussion of this problem, David Chalmers briefly considers the possibility of giving a 'genealogical' solution, according to which problem intuitions are 'accidents of cultural history' (2018, p. 33). Chalmers' response to this solution is largely dismissive. In this paper, we defend the viability of a genealogical solution. Our strategy is to focus on a particular problem intuition: the thought that the phenomenal character of colour experience is irreducibly subjective. We use the history of the inverted spectrum thought experiment as a window into how various philosophers have thought about colour experience. Our genealogy reveals that problem intuitions about colour are not timeless, but instead arise in a specific historical context, one that, in large part, explains why we have these intuitions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,923

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-21

Downloads
81 (#211,198)

6 months
13 (#219,505)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jacob Browning
New York University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references