Husker du?

Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94 (2011)
Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.
Keywords Sven Bernecker  Closure  Knowledge  Propositional memory  False memory  Dispositional belief  Gappy proposition
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9663-4
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,545
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Memory: A Philosophical Study.Sven Bernecker - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Remembering Entails Knowing.Andrew Moon - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2717-2729.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
56 ( #99,503 of 2,210,861 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #115,658 of 2,210,861 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature