Information and knowledge à la Floridi

Metaphilosophy 41 (3):331-344 (2010)
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Abstract: Luciano Floridi has impressively applied the concept of information to problems in semantics and epistemology, among other areas. In this essay, I briefly review two areas where I think one may usefully raise questions about some of Floridi's conclusions. One area is in the project to naturalize semantics and Floridi's use of the derived versus nonderived notion of semantic content. The other area is in the logic of information and knowledge and whether knowledge based on information necessarily supports closure, in every instance. I suggest that it does not and, thereby, raise a challenge to Floridi's logic of being informed.



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Fred Adams
University of Delaware

Citations of this work

The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised.Patrick Allo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):417-434.
Logical Maximalism in the Empirical Sciences.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2021 - In Parusniková Zuzana & Merritt David (eds.), Karl Popper's Science and Philosophy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 171-184.
Information, Cognition, and Objectivity.Nir Fresco - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):251-268.
Extended control systems: A theory and its implications.Hunter R. Gentry - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):345-373.

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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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