On the cluster account of art

British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (4):379-385 (2003)
The cluster account of art is a purportedly non-definitional account of art, inspired by Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance, and recently defended by Berys Gaut. Gaut does not provide good reasons to think that art is not definable, and his approach to possible counterexamples to the cluster account would, applied consistently, preclude this. The cluster account's theory of error, its resources for accounting for borderline cases, and its heuristic usefulness are not impressive. Reasons strong enough to warrant accepting the cluster account, it is concluded, have not been given
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DOI 10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.4.379
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