Reply to Russow

Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65 (1993)
Abstract
In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not exist.
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DOI 10.1080/09515089308573078
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References found in this work BETA
A Modal Argument for Narrow Content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
Fodor's Modal Argument.Frederick R. Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
Fodor, Adams, and Causal Properties.L. M. Russow - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.

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Citations of this work BETA
Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.Bryan Frances - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.

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Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them?Kam-Yuen Cheng - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
What Narrow Content is Not.Ned Block - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
Fodor, Adams, and Causal Properties.L. M. Russow - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.
Individualism and the New Logical Connections Argument.Anthony B. Dardis - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):83-102.
Fodor's Modal Argument.Frederick R. Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.

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