Resurrecting the tracking theories

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221 (2005)
Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial
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DOI 10.1080/00048400500111030
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
Kevin Wallbridge (2016). Sensitivity and Higher‐Order Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.

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