Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40 (2004)

Fred Adams
University of Delaware
There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? Dretske and Tye disagree on this issue. We try to settle the dispute in favor of Dretske's theory
Keywords Externalism  Internalism  Metaphysics  Representation  Dretske, F  Tye, M
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DOI 10.1080/0951508042000286712
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Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.

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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.

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