Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40 (2004)
There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? Dretske and Tye disagree on this issue. We try to settle the dispute in favor of Dretske's theory
|Keywords||Externalism Internalism Metaphysics Representation Dretske, F Tye, M|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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