Synthese 188 (2):179-196 (2012)
Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories of knowledge
|Keywords||Contrastive statements Closure Equivalence Distribution Dretske Nozick Hawthorne Vogel|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology.Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge.Kevin Wallbridge - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection.Luciano Floridi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050.
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