Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge

Logos and Episteme 7 (1):67-73 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Reply to Adams and Clarke.Tristan Haze - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):221-225.
Rejoinder to Haze.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):227-230.
Still Stuck on the Backward Clock.John Nicholas Williams - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):243-269.
Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
Beat the (Backward) Clock.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361.
Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke.Clarke Murray & Fred Adams - 2003 - In P. Weingartner W. Loffler (ed.), Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 18-19.
The Resurrection Shuffle.Murray Clarke & Fred Adams - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2):207-222.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-02

Downloads
1,101 (#14,045)

6 months
226 (#15,101)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Fred Adams
University of Delaware
Murray Clarke
Concordia University

Citations of this work

Against global method safety.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5101-5116.
Reply to Adams and Clarke.Tristan Haze - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):221-225.
Rejoinder to Haze.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):227-230.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Resurrecting the tracking theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.

View all 6 references / Add more references