Particulars and acquaintance

Philosophy of Science 34 (3):251-259 (1967)
Philosophers who hold that the correct ontological analysis of things includes both properties and particulars have often been pressed to "show" the particular. If we are not acquainted with them, it is argued, then we should not suppose that they exist. I argue that, while we do have good and sufficient reasons for supposing there to be particulars, we are not acquainted with them. To suppose that we are acquainted with them is to treat particulars as if they were properties and to fail to realize how radically different particulars are from properties. The relevance of these matters to some considerations of "simplicity" and the principles of empiricism is explored
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DOI 10.1086/288156
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Richard Fumerton (2005). Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):121–138.

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