Contextualism and fallibility: pragmatic encroachment, possibility, and strength of epistemic position
Synthese 188 (2):247-272 (2012)
A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do not. Given the knowledge norm of assertion, if one recommendation is preferable to the other, the result favors the preferred recommendation's account of knowledge. In the final section, I offer a unification of these criticisms centering on the contextualist use of 'epistemic position'. Their use imposes on threshold notions of justification, warrant, or knowledge tests that are suitable only to unlimited comparative or scalar notions like confidence or certainty and places them at one with an important strand of sceptical reasoning
|Keywords||Contextualism Invariantism Raised costs of errors Possibilities (counter-possibilities) Lewis Cohen DeRose Unger Pragmatics Fallibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Pragmatic Encroachment: It's Not Just About Knowledge. McGrath & Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Methods and Contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):526-534.
The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology.Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.
Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manœvres.Tim Black - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
Pragmatic Encroachment in Accounts of Epistemic Excellence.Anne Baril - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3929-3952.
Added to index2012-10-03
Total downloads86 ( #60,108 of 2,163,866 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #39,854 of 2,163,866 )
How can I increase my downloads?